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Abstract 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was an experiment and a radical 
departure from policies in creating corporations with all shareholders being equal.  The 
replication of publically traded corporate governance has created frustrations, inequities 
and unintended consequences for thousands of Natives which can be righted only if the 
experiment is continued.  This is not a history of land claims but an attempt to unravel a 
tangled web of leadership, political, and rural development issues that are intimately 
interwoven with the ANCSA corporations.  This paper is not about second guessing the 
leadership of the movement but about the need to understand how difficult it is to create 
rural development on corporate lands whose shareholders may or may not be residents 
and may not be Native.   
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Chapter 1 
Prelude 
Imagine this, the year 2071.  Robert, a student in an Alaska Native studies class 
on the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(ANCSA) on December 18, 1971, sits quietly as the professor lectures on the 
accomplishment of an uneducated class of aboriginal subsistence hunters, fishers, and 
gathers.  Robert is an Alaska Native, born and raised in a village along the Kuskokwim 
River.  He is the first member of his big, extended family to go off to college.  Now in his 
third year, Robert, a 3.7 GPA student, is thinking about what to do after graduation with 
a business degree from the University of Alaska Fairbanks.  According to the 1970 
census, his home village had a population of 100 people.  In 2071 the population is 
estimated to be 500 year-round residents, almost all are of Yupik Eskimo heritage.  
Traditionally, the residents have hunted and fished for generations.  Today, most of the 
people live in subsidized housing and rarely fish because the permits are owned by non-
residents from Washington state and California.  It is a big-boat fishery and the fishers 
rarely come ashore to visit with the locals even though they fish right off shore of the 
village.  Subsistence fishing is open later in the season after the Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game determines whether the quota for the commercial fishery has been met.   
The commercial fishers, though small in number and getting smaller as more 
permits are accumulated by the successful fishers, are an influential lobbying group 
whose connections extend throughout state and federal legislative offices.  
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 Though the residents live and shop in local stores, they seldom interact with the 
750 mine workers who live in dormitory-style housing three miles from the village.  The 
mine is owned by a trans-national resources corporation headquartered in Hong Kong 
with public relations offices in Anchorage, a city with close to a million residents. 
 When the workers from the mine do come to the village via the dirt road that 
connects the mine with the village’s airport, they sometimes shop in the store and pay the 
8% sales tax on the cigarettes, candy bars, and soda pop they buy.  The airport is the 
only connection the mine has for moving supplies and people to the outside world. 
 The mine produces an ore which was determined to be of value in 2021, one year 
after the village corporation, organized pursuant to ANCSA, sold the surface of 120,000 
acres to a company owned by a wealthy lodge owner who said he wanted to preserve the 
area for hunting and fishing for his guests.  He promised hunting and fishing rights to all 
of the village corporation shareholders.  When the surface estate was sold, there were 50 
village corporation shareholders who lived in the village, owning between four and 15 
shares each.  The other 150 village corporation shareholders lived in Anchorage, the 
Mat-Su Borough, and the Lower 48.  The shareholders voted in favor of selling the 
surface estate on the promise that the village board of directors would redistribute the 
profits of $10 million to the shareholders.  In 1971, when ANCSA became law, there were 
100 shareholders in the village, almost all were subsistence users and hunted, fished, and 
gathered at what became the mine site. 
 The lodge owner did not note in the sales documents between his lodge company 
and the village corporation that the land acquired would preserve hunting and fishing 
 
 
 
3 
rights for residents or shareholders.  The law firm received their fees from the proceeds 
of the sale. 
 The subsurface estate is owned by the regional corporation and under 7(i) of 
ANCSA, 70% of the profits must be distributed to the owners of original shares of all 
regional corporations.  The other 203 village corporations receive their share of the 
mine’s profits directly and the villages boards determine how to use their pro rata 
distributions. 
 There were approximately 65,000 ANCSA original shareholders in 1971, as of 
2071 there are over 180,000 and most of them live in the lower 48 states.  Each share is 
worth approximately $100 annually in dividends from the mine. Thus, if an ANCSA 
shareholder owns 100 original shares, he or she would be entitled to receive 
approximately $10,000 each year in dividends from the mine which is three miles from 
Robert’s three bedroom aging, poorly insulated home that he shares with five brothers 
and sisters and his parents. It is in a low-income Native American housing project next to 
the airport. Robert lives in the village during the summer when he is not attending UAF. 
Robert owns no ANCSA original shares. 
 There are 50 major mines on Alaska Native corporations’ lands throughout the 
state of Alaska.  All of the regional corporations are joint venture partners with the 
transnational corporations.  The regional corporations have no management 
responsibilities for the mining operations on the Alaska Native corporation lands. 
 In St. Louis, Missouri, Tom Smith IV is a 21-year-old student who lives with his 
parents in a wealthy section of the city while he attends St. Louis University.  He owns 
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100 original shares he inherited from his grandfather who inherited the shares from his 
maternal great-grandmother who was one-eighth Yupik Eskimo.  She was born in Ohio 
and never visited Alaska.  Tom is one-sixty-fourth Yupik Eskimo, never been to Alaska, 
has no interest in Yupik culture and traditions, and receives an average of $75,000 a year 
from his original shares under the profit-sharing provision of ANCSA. 
 Robert does not own original shares in either the village corporation or the 
regional corporation, although his oldest sister who lives in Seattle, Washington, owns 
5 shares in the village corporation she inherited from a great aunt. 
 Robert’s grandfather had 100 life estate shares in the regional corporation but 
they were not ANCSA original shares. The 100 life estate shares were only for the 
duration of his life.  When Robert’s grandfather died, the life estate shares went back to 
the regional corporation and never reissued. 
 Robert is 21 years old and a Yupik Eskimo.  He does not own any ANCSA shares 
but he can Eskimo dance and speaks Yupik fluently.  Yesterday, December 17, 2071, the 
largest natural resource extraction corporation in the world announced that they had 
signed an agreement with another regional corporation to build another mine (the 87th 
on Alaska Native corporate lands) that would rival Pebble by 15 times.  
 On the this day, December 21, 2071, a hundred years after the signing of ANCSA, 
Robert, sitting quietly in his class at UAF, wonders what were the Alaska Native Leaders 
thinking, what were they thinking way back in 1971?  Was ANCSA a fair, just, and 
equitable land settlement that his great-grandparents fought so hard for and placed so 
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much hope in so that the Alaska Natives of the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta would live better 
lives and would never again be taken advantage of? 
A Complex Puzzle of Intent, Leadership, and Corporate Democracy 
 ANCSA is a complex puzzle with the parts changing shapes as if it was water 
flowing downstream twisting and bending around obstacles and barriers.  Sometimes the 
Settlement Act appears as placid as a midsummer lake.  At different times ANCSA seems 
without logic.  No matter what public policy theories and opinions are attached to 
ANCSA, its complexities continue to daunt those who seek to define a big, bold, 
experiment sought in quest of a fair, just and equitable settlement of indigenous land 
claims.  
 There is no doubt that ANCSA is considered a great success. What has been 
accomplished by the many who have been involved throughout the decades has been 
done facing obstacles that few would have had the stamina to endure.  The present focus 
of the original intent of ANCSA corporate governance, however, is often blurred.  The 
methodology used was to bring into sharper focus the original intent of Alaska Natives 
during that time period immediately before and after passage of the Settlement Act.  To 
rediscover what Alaska Natives wanted and expected was done using sources that were 
written and published during that time of hope and expectations.  
 Newspapers are great resources for interpreting and understanding the feelings 
and motivations of current events.  Periodicals such as The Tundra Times and The New 
York Times are valuable in that they reported in depth what was happening in 1971.  
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Books and government studies published within the time frame are also valuable 
resources and those published after were less so. 
 The methodology used was intended to be a rediscovery of knowledge - while old 
- is new and refreshing for those who do not know.  That group is made up of the 
generations of Alaska Natives who were born after December 18, 1971.  The ‘afterborn’ 
Alaska Natives are the ones who are most in need of this new knowledge of original 
intent of ANCSA.  And, it is they who have the most to gain and the most to lose 
because, after all, they are as Alaska Native as those who were born before ANCSA 
became law.   
 In 1971 ANCSA was hailed as a tremendous achievement for Alaska’s Eskimos, 
Indians, and Aleuts.  Most of them lacked the professional experience and college 
degrees assumed to be necessary for success in the corporate system.  Civil rights 
activism and opposition to the war in Vietnam had created a climate for social justice and 
change.  With the discovery of black gold at Prudhoe Bay, the mixture of oil and politics 
became a major part of the catalyst for settlement of the land claims.  There was, 
however, major opposition in Alaska from political and business leaders who blamed the 
filing of land claims with the United States Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall as 
stopping the development of the state’s rich oil fields.  In a Los Angeles Times Service 
story which appeared in the St. Petersburg Times on October 30, 1969, Mark Ringstad, 
president of the 3,000-member Alaska Miners Association opposed the land claims 
proposals.   
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I really don't think they (Alaska Natives) should be entitled to thousands 
and thousands of acres just because their fathers walked over the land, 
Ringstad said.  Archeologists say they've found Norwegian bones on this 
land - does that mean Norwegians should claim the land?  I can't buy this. 
(St. Petersburg Times, 1969)  
 Alaska Native land claims was a controversial issue in the 1970 Alaska 
gubernatorial election.  Governor Keith Miller who succeeded Walter Hickel when he 
resigned to become President Nixon's Secretary of Interior faced former two-term 
Governor William A. Egan.  Egan, a Democrat, won the election with strong support 
from Alaska Natives.   
 The continuing, developing history of a corporate system as part of the land 
claims settlement is now being told from a number of perspectives that range from 
President Nixon’s sympathetic feelings for Indians to an aging Tlingit who, as a lawyer, 
pushed for jobs and economic opportunity for Indians in the 1930s.  There are many and 
perhaps there will be many more stories and recollections as a bursting population of 
Alaska Natives born after December 18, 1971 who are ineligible to own ANCSA original 
shares unless by inheritance or gifting question the system that is sure to create haves and 
have-nots. 
 While it is important to recall some of the history of ANCSA, this is not a 
historical telling of it.  It is, rather, an effort to unravel a tangled web of leadership, 
political, and rural development issues that are intimately interwoven with ANCSA.  
There is no right or wrong perspective but there is a common theme throughout and that 
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is the corporate system was just an idea that took root as an experiment.  In a paper 
delivered at the 53rd Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, James D. Linxwiler (2007, 
p. 2) wrote that ANCSA “was an experiment in resolving aboriginal title in Alaska.  
Congress sought to resolve claims of aboriginal title without resorting to tribes, 
reservations, and litigation.”   
 Though ANCSA was experimental, there have been few changes to corporate 
governance either in federal or state statute.  “Under ANCSA Sec. 7(g) the 12 regional 
corporations are organized under existing Alaska corporate law, which contains a number 
of special provisions for ANCSA corporations.” (Linxwiler, 1969, p. 15)  It was then, in 
December 1971, that the professional lawyers, almost all of whom were non-Alaska 
Native, superimposed their interpretations of the experiment on the Alaska Natives who 
suddenly became equal shareholders in privately-held corporations simply because they 
had to because ANCSA created corporations.  
 Political and Alaska Native leaders grappled from the beginning over what kind 
of settlement would work best for the Alaska Natives. What would best protect traditional 
hunting, fishing, and gathering and at the same time usher the Alaska Natives into a 
modern era.  The first concept of Alaska Native subsistence rights fell as money, land, 
and a corporate system took root over hunting and fishing.  
 The idea of creating a corporation or corporations for Alaska Natives was a 
blatant attempt to avoid creation of reservation-styled land settlements familiar to the 
western states.  Many argued that the Indian reservation system in the Lower 48 had 
created pockets of poverty and there was little support for creating such a system in a 
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state about to enrich it’s treasury from oil royalties.  Among those who made the case 
against reservations was William Paul.  In his autobiography, Paul, a southeast Tlingit 
and a lawyer, said he urged the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the U.S. Congress to 
allow ‘groups of Indians’ without regard to tribal affiliation to organize corporations.  
(Paul, 2003, p. 78)   
 While many assume President Richard Nixon’s support of a large and generous 
settlement was because of his support of oil development, there may be another reason.  
It is often said that Nixon had a soft spot in heart for American Indians.  Maybe so, but in 
Donald Craig Mitchell’s second book (2001) on Alaska Natives, Take My Land Take My 
Life, he writes of a touching moment in Nixon’s impromptu speech to a Blue Lake 
gathering of Taos Pueblo Indian people in March 1971 that gives credence to many who 
believe the legislation Nixon signed into law was returning part of Carson National 
Forest to the Taos Pueblo.  Mitchell quotes a Nixon aide who was there and described it 
as in the following way:   
As he walked into the room (Nixon had) said, ‘I’m going to say ten words, 
sign this thing and get out.’  But he saw the people there, the elders, and 
he stood up and went on and on and on and on and on.  This was a thing 
that was lying close to his heart.   (Mitchell, 2001, p. 398)  
There probably would not have been a billion dollars and a 44 million-acre settlement 
without Nixon’s support. 
 The complexities should come as no surprise in this introduction.  This paper is 
not about second guessing the leaders of the land claims movement but about the need to 
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understand how difficult it is to create rural development on corporate lands whose 
shareholders may or may not be residents and may or may not be Alaska Native.  It is an 
attempt to explain the words ‘corporate democracy’ and what it means to the largely rural 
population of Alaska Natives who depend on subsistence activities to feed families and 
carry on cultures and traditions in an ever-increasing world whose population hungers for 
middle-class status.  The rapidly increasing world population and the motivation to 
achieve middle-class status stress available natural resource reserves worldwide.  This 
drives the free-market and in the effort to satisfy the hunger, other resources will 
probably be tapped and new uses for minerals probably will be discovered.  A good 
example of uses for old minerals is uranium.  It was not until theory was put to practical 
use with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the entire world was made aware 
of the value of uranium.  Later, energy uses from uranium was discovered. 
 When all is said and done, the lands of the Arctic will most likely be explored and 
developed for three reasons: firstly, global climate change has made the Northwest 
Passage more likely to be used for commercial shipping of natural resources and products 
from Europe, Asia, and North America; secondly, the Northwest Passage will reduce the 
need for long surface transportation.  Harbors and ports will be built in the Arctic where 
none were needed before and not then economically feasible.  Thirdly, the Arctic is 
sparsely inhabited.  Alaska, Siberia, Greenland, Iceland, and the Nunavut Territory in 
Canada have few inhabitants and some have assumed that means there will be less 
conflict and confrontation with resource development corporations. 
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 Most of the village corporations still have their land holdings which is only the 
surface estate.  The subsurface is owned by the regional corporations.  Though some 
village corporations have sold their surface estate, they cannot sell what they did not own.  
Thus, the regional corporation still owns the subsurface estate that is subject to 7(i) of 
ANCSA.  Under 7(i) each regional corporation is required to share with all the other 
regional corporations 70% of all revenues derived from timber resources and the 
subsurface estate. (Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688, 693, 1971) That section applies only 
to owners of original shares and not to the life estate shares created by several of the 
corporations for those born after December 18, 1971. 
 All owners of original shares have a stake in the profits from any development of 
the mineral estate in an area approximately the size of the state of Missouri.  The stake is 
the subsurface estate that is also eyed by resource development corporations, both small 
and transnational.  In an information summary circulated by the Alaska Miners 
Association their interest in the mineral estate is clearly laid out.   
Alaska regional and village corporations are a unique form of private 
corporations.  Their lands are owned in fee simple and can be mined or 
developed under agreements just as any other private lands in this 
country.  Additionally, the Alaska Native corporations want 
development on their lands and they encourage minerals exploration.  
These lands were often selected because of their high mineral potential 
and because there has been relatively little exploration or development 
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in Alaska, the opportunities are tremendous. (Alaska Miners 
Association, 2011)   
 Proposals to develop Alaska Native corporate lands bring with them a powerful 
local, state and federal political lobby for any transnational corporation.  Each regional 
corporation and its shareholders have a vested interested in the profits from exploitation 
of the mineral estate.  There were approximately 6.5 million original shares issued after 
ANCSA's passage.  Since then the number of shareholders worldwide has grown. For 
example, an Alaska Native born on or before December 18, 1971 outside of Alaska and 
married to a non-Alaska Native may gift all or a portion of his/her shares to his/her 
children; if he/she dies without children his/her non-Alaska Native spouse could inherit 
his/her shares; and if he/she dies, his/her inherited 100 ANCSA shares could be 
transferred to his/her non-Alaska Native relatives living anywhere in the world.  It is 
presumed that a shareholder is interested in dividends and will advocate for resource 
development on 7(i) lands. 
 In a story in the online newspaper Alaska Dispatch, Bristol Bay Native 
Corporation (BBNC) is described as a regional corporation caught in a paradox.  While 
BBNC opposes the proposed Pebble Mine because of the threat to the world's largest 
natural run of wild salmon, the corporation has an agreement to explore mineral prospects 
in another part of its regional boundaries.  BBNC's move may be more similar to a 
paradigm.  The corporation's vice president of land and regional operations is quoted as 
saying that the move “should come as no surprise to many who understand the 
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corporation's responsibility to its shareholders.” (Alaska Dispatch, 2013)  The 
corporation had 5,401 original shareholders in 1971 and in 2013 had about 7,800. 
 The village corporations play a critical role in the development of the 7(i) 
resources that cannot be overlooked but they can be overwhelmed with pressure for 
development from non-resident original shareholders.  The locations of the 200 or so 
villages have strategic implications when it comes to resource development.  Many of 
them are located in potential transportation corridors and in the event of resource 
development and exportation of the ore, those villages, at least some of them, could 
become strategically important ports, transportation transfer hubs or sub-regional 
financial and service centers.  
The Disconnected Dots, Confusion and Secrecy  
Emergence of Paradoxes and Controversies 
Any discussion of governance of the ANCSA corporations is fraught with 
complex issues involving paradoxes.  There are contradictions involving corporations and 
democracy, leadership and followers and the benefits of traditions and those that come 
with modernization.  And there are public policy controversies that emerge between rural 
and urban residents over economic development versus subsistence and other issues 
involving for-profit or non-profit organizations.  And looming in the not too distant future 
are the legal issues, which are steeped in emotion of who benefits from the development 
of the subsurface - rural residents or Alaska Native regional corporations shareholders. 
ANCSA created 12 Regional Corporations (Appendix A) and over 200 Village 
Corporations (Appendices B and C).  “The imposition of a conventional corporate 
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structure on tribal members carries significant implications for land use and social 
organization.” (Huhndorf & Huhndorf,  2011, p. 386)  Whether Congress intended or 
wanted conventional corporate governance for the long term is debatable.  Congress 
either wanted the corporations to develop their own corporate model of governance by 
following the unique traditions of Alaska Native governance and then incorporate them 
into the western corporate model, or develop some other form that was more in step with 
common ownership of fish and game resources. The former would empower subsistence 
hunters and gathers and make them responsible for the management of the land as equal 
owners with equal voices and equal votes in for-profit corporations.  
Perhaps governance of the Alaska Native corporations was a side issue not openly 
discussed because the emphasis was on getting the oil out of the ground and into a 
pipeline.  “Congress was under pressure to settle with the [Alaska] natives so Alaska 
could be opened up to oil development, but in settling with the [Alaska] natives it 
rejected the idea of Indian reservations as a failed social policy.” (Egan, 1990)  
What emerged within months of President Nixon’s signature on 
the bill was the western corporate model superimposed over some of the 
poorest people in the United States with the expectation that they would 
behave as Wall Street bankers and capitalists.  What also emerged has left 
many of the people confused or left out of some of the corporations, which 
have incredible potential wealth in subsurface minerals. And, some say, it 
also resulted in dissention with allegations of overpaid non-Alaska Native 
managers who do little more than administer government minority 
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contracts and long time incumbent directors more interested in self-
service. (O'Harrow, 2010)      
When it comes to lawmaking, an old adage is often stated, there are two things 
you never want to see:  how sausage is made and how law is made (attributed to Otto 
Von Bismark).  Such is the case with ANCSA. 
Governance Intent 
The question addressed in this section revolves around intent.  What was the 
intent of those who negotiated the various proposals that eventually culminated in 
ANCSA?  The intent involves the question of governance of the Alaska Native 
corporations and not whether the westernized model of the corporation was better than 
Lower 48 reservations.  This section requires a look at the past by deciphering words 
from a few leaders at the time (Charles Edwardsen, Jr., Al Ketzler, Sr., and Byron 
Mallott) that encapsulate the meanings of the many who testified before and after the 
Settlement.  The question of corporate governance is largely left outside of the realm of 
the United States federal government regulations since the act specifically exempts the 
Corporations from the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC).  This is not to say that 
other aspects are left out of that realm.  Of course, environmental regulations, labor rules 
and regulations, and numerous other regulations apply, but there are no federal 
regulations to preserve fairness and justice in Alaska Native corporation governance.  
What was assumed, perhaps, was that the State of Alaska would promulgate and 
implement rules and regulations on corporate governance that would reflect the wisdom 
of the numerous leaders throughout rural Alaska.  The tactics used by boards and 
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managers of publically traded corporations were, for the most part, not discussed nor are 
there any popular notions expressed in any of the proceedings of how they – the newly 
formed Alaska Native corporations – were to be governed. 
While it is not clearly stated that the Alaska Natives expected to be treated as 
equals in a corporate system, the intent is clearly established that all expected to be 
treated as equals.  This expectation is the establishment of the intent that democracy as it 
was known and practiced at the time was one Alaska Native equals one vote.  It is 
inconceivable to think that any Alaska Native would accept a corporate system where the 
of status of a shareholder's vote and participation is defined by the use of tools of 
publically traded corporations in the privately-held ANCSA corporations 
The Superimposition of Non-Alaska Native Intent 
Almost from the time of the discovery of oil and the filing of Alaska Native 
claims to all of Alaska and parts of Canada, informal and formal proposals were moving 
fast and furious.  It was easy to lose track of the rumors and to determine what was 
serious and what was not.   
During the intensity of the negotiations over various proposals in 1970 and 1971, 
there are some who maintained that the lawyers kept the Alaska Natives in the dark.  For 
example, Arctic Slope Alaska Native Association leader Charles ‘Etok’ Edwardsen, Jr. is 
quoted as saying in the book Etok: A Story of Eskimo Power that “he was really shocked 
to find out what the Alaska Federation of Natives attorneys had been trying to do without 
telling their clients.” (Gallagher, 2001, p. 203)  The book Etok said Edwardsen was 
referring to HR 1830, a bill later scrapped by Representative Wayne Aspinall, Chairman 
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of the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs.  Etok quotes Edwardsen as saying, “‘Jesus 
Christ, we haven’t even seen this (referring to HR 1830).’   Our goddamned attorneys had 
been working with a few Congressmen trying to make an agreement, and they were going 
to try secretly to report this thing out.” (Gallagher, 2001, p. 36)   
 Closed sessions of Congressional Committees often occur when there appears to 
be a strong likelihood that a bill will be reported out.  In such loose secrecy, provisions 
can be added and taken out.  Such was the case in September 1970 when “the [Alaska] 
Natives won their first legislative victory when the House Subcommittee on Indian 
Affairs agreed in ‘closed sessions’ to a provision that would grant the [Alaska] Natives 
title to 40 million acres.” (Jones, 1981, p. 36)   
 Charles ‘Etok’ Edwardsen, Jr. in the book Etok and the government report citied 
are two examples of how the settlement of the way in which politics and the political 
process affected the final version of the Settlement Act enacted by Congress.  So with 
allegations of ‘secrecy’ and congressional practices of ‘closed sessions,’ it is difficult to 
academically determine who was ‘sitting’ at the table when the issue of corporate 
governance emerged and how it was addressed by the various lobbies which included 
federal agencies, tribal advocates, State of Alaska, Chambers of Commerce, Alaska 
Federation of Natives (AFN), oil and gas industry companies, Alaska municipalities, and 
numerous yet unnamed entities. 
 It is almost without a doubt that what was driving an Alaska Native claims 
settlement was the pressure by the oil industry and the economic and financial interests in 
Alaska who would likely profit from the construction of mega-projects.  The state needed 
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to generate revenues to fund social programs such as education, job training, and rural 
development.  In Barry Scott Zellen's book, Breaking the Ice, he quotes attorney James 
Wickwire who wrote in Native News,  
Assertion of Alaska Native rights effectively stalled land selections by the 
State of Alaska and construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline to transport 
Prudhoe Bay oil south across the entire state.  Congress was compelled to 
respond to the legal, political, social and administrative turmoil; ANCSA 
was the result.” (Zellen, 2000, p. 33)    
 Forty years ago was a thousand years ago in rural Alaska. Some people felt that 
while a few negotiators behind the scenes expected the Alaska Native leadership to 
develop new concepts on how to govern the newly created corporations, this did not 
happen but instead what happened was the superimposition of the standardized model 
over them.  This is an interesting observation and sparks great curiosity in 2013 during 
this time of the current Great Recession, wide-spread media coverage of corporate greed, 
and lax government regulations over corporations.  Unease with the current ways of 
doing business on Wall Street, and all that its culture represents, has sparked considerable 
academic theorizing.  As new theories take hold, such as the developing Stakeholder 
Theory, Alaska Native corporations seem intent on holding on to the old cultures of Wall 
Street that were developed a century before ANCSA. 
 The Stakeholder Theory seems to make an abrupt departure from the usual 
understanding of business as a vehicle to maximize returns to the owners of capital. 
(Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, & De Collie, 2010, p. 5) It can be said that Congress 
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handed the Alaska Natives an academic theory in 1971 – pure ‘corporate democracy.’  It 
was not widely known then in such terms but it was practiced throughout the Alaska 
Native communities.  As corporate America has moved to embrace tinges of corporate 
democracy, the Alaska Natives have to embrace the purity of corporate democracy if it is 
to redefine itself as ethical and moral in the sense and interpretation of those who gave up 
their claims to the land in exchange for something purely American and yet so un-Alaska 
Native. 
 If corporate America is apt to change, then ANCSA corporations should also seek 
changes but in ways that do not imitate those ‘normal’ corporations but reflect traditions 
and cultures of Alaska’s indigenous peoples.  Rather than imitation, should come 
innovation and thinking outside the box. Those seated at the table during Alaska Native 
settlement negotiations put the Alaska Native inside the box.  
The Relevance of the Past 
When you begin a great work you can’t expect to finish it all at once; 
therefore do you and your brothers press on, and let nothing discourage 
you till you have entirely finished what you have begun.  Now brothers, as 
for me, I assure you I will press on, and the contrary winds may blow 
strong in my face, yet I will go forward and never turn back, and continue 
to press forward until I have finished, and I would have you do the same . . 
. Though you may hear birds singing on this side and that side, you must 
not take notice of that, but hear me when I speak to you, and take it to 
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heart, for you may always depend that what I say shall be true. (Nerburn, 
1999, p. 20)  
Teedyuscung (1700-1763) 
King of the Delaware 
 The questions of how to provide for future generations have been with Native 
Americans probably from the moment it was fully realized by Native American leaders 
that the great waves of Europeans arriving on the shores of North America would not 
soon end.  Thus it came to be that the same questions asked by Teedyuscung and others 
before him would be asked almost 250 years later in far off Alaska.  As the earth’s 
population continues to grow with a projected population of over nine billion by 2050 
(U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, June 2011 Update.), the pressure for 
natural resources will grow and the eyes of developing countries will see the northern 
hemisphere as ideal because of sparse populations and free-market politicians in 
command of states and territories.  Siberia, Greenland, the Inuit Territory of Canada, and 
Alaska will become favored targets of trans-national corporations eager to satisfy the 
needs of growing middle classes in the developing countries.  They will want better 
refrigerators, better televisions, more iron, gold, oil, gas, automobiles, and all the other 
trappings now possessed by the middle class in the United States.  Today, the trans-
national corporations know ANCSA corporation lands are private lands, unrestricted by 
corporate policy on natural resource development.  As the corporations become more 
concerned with the need for a positive bottom line, the pressure from within the 
corporations will grow to develop these natural resources.  Many other voices in rural 
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Alaska, not shareholder voices, but Alaska Native voices, may be drowned out by the din 
of offers from the trans-national corporations that owe no allegiance to country, tradition 
or culture. 
In 2013 the drumbeat for new mining developments throughout 
Alaska is increasing in tempo. Since NANA's Red Dog mine was 
developed in 1987 no less than 75 mining prospects are in early or 
advanced planning stages. Names of prospects like Lik (5,500 acres, zinc, 
lead, and silver); Kelly Creek (105,000 acres, gold); Sun (45,000 acres, 
gold, silver, and lead); Lucky Shot (8,800 acres, gold); and Unga (62,000 
acres, gold and copper) could become as familiar in Alaska as Red Dog 
and Pebble. (DeMarban, 2012)   
Some of the prospects are on state lands but many others yet to be will be on ANCSA 
lands which brought in the profit sharing provision of 7(i).  The significance of mining on 
Alaska Native lands is simply that mining will be done on private lands which have never 
existed in an aboriginal lands claims settlement.  Mining prospects on Alaska Native 
corporate lands brings in a powerful political lobby of at least 65,000 original 
shareholders, many of whom have died but whose shares are now distributed among 
many others around the world. 
 When one thinks of mining on Alaska Native lands, it should never be done with 
the belief that it is the Alaska Natives who will have the only (or most) say in whether the 
prospect will or will not be developed.  This is because original shares (approximately 6.5 
million) are private property and can be inherited by anyone in the world or inter vivos 
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amongst family.  Thus, the Alaska Native corporations may respond to shareholders 
pressure for dividends rather than preservation and promotion of original cultural values.  
This will become more complicated when, by December 18, 2021 (fifty years after 
passage of the Settlement Act), most of the original shareholders will be deceased and the 
inheritors will not be living within the regional boundaries.  In essence, they will be less 
concerned about Alaska Native issues such as traditions, cultures and subsistence 
activities.  At least one regional corporation has already reached this heralded milestone.  
Chugach Alaska Corporation, the second smallest of the 12 Regional Corporations in 
Alaska, whose boundaries include the Gulf of Alaska and the coast of the Kenai 
Peninsula, has fewer than half of its shareholders living in Alaska and only about a 
quarter living within the boundaries.  Yet, since 1971, the Alaska Native population of 
the Chugach region has doubled and most of those born are not and probably will not be 
shareholders.  (Alaska Population Overview 2010 Census and 2011 Estimates, 2012, pp. 
53-54)   
 All of the mining prospects are too big and too far off in the future to be financed 
solely by the regional corporations.  The financing of such developments will likely come 
from trans-national corporations whose corporate missions will not include protection 
and enhancement of cultures and traditions of Alaska Native peoples, but profits and 
dividends for the stockholders.  Therein lay the paradox of the Alaska Native 
corporations – profits vs. Alaska Native values. 
The advice of past generations of Native American leaders was as relevant then as 
now.  Teedyuscung advised the young to deliberate respectfully, but press on and not 
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become discouraged by voices from one side and ignore the other side.  Just as 
Teedyuscung’s advice was relevant so was Sitting Bull’s, “Let us put our minds together 
and see what kind of life we can make for our children.” (Nerburn, 1999, p. i)     
Alaska Native Corporate Governance, the Failure to be Bold, Experimental 
ANCSA in 1971 was hailed six years after the AFN was formed in 1966 as a big, 
bold experiment in how to settle age-old disputes over land ownership and how 
indigenous peoples should be treated.  In his paper written in 1994, University of Alaska 
Anchorage Economist Steve Colt wrote that ANCSA  
….was widely hailed as a radical departure from previous United States 
Indian policy and perhaps the most generous settlement of indigenous land 
claims every offered by a major colonial power.  Alaska's living 70,000 
Alaska Natives acquired clear title to 44 million acres of land – an area 
larger than New England. (Colt, 1994, p. 7)     
The negotiating and lobbying efforts of numerous Alaska Native leaders and 
friends of the Alaska Native communities were a tremendous accomplishment but the 
future loomed with uncertainty.  The challenges facing Alaska Native leadership were 
assumed to be no greater and no less than the battle for a fair, just and equitable 
settlement.  In the December 17, 1971, The Tundra Times editorial, which was written 
prior to the signing of the act, Editor Howard Rock noted the opportunities and 
challenges.   
If the bill is approved, or when it is approved, the President, no doubt, will 
sign it.  That moment will be the beginning of a great era for the Alaska 
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Native people of Alaska.  It will not be an easy task.  It will demand all the 
strength the leadership has.  It will be a job for the present and more for 
the future of our Alaska Native people. (The Tundra Times, 1971)       
In the same editorial, Rock said that the Alaska Native people had proven that 
they could handle “… highly complex problems.  We must not do less in the future.  We 
must meet it with confidence and then do more for the good of our people today and 
those of tomorrow.” (The Tundra Times, 1971)        
Thirteen years later (1984), at hearings of the privately-funded Alaska Native 
Review Commission (the Berger Commission), Alaska Native leader Byron Mallott said 
that when the corporations were created, “Uncle Sam slipped an ace up his sleeve.” 
(Alaska Native Review Commission [ANRC], 1984, p. 308)  Mallott was referring to the 
federal government using corporations in ANCSA “to propel Alaska Native people into 
the mainstream, and to use mainstream-kind of institutions in order (for Alaska Natives) 
to exercise self-sufficiency and control over their own destinies.” (ANRC, 1984, p. 308) 
The Settlement Act itself is an example of outside forces using their self-interests to 
further aboriginal issues.  Without the powerful lobbies that the oil and gas industry 
brings to the table, the land claims would probably have been much less, much later in 
time. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge that has come to burden Alaska Natives is how to 
govern the corporations when as the Alaska Native population grows, the number of 1971 
original shares remains static (approximately 6.5 million original shares).  Those 
shareholders with original stock will share in the development of the subsurface estate of 
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the land – 44 million acres, an area roughly the size of the state of Missouri.  The many 
new shareholders created with new classes of life estate shares in regional corporations 
such as Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, NANA, Doyon, Ltd., and Sealaska, will not 
share in the profits from mineral and forest harvesting development. 
Benefits of Enrollment 
Almost all who know of ANCSA would probably agree that the single most 
important benefit of owning shares in a corporation is identity.  Shareholder status means 
the right to belong to participate in your tribe's governance.  There are, however, other 
benefits of enrollment. 
There are two general categories under federal law on how an Alaska Native 
owner of original shares created by the Settlement Act can benefit.  The first is under the 
‘Indian Commerce Clause’ of the U.S. Constitution.  The Constitution gives Congress the 
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes.” (U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3)  The second 
category is under Section 7(i) of the Settlement Act which grants all shareholders the 
right to share in the profits either directly or indirectly from the development of the 
timber and mineral estate of entire land base of 44 million acres. 
In the 1970 census there were 50,605 Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts in the State of 
Alaska.  Starting in 1950 with a population of 33,863, each new census has shown a 
dramatic increase in the Alaska Native population.  In the 1960 census there were 42,522.  
The population grew to 64,103 in 1980 and to 85,698 in 1990.  Twenty years after 
ANCSA (1991) there were 107,929 people in Alaska who identified themselves as 
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Alaska Native.  The most recent census (2010) shows there are 120,452 Alaska Natives 
living in the state. (Alaska Population Overview, 2012 p. 13)  Since ANCSA is a 
settlement of all aboriginal claims the number of shares of original shares is set at the 
number of Alaska Natives of at least one-quarter blood who were born alive by 
December 18, 1971 and who choose to enroll.  Upon enrollment each Alaska Native was 
granted 100 shares of stock.  There are therefore approximately 65,000 shareholders who 
own 6.5 million shares. (Arnold, 1978, p. 146)   What is significant about the Settlement 
Act is that there will be no more original shares to be distributed to ‘afterborn’ Alaska 
Natives born after December 18, 1971.   
Under Section 7(i) of the Act, 70% of the net profits from the 
development of timber and subsurface estate must be distributed to the 
other regional corporations based on the number the original shares owned 
by their shareholders.  At-large shareholders receive a direct distribution 
while village shareholders' distributions go to the village corporation. 
[Public Law 92-203, Section 7(i)]   
Alaska Natives can be granted contracting opportunities under federal law such as 
the Small Business Administration's 8(a) program.  And as an owner of original shares, a 
shareholder can receive monetary distributions from the profits of the development of any 
of the regional corporation’s subsurface estate.  Some of the regional corporations 
(Sealaska, NANA, Doyon, Arctic Slope Regional Corporation and Bristol Bay Alaska 
Native Corporation) have created life estates for those born after December 18, 1971.  
While the ‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives can participate and vote in the annual meetings of 
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shareholders they cannot pass on their shares to whomever they choose as original 
shareholders can and do.  Life estate shares revert back to the corporation upon the death 
of the shareholder. 
Alaska Native Corporate Democracy 
The central issue to be discussed revolves around the concept of corporate 
democracy.  While many think that such a concept is oxymoronic, similar to General 
Patton’s interpretation of military intelligence as depicted in the movie Patton (Schaffner, 
1970) , much can be explained in the thoughts, actions, and testimony of hundreds of 
Alaska Natives during the land claims battles of the 1960s.  What was the intent, or 
perhaps better yet, what was the expectation of how the typical Alaska Native corporation 
was to be governed?  Were Alaska Native corporations to be governed like associations 
with members each having an equal vote similar to tribal governments where voting 
equality is traditional and cultural?  Or, did the Alaska Native leadership fully 
comprehend the complex  corporate system with proxies, management slates, and never-
ending public relations campaigns via newsletters, informational meetings, and 
shareholders’ annual meetings where voting has come to be a distraction from the door 
prize drawings.  In another oxymoronic characterization, the annual shareholders’ 
meetings have turned from verbal exchanges between shareholders and directors to 
deafening silence.  This has become the case in at least one regional corporation’s annual 
meetings. 
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 Before a discussion of Alaska Native corporate democracy can begin, corporate 
democracy must be defined and then explained how it is applicable to corporations 
created pursuant to P.L. 92-203. 
 So, what is corporate democracy?  And how is it distinctly applied to Alaska 
Native corporations?  And, how did corporate governance come to be part of the 
discussion of a fair, just, and equitable (as was often said) Alaska Native land claims 
settlement?  Did it just arise without any legal advice, consultants’ reports, or 
explanations of how corporate governance differed from local, state, and federal 
governments as well as traditional tribal governments? 
 ANCSA corporate democracy is the right to participate on a equal footing with all 
shareholders.  All shareholders have the right to vote, the right to speak freely, the right 
to gather independently of corporate management, the right to information on how their 
corporate funds are spent, and the right to be treated honestly and fairly by those who 
they elect to the board. 
 Corporate democracy within the realm of the settlement act has yet to be fully 
defined.  Any core part of the definition would have to come from P.L. 92-203 which 
states that any person of one quarter or more Alaska Native blood was eligible for 
enrollment with 100 original shares of stock in a regional corporation and/or village 
corporation.  Before the 1991 amendments, all shares were restricted and could pass from 
a shareholder to another living person only by death.  Thus, all Alaska Natives enrolled in 
a particular corporation were created as equal shareholders. 
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 In western conceptual thinking, many consider corporate democracy a myth. 
(Icahn, 2008)  Wall Street businessman Carl Icahn maintains it is a myth when applied to 
publically traded companies where shareholders come and go as stock prices rise and fall 
and thus have little or no interest in the concept of corporate democracy.  As Icahn 
applies it, shareholders are interested only in the bottom line and how much money they 
have made or lost.  But in Icahn’s application of what corporate democracy is today, it is 
not an attack on corporate governance in theory or in another era’s practices, but of what 
western corporate democracy has become.  “’The buildup of incompetent boards and 
managers is the result of poor corporate governance.’  Icahn goes on to say that the 
corporation is run ‘like a decaying socialistic state.’” (Icahn, 2008) Carl Icahn’s 
summation of what publically traded corporations are today is only partially applicable to 
P.L. 92-203 corporations because the issues with Alaska Native corporations are of the 
use of voting regulations to maintain political control over the board and management of 
the corporation.  In publically traded corporations, as the shareholder buys and sells 
stock, the shareholders voting strength ebbs and flows with the purchases and sales.  Not 
so with Alaska Native corporations. 
 There are many scholars and professionals who now seek to define corporate 
democracy.  It is oxymoronic, even the 2012 Occupy Wall Street protesters and those 
sympathetic to its many slogans and mission statements are at loss to define what has 
become an elusive definition that is caught up in free-market jargon.  There are those, 
however, who seek to define Occupy Wall Street in the sense of democracy.  The online 
magazine Yes! refers to it as “the people's movement to take back democracy and build a 
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new economy.” (Yes!, 2012)  In a sense, that is what dissident shareholders of Alaska 
Native corporations seek to do – to allow for a larger shareholder voice in the 
management of the Congressional created companies.  The dissidents also seek to level 
the playing field when it comes to election of directors. 
 In late 2011, as the Occupy Wall Street protests grew around the world, Forbes 
magazine contributor Peter Cohen attempted to define corporate democracy by asking, 
“What is Occupy Wall Street?” (Cohen, 2011) Cohen's response is one that can easily be 
attributed to Alaska Native shareholders who question the values system of the 
management of ANCSA regional corporations.  Cohen writes that companies create jobs 
that provide money, health care, and a sense of purpose and if they do that well, they 
reward shareholders with dividends.   He also writes that by paying taxes and giving to 
communities they become good corporate citizens.   
Regrettably, not all companies follow this value-creating script.  That's 
why society needs to regulate companies.  And due to the symbiosis 
between politicians who need cash to finance their quest for power and 
companies that are eager to supply that cash in exchange for profit-
boosting government policies, government does not represent the interests 
of non-corporate people as well as it does those of corporate ones. (Cohen, 
2011)  
 Alaska Native regional corporations are loosely regulated by the State of Alaska 
and exempt from federal securities laws.  In December 2012, the U.S. Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) released its long-awaited report on ANCSA.   
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The Corporations are subject to some federal and state financial reporting 
requirements and limited state oversight.  The Settlement Act generally 
exempts the corporations from complying with federal securities laws 
while requiring them to annually transmit a report to their shareholders 
that contains ‘substantially all the information’ required to be included in 
an SEC registrant's annual report to shareholders.  The act does not 
provide a federal role for monitoring the corporations’ compliance with 
this requirement, and the state's oversight is generally limited to 
enforcement of state securities laws and proxy regulations. (Government 
Accounting Office GAO-13-121, 2012)     
 Corporate democracy has its roots in commercialization that today is better 
defined within the concepts of globalization.  Many multi-national corporations are 
becoming trans-national corporations that have no national boundaries and flee from the 
reach of weak governments or small state’s governments.  Sophisticated, driven and 
motivated by huge financial rewards, they hire the best and brightest from the world’s 
best law schools, the world’s best research institutions, and the world’s best business 
schools.  This has put the concept of corporate democracy at risk as national states are 
becoming increasingly powerless and easier to intimidate.  It also comes at a time when 
ANCSA corporations are at risk of losing control to bottom-line driven executives who 
have become comfortable manipulating boards of directors, monitoring social networks, 
and conducting never-ending public relations campaigns to convince the shareholders of 
the good that they do. 
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 For many Alaska Natives the shift from the male role model of a subsistence 
hunter to a corporate executive has been a quick one-way trip down a rocky path as it 
twists and turns.  In a 1986 scholarly article in the Journal of American Indian Education, 
author Gary C. Anders wrote that there were two roles applied to young Alaska Natives.  
 The first is that of the traditional hunter and village leader, a person with a 
strong sense of the natural order and the cultural traditions that have 
bonded people to the environment for countless generations.  The second, 
more difficult to describe because it lacks historical connotations, is that of 
the corporate Alaska Native.  This stereotype blends the tundra tradition 
with Wall Street.  A characterization includes astute knowledge of 
corporations, high finance, and big money projects.  Debonair, articulate, 
and urbane, this role model stresses all the style implied by the term, 
“Brooks Brothers Alaska Native.”  Between these traditional and 
corporate extremes, there are few other roles for Alaska Native high 
school age villagers.  This phenomenon is largely due to the impact of the 
various media and glorification of stereotypes by their own corporation's 
public relations efforts. (Anders, 1986, p. 7)     
Did Congress Intend Pure Corporate Democracy? 
What the U.S. Congress created in 1971 was unintentional at least within the 
understanding of the thousands of Eskimos, Indians and Aleuts living in rural Alaska.  
Congress created the standard corporate model instead of ‘pure corporate democracy.’  
To be fair the ‘pure corporate democracy’ model had not been developed in 1971. Instead 
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the Congress introduced a new bold, fair, and just concept, ‘pure corporate democracy.’  
The emphasis here must be on ‘pure’ because each and every Alaska Native of at least 
one quarter Eskimo, Indian or Aleut blood was entitled to own 100 shares of stock in a 
corporation that would own the land.  There was a 20 year restriction on the 
transferability of the stock.  That, essentially, was it.  The intent, it would be safe to say, 
was to further the interests of equality and fairness by the corporation as it treated its 
owners and the land which the corporation owned.  The people who used the land would 
become shareholders with no one user having greater usage than any other since who 
hunted or fished was open to all as equals. 
Evolution of Corporate Democracy:  From Concepts to Words to Making Laws 
In a sense, the gospel of capitalism has gripped the leadership of the 
regional corporations just as in another day, another kind of gospel was 
introduced for its educative and assimilative influence.  The profit-making 
mandate has become a powerful vision, a powerful driving force.  The 
corporate executives will be those who are willing to forego subsistence 
activities, to place a higher priority on board meetings than on salmon 
fishing, and to spend time talking to lawyers and financiers and bankers 
rather than the people of the villages.  It is possible that there will develop 
a leadership cadre in the Alaska Native corporations that will become 
somewhat removed from the shareholders.  The Alaska Native 
corporations, in a sense, will approximate other large businesses and that 
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management will, more and more, be separated from ownership.  (Berger, 
1985, pp. 41-42)     
Professor Monroe Price 
 
 
The Entering of ‘Corporation’ in the Alaska Native Lexicon 
 How did the word ‘corporation’ come to be in the Alaska Native lexicon?  Did it 
just happen because no one seemed to take the time to understand how the Alaska Native 
culture would fit within the corporate structure?  Or was it because those who were 
involved made too many assumptions about corporate governance?  After all, if the 
shareholder owned a share the shareholder could vote, right? The U.S. Congress in 1971 
determined that only Alaska Native shareholders would be allowed to vote and non-
Alaska Native shareholders could not.  This is subject to change.  But there was nothing 
said or explained about corporate regulations that allowed for staggered terms and 
cumulative voting now commonly used by the regional corporate boards to win elections.  
Cumulative voting was implemented in most corporate systems to allow for minority 
representation on the boards, but since all are equal  in Alaska Native corporations where 
no one shareholder can gain an upper hand in voting by buying more shares, thus have 
more votes, it is routinely used to keep majority board members in their positions. 
 Cumulative voting in ANCSA corporations was introduced as regional 
corporations struggled to maintain stability.  By the mid-1970s, the system used by 
publically traded corporations was used en mass by ANCSA regional corporations.  It 
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also cemented the advantage incumbents have over independent candidates for the board.  
For example, if there are three seats for three years terms on a nine member board of 
directors, each share is multiplied by three.  Thus an owner of 100 shares has 300 votes.  
In publically traded corporations, cumulative voting was implemented to increase the 
chances of minority shareholders (those who owned only a few shares) to gain a voice on 
the board. 
Who was watching the store in 1969? 
In his book, Give or Take A Century, author Joseph E. Senungetuk summed up 
what probably was a major issue among those involved with lobbying efforts.  There 
were very few organizations that could afford to send delegates or representatives to 
meetings because they were making a living doing subsistence.   
The real problem today is that there is little time to ponder the question of 
whether to get involved in such things as Alaska Native Rights, Civil Rights, or 
Alaska Native Leadership.  Time is moving, getting shorter and shorter for those 
of us who would pause a moment to ponder our ‘self-involvement.’  There are 
just too many people who are not Alaskan Natives, who are willing to exploit as 
much labor, natural resources, and cultural uniqueness out of the Alaskan Alaska 
Native as they can. (Senungetuk, 1971, p. 169)  
This was at a time of intense pressure on Alaska Natives to agree to a proposal, any 
proposal, to settle the land claims issue so that construction could begin on the trans-
Alaska oil pipeline. 
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If knowledge is power and education is the key to the power, then who was 
watching the store in the 1960s was no one or, at best, only a few.  The few, if any, 
Alaska Natives who were learned of how publically traded corporations elected directors 
to govern were either too trusting of their lobbyists and lawyers or the lawyers and 
lobbyists were so arrogant that they felt little obligation to keep their clients appraised of 
what the governance consequences would be under the various bills considered by 
Congress. 
Pure Corporate Democracy, The Unfulfilled, Unintended Consequence 
It should be said that the Alaska Native invented ‘pure’ corporate democracy.  It 
was done so with passionate feelings for the land and cultures; it was done after 
generations of isolation from justice and equality; and, it was done only because the U.S. 
Congress passed a law that the Representatives and Senators hoped would not result in 
leaving Alaska’s Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts among the lowest classes of peoples in the 
country.   What happened after passage of the law is speculative, spawning 
rationalization of why things turned out the way they did.  In another sense, perhaps the 
other part of the invention statement should be and then the bastards stole pure corporate 
democracy from the Alaska Natives. 
That unintended, and now unfulfilled, consequence of the Settlement Act, the 
creation of ‘pure’ corporate democracy, came at a time when any discussion of corporate 
ownership equality and management control in westernized, publically traded 
corporations was often discussed by corporate directors in terms of cumulative voting 
(one share equals one vote times the number of seats up for election).  Arguably, 
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cumulative voting was unknown, even among the most highly educated Alaska Native 
leaders, since experience with corporate business was practically unknown to Alaska 
Natives.  This was not to say that there were no successful Alaska Natives in private 
business and there were no educated Alaska Natives in the professions of law and 
teaching.  Indeed, there were, but precious few.   
The U.S. Congress created equal ownership among the Alaska Native corporate 
shareholders but restricted that ownership for 20 years, hence the restrictions would be 
lifted and the stock would be freely alienable.  That section of the law was later amended 
to prevent non-Alaska Native ownership of valuable lands and subsurface resources.  
Even with the amendments, what was left intact was ‘pure corporate democracy.’  This is 
evident throughout the act where there is a total absence of any attempt to give one group 
more or any one individual more influence or power over the other.  Such eventual 
influence results from political skills rather than buying and selling of shares in the 
manner of publically traded corporations.  That influence and control comes simply 
because of a lack of state regulatory affect on the corporations. 
The FitzGerald Commission:  Land Claims Settlement and Poverty 
When the Alaska Federation of Natives was created in October 1966 there is little 
doubt that any one seemed in favor of creating a Lower 48 reservation-styled Alaska 
Native claims settlement.  Though there was talk of something different, that difference 
did not become publicly known until the presidentially appointed Federal Field 
Committee for Development Planning in Alaska came out with their recommendations in 
February 1969.  The field committee was originally appointed by President Lyndon 
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Johnson after the 1964 earthquake but was later tasked with the responsibility to come up 
with recommendations to solve the land freeze imposed by Secretary of the Interior 
Stewart Udall.  The announcement came in the form of a headline in The New York 
Times.  “A federal study team recommended a broad plan that would settle the claims of 
Alaskan aboriginals to millions of acres of their ancestral lands while avoiding racial 
segregation that put American Indians on reservations more than a century ago, ….”  
(Blair, 1969)    
Reflecting back on the recommendations of the field committee, Etok, A Story of 
Eskimo Power, the author quotes Charles Edwardsen, Jr. as saying that the proposals 
reflected Chairman Joseph FitzGerald’s ideas on fighting poverty, not a just settlement of 
the land claims.  “Joe’s concept of the Alaska Native land claims settlement evolved out 
of Joe’s concept of the Alaska Native people being poor.  That was not my concept.  I 
don’t really think that Joe FitzGerald ever really thought in his mind that the Alaska 
Natives had title.” (Gallagher, 2001, p. 192)     
 The Times also reported that the field committee (also known as the FitzGerald 
Commission) recommended the creation of a corporation to administer a land and 
monetary award.  The committee recommended an Alaska Native corporation, owned by 
aboriginals as shareholders and granting it $100 million from the treasury as payment for 
rights taken in the past and granting to the corporation 10 percent of the income from the 
leasing or sale of minerals and other resources for a period of 10 years.  This would be in 
compensation for all rights extinguished by the proposed legislation at the end of 10 
years. (Gallagher, 2001, p. 193) This is when the word ‘corporation’ entered into the 
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Alaska Native lexicon.  The Eskimo, Indian and Aleut world was about to change in 
unthinkable and unanticipated ways. 
 The FitzGerald Commission had some big names on it and they were workers and 
thinkers.  It included upper level federal government managers from the Federal Power 
Commission; Federal Aviation Administration; Small Business Administration; 
Economic Development Administration; Office of Economic Opportunity, Housing and 
Urban Development; Department of Interior; and the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, and even the Commanding General of Elmendorf Air Force Base.  The staff 
of the commission included some who would remain influential and become respected 
names in Alaska’s public policy arena for generations – Esther Wunnicke, Dr. Douglas 
Jones, Dr. Arlon Tussing, Robert D. Arnold, and David M. Hickok.   
After the commission’s work began, they soon realized that the Alaska Natives 
had legal title to an asset – the land.  Attorney Fred Paul later recalled,  
I asked David Hickok, ‘How long did it take you folks to stumble on the 
theory that Alaskan Natives have substantial legal rights?’  Oh, it took us 
several months, he replied.  Then he amended his statement.  ‘No, no, it 
was just a matter of a few weeks.’ (Paul, 2003, p. 185)  
Once the FitzGerald Commission determined that the Alaska Natives had 
legitimate legal claims to the land, the land as an asset would have to be owned by 
someone or something and managed by someone or some kind of entity. The 
Commission also determined it was unlikely to be the United States Government as in the 
manner of the Lower 48 Indian reservations. 
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In the final section of Alaska Natives and the Land, Framework for a Settlement 
(written by Wunnicke, Arnold and Hickok), the FitzGerald Commission gave direction.  
 There are two basic approaches: one grants assets to beneficiaries directly 
and relies upon their management of their assets; the second gives assets 
in trust to the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of Alaska Natives.  
One seeks to protect Alaska Native assets by adding another layer of 
decision-making; the other seeks to assign full and final responsibility to 
the beneficiaries for the management of their assets.  While the Alaska 
Native leadership prefers the management to be given to the people rather 
than to the Department of the Interior, they are fully cognizant of the 
varying abilities of villages to make final management decisions 
respecting large expenditures of money. (Federal Field Committee, 1968, 
p. 546)   
The Commission also recommended that Congress should define the structure to manage 
the assets.  “Although a trust arrangement is not supported by the Alaska Native 
leadership, it appears they do wish the Congress to spell out the mechanism of corporate 
or organizing structure for asset management which will protect their own and the public 
interest.” (Federal, 1968, p. 546)   
Management of Assets 
Congress did designate the type of ownership in the final legislation, but it did not 
mention any uniqueness that would apply to Alaska Native corporations.  The 
corporations would be left to adapt to the prevailing (western) ideas of corporation 
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structure and governance or continue the experiment with bold, new ideas of corporate 
management. 
Meanwhile, among shareholders of western corporations, the fight to change how 
westernized for-profit corporations were governed simmered for years, erupting in the 
creation during the Great Depression of the federal Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to regulate publically traded corporations.  The SEC implemented regulations to 
curb graft and corruption such as insider trading and management using tactics to prevent 
small, minority shareholders from having a voice on the boards of directors. 
The challenges of a non-reservation type settlement were looming.  Yet 
undefined, yet misunderstood, and yet imitated, the model of the tool to be used to what 
Natives thought would be a model based on fairness and equality was the corporation.  
By the mid-1970s all of the ANCSA corporations veered to the right and implemented 
strategies to weaken shareholders’ voices and participation.  Such strategies included 
cumulative voting, restricting access to information, and intimidating shareholders by 
filing or threatening to file complaints against dissident shareholders.  Complaints against 
shareholders on the basis of false and misleading information became widespread.  If the 
ANCSA corporations were democracies, then speaking freely about candidates or 
corporate management did not warrant the filing of legal action.  In the American 
democracy, which was what most Alaska Natives thought would ensue, if a citizen can 
complain about the performance of the President of the U.S. or any governor, then a 
shareholder could complain about the Alaska Native corporate management without fear 
of legal action.  After all, among Alaska Natives who, as a class, had some of the lowest 
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education levels of any group in the United States, complaints about corporate 
management should be treated in the same manner as complaints about politicians and 
bureaucrats in a democracy.   
Starting in September 2011, in every major city in Europe and the United States, 
protesters united under the banner ‘Occupy Wall Street.’  Wall Street-type corporations 
today are not the type of 40 years ago, but how they are governed has not changed.  This 
is the governance model used by ANCSA corporations today, yet it is a broken model.   
It should come as no surprise that the practice of corporate governance 
fails, precisely because it has been built on the wrong pillars atop the vices 
of individualism and utilitarianism.  What we have had so far is corporate 
governance designed for crooks; it is time to devise one that makes 
corporate virtue possible (Osterloh & Frey, 2003).  (Sison, 2008, p. 36)   
The FitzGerald Commission used the corporation because it needed something to 
own the land. The commission was not going to recommend that Alaska Native lands be 
held in trust by the Federal Government.  Corporations in 1969 were more regulated 
(Glass-Steagall was federal law) and corporate governance was publicly perceived to be 
working without any of the greed and corruption now routinely reported by the media 
starting with Enron in 2001, Madoff in 2008, and the Banking Scandals in 2012. 
The Daunting Task of Corporate Governance 
 To illustrate the daunting task facing Alaska’s Natives, a primer prepared by the 
State of Alaska’s Department of Education and the University of Alaska Fairbanks in 
June 1975 (three and a half years after passage of ANCSA) was distributed among the 
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new shareholders.  The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act gave every Alaskan Alaska 
Native the right to be a shareholder in at least two corporations, the small book explained.  
In a series of questions, such as, “Why did this important law give people shares of stock 
instead of just dividing up all the land and money between them?” the author answered 
the question using a story told in terms related to subsistence hunting and fishing. (Conn, 
1975, p. 3)  
 Another good example illustrating the efforts to overcome those obstacles is the 
Alaska Native Foundation (ANF) book, Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, edited by 
Robert Arnold (1978).  The book was released at a time when change began to happen 
rapidly.  With the effective date of the Settlement Act set within six months of President 
Nixon’s signature on the bill, the non-profit Alaska Native associations’ boards of 
directors were charged with changing the direction from social agenda causes to for-
profit bottom lines.  Almost overnight, the non-profit, advocacy-oriented Alaska Native 
associations were transformed into for-profit corporations which had millions of dollars 
in cash and ownership rights to 44 million acres of Alaska land.  The for-profit boards 
had money to meet, money to pay directors fees and per diem, money to hire consultants 
and lawyers, and money to travel but not enough money to meet the expectations of 
thousands of Alaska Natives who were now shareholders.  Not only did the expectations 
include dividends but also funding expectations for housing, jobs, scholarships, and 
building transportation infrastructure.  The pressure on the directors magnified with 
unrelenting media interests igniting the general public’s curiosity of the Alaska Native 
corporations.  Not only did the Alaska Native-turned-Alaska Native shareholder need to 
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be educated about the private sector and making money, the general public also needed to 
know about private corporations, shareholders’ rights, and the high cost of doing business 
in rural Alaska. 
 The pressure on the social activists who sat on the ANCSA boards was intense as 
shareholders’ expectations went unmet.  Many of the shareholders expected the regional 
corporations to address issues on the public agenda such as employment, housing, 
poverty and education.  But, ANCSA corporations were not public entities by private and 
had the corporate duty to maximize profits.  At annual meetings from one end of the state 
to the other, newly enrolled shareholders packed the halls and peppered their boards with 
questions.  None of the questions were considered to be ‘stupid’ or ‘ignorant’ questions.  
Management and directors often listened politely and answered professionally.  There 
were no demeaning comments made to shareholders on how they conducted themselves 
nor were there efforts to intimidate them.  All shareholders were created equal and all 
shareholders had a right to know. 
 The shareholders did not hesitate ousting the directors and replacing them with 
more sophisticated shareholders who could articulate ideas and instill confidence in the 
attendees represented in person and by proxy. 
Tactics Change, New Leadership Emerges and the Table is Rearranged 
In what ways were leaders of the land claims movement different from 
traditional leaders?  First, they were younger men.  For example, Willie 
Hensley, Byron Mallott, Charlie Edwardsen, and Emil Notti were all less 
than 40 years old.  Second, they differed in education.  Most of the 
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movement’s leaders had completed high school, which contributed to their 
acculturation to white society.  Third, they were more knowledgeable 
about politics and law and more willing to experiment with different kinds 
of political tactics.  And, they were politically assertive, not passive.  
Fourth, the new leaders were more likely to have a statewide orientation.  
By this we mean they were less tied to their villages of origin.  They were 
more experienced in the various Alaska communities, having travelled 
extensively as part of their educational training or participated in 
antipoverty programs in areas other than their own.  Finally, in attitude 
they responded to the tempos of the 1960s rather than the 1940s – intent 
on deal [dealing] with administrators and politicians as equals, not 
merely as clients of administrative agencies. (McBeath & Morehouse, 
1980, p. 26)     
Howard Rock, Editor,  
The Tundra Times 
 
The Bottom Line Versus the Social Agenda 
 Rearranging the table began within a year of the passage of the Settlement Act.  
There was a severe shortage of professional, technical, and clerical manpower to meet the 
needs of the ANCSA corporations.  Business managers, social and economic program 
managers, attorneys, land management specialists, comptrollers/accountants, land 
resource technicians, secretaries, and bookkeeper and accounting clerks were all needed.  
Judith Kleinfeld’s study of manpower needs was just one of many done that noted the 
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shortages. (Kleinfeld, Jones & Evans, 1973) What was not noted was the lack of 
knowledgeable Natives who could serve on the boards.  Since it was the shareholders 
who would decide who was elected, it was assumed that board members would be local 
or regional leaders.   However, with so much at stake the elections soon became like 
campaigns for public office.  In seeking the support of the Alaska Native shareholder 
vote the effort to use public office-styled campaigns for seats on private corporate boards 
became the standard. 
 In some of the poor areas of the state where there were few opportunities for full-
time jobs and the housing conditions were below poverty guidelines, the pressures on the 
for-profit boards were intense.  The media continued to press forward with the image that 
these were for-profit companies that were supposed to make money.  There was little 
correlation in the media stories between government responsibilities to its citizens and 
shareholders of Alaska Native corporations.  There was an elementary understanding by 
both Alaska Native and non-Alaska Native that the for-profit corporations would address 
and fund what was clearly in the government area of responsibilities. 
 Stories in the press often noted the ‘coups’ that seemed to take place routinely.  
Only NANA, the regional corporation for Northwest Alaska, and Ahtna (Copper River 
Basin) seemed immune from the management and board turnovers.  The Alaska Native 
shareholders were responding to this new concept of ownership and did so in the only 
way they knew how – vote the incumbents out and put new people in to serve on the 
boards.  It should be noted, that at this time almost all of the Natives who wanted to be 
shareholders were shareholders and an estimated 99% of them were owners of 100 
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shares.  Gradually as death took its toll, the number of 100 share block-holders became 
fractured as Alaska Natives and non-Alaska Natives inherited stock.  Happening at the 
same time was the growing number of ‘afterborns,’ those Alaska Natives born after the 
effective date of the act December 18, 1971. 
 The Alaska Native shareholders seemed to be listening to the tundra that harbored 
the traditions and cultures of generations of Eskimos, Indians and Aleuts.  The incubators 
of the corporate governance system were not. 
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Chapter 2 
Prelude 
A Hundred Years Ago, Did the Alaska Native Leadership Intend This? 
 Robert is sitting in the UAF student cafeteria reading his mail. He opens a letter 
from the regional corporation he belongs to that is marked ‘important, proxy material.’  
Robert is a shareholder in the regional corporation.  Last summer when he attended an 
informational meeting in the tribal community hall on the proposal to expand the mining 
operations lands once owned by the local village corporation he was not a shareholder.  
When he started to ask a question about hiring local people, the chair interrupted him 
and asked if he was a shareholder.  When Robert answered, No, not yet, but I live here 
with my parents, brothers, and sisters, the chair cut him off and said the meeting was 
only for shareholders and he was not allowed to speak or ask questions.  He could, 
however, remain in the meeting and listen – if he behaved.  There were about two dozen 
shareholders in the village of mostly Yupik Eskimos.  Robert’s sister was embarrassed, so 
much so that she gave him one share of her ten so that he could participate in 
shareholders’ meetings – and be eligible for a job at the mine. 
 The proxy solicitation contains four names.  There are 12 members on the 
regional board of directors.  The solicitation also announces that any shareholder of 
Alaska Native descent can run for the board; however that does not mean the 
shareholder’s name will be on the ballot unless approved by the nominations committee 
made up of all directors not running for reelection.  The committee is made up of eight 
directors, all of them having served 20 to 30 years.  Two of the directors live on the 
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Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta.  Three of the directors have graduated from a university and 
one of the three has a B.A. in business administration. 
 All members of the regional board of directors serve on the boards of other 
Alaska Native organizations such as the non-profit health corporation, non-profit 
housing authority, and federal/state regional subsistence advisory committee.  Most of 
the board members are on a first name basis with the state’s political leadership. 
 No independent candidate, not nominated by the board for inclusion on the board 
slate, has won election in over 75 years. 
An Experiment Born Out of Poverty and Frustrations:  Efforts to Civilize the 
Indian and Bring the Alaska Native into the 20th Century 
 During the mid-1980s hearings of the Alaska Native Review Commission, funded 
in large part by private organizations, it became apparent that ANCSA was being 
implemented but there was still grinding poverty throughout the Alaska Native 
community.  The creation of 12 regional corporations and over 200 village corporations 
had sapped much of the financial resources awarded by the Settlement Act for the 
creation of entrepreneurial enterprises.  Jeanie Leask, then president of the Alaska 
Federation of Natives,  
If the implementation costs were heavy for the regions, it is worse for the 
villages, especially for the small ones, because they had so little cash from 
the Alaska Native Fund to begin with.  We have villages which are almost 
broke from going through the steps of incorporation, corporate elections, 
enrollments, stock issuance, land selections, land conveyances, CPA 
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audits, meetings, decisions, public reporting, etc., etc., etc.  They haven't 
made much money or really engaged in much economic development.  
But they have implemented ANCSA.  And many of them have now come 
to a point where they may have to sell some of their land in order to keep 
going.  (Berger, 1985, p. 30)  
An Experiment, Big and Bold  
There is no doubt that the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) 
was experimental.  It was passed at a time of great social unrest as civil rights protests 
and Vietnam War demonstrations left many Americans unsettled and pessimistic about 
the future.  Voting rights, poverty, discrimination, and corporate greed and influence over 
political processes dominated commentary in the media.  The country’s young and the 
intelligentsia had swung to the left while the social, political, and business leadership 
attempted to steer the country down the middle road.  Somewhere in the mix of all this 
was the oil industry with its leases on the Arctic Slope and its inability to get the permits 
approved to build the pipeline to pump the oil.  The Eskimos on the North Slope were in 
the driver’s seat as the momentum went down the road of social justice. 
The 1960s was a decade of change: music changed; clothing styles changed; hair 
styles changed; ideas about sex and drugs changed; and the proposals on how to deal with 
the Indian ‘problem’ began to change.  
Replicating two hundred years of federal Indian policy to create reservations in 
Alaska was a non-starter in the negotiations because Lower 48 Indian reservations were 
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pockets of poverty. However in many cases those reservations were far better off than 
Alaska Native villages in rural Alaska. 
The evolution of efforts to civilize the American Indian went from ethnic 
cleansing to teaching them how to farm and operate a ranch. Then in the 1950s the 
official federal policy became individual private ownership of the land.  “The idea of 
American Indian private property in land dates back as far back as 1633 and even 
President Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809) saw the policy as an appropriate instrument for 
civilizing the Indians.”  (Frantz, 1992, p. 23)   
Around the middle of the nineteenth century the idea of the 
individualization of landholdings was again taken up, for example, in the 
treaty negotiations with the Chippewa and the Shawnee.  From the 
viewpoint of American Indians, however, all these experiments were 
failures, because ultimately it often meant that the commonly held trust 
land was granted to individual Indians, who in turn very often lost their 
land.  (Frantz, 1992, p. 23)    
Removing the Indian from his homeland was a government policy that found 
favor even with President Jefferson.  The idea had originated with Jefferson who saw the 
new Louisiana Purchase as “perfect for the relocation of Indian tribes.” (Hoxie, Hoffman 
& Albert, 1999, p. 327)   
Thus, from almost all aspects – national guilt over treatment of Native Americans; 
increasing rates of poverty on reservations; need for civil rights for all minorities; and, 
the legal basis for land claims – it is not unreasonable to conclude that Congress expected 
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a continuation of the experiment. Nor is it unreasonable to conclude that no one in 
Congress expected anything except for a pipeline to be built. 
Facing Political Reality 
In Alaska, the idea of numerous reservations throughout the state was met with 
hostility by the general population.  Old timers who had spent decades in the territory, 
many born in Alaska, resented the fact that they would be excluded in any proposed 
settlement.  Reservations were viewed as permanent, which could tie up valuable areas of 
potential resource extraction and if there was any extraction it would benefit only a few.  
Free education, free healthcare, and no obligation to pay property taxes on reservation 
lands were often argued, first loudly in the early years of the land claims, then in more 
quiet terms as the 1960s ended.  With a voting population that could number 20% of the 
total, Alaska Natives made up a huge potential voting bloc that would be lost if 
reservations were established. 
The reservation idea was met with hostility in 1944 when the federal Department 
of Interior suggested that the Alaska Natives be compensated for their aboriginal claims.  
This prompted a visit to Washington D.C. by Alaska officials who said the U.S. Interior 
Department ‘stirred up the racial issue’ in the territory. (Crider, 1944) In The New York 
Times story, delegate-elect E.L. Bartlett is quoted as saying,  
These officials in Washington are talking about the rights of the [Alaska] 
natives, but I can't understand is how they can discriminate against the 
white men who moved up here and made their homes in Alaska.  If they 
cannot enforce the present rights of Indians, how do they propose to police 
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the new reservation policy?  I think it is unfortunate to stir up racial 
feelings between the Indians and the white people at this time when we 
have made so much progress toward removing the racial barrier.  (Crider, 
1944)  
E.L. ‘Bob’ Bartlett later won election as one of two U.S. Senators when Alaska 
became a state.  He served until his death in December 1968.  Governor Walter J. Hickel 
then appointed a former state representative, Ted Stevens, who was defeated in the 
August Republican primary to the Senate seat. Senator Stevens was a key architect of the 
Settlement Act. 
Once the 1966 gubernatorial election was over and the analysis of the election 
returns began, it quickly dawned on the politicians and the Alaska Natives that there 
would be a settlement, but what kind was still up in the air.  Several things were clear; it 
was going to be complex and there were going to be many obstacles but the Alaska 
Natives had to stick together.  In a guest editorial in the Tundra Times, Nick Gray wrote 
The myriad of problems which we will demand be resolved by the State of 
Alaska and the U.S. Federal Government are extremely confusing and 
complex.  But with careful selection of leaders among our people to 
represent each area – meeting delegates and representatives from sections 
of Alaska so that we pool our efforts and then speak with one voice.  Such 
a voice, representing 50,000 Alaska Natives – all voters, will impose upon 
our duly elected representatives in Juneau, a thorough and complete 
survey.  We must resist and forever detest the attitude of paternalism 
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which government and state actions incur.  Our hereditary claims can 
hardly be denied, since they extend far into the dark ages of history, far 
out-dating the beginning of most established nations . . . (Morgan, 1988, 
p. 217)   
That the Alaska Native land claims had legal and political legitimacy was 
clarified by Interior Secretary Stewart Udall’s executive order that there would be no 
federal land transfers until the claims were settled.  The December 1966 order (Executive 
Order 13175), commonly referred to as the ‘land freeze,’ meant that there would be no 
granting of pipeline construction permits for the proposed trans-Alaska pipeline.  The 
order simply formalized federal Indian trust policies. 
Six months later, Emil Notti, president of the newly-formed Alaska Federation of 
Natives, is quoted in The New York Times as stating that the Secretary is charged with 
looking after the [Alaska] Natives’ interests and “should maintain the freeze until positive 
action is taken for settlement of the claims.” (The New York Times, 1967) What was in 
store for the Alaska Native was unknown but whatever it was going to be, it was going to 
be tangible. “We realize compromises will undoubtedly be made,’ he (Notti) added, and 
he agreed it would be in the [Alaska] natives’ interest to present a united front with the 
state once Secretary Udall presents to Congress a bill he is preparing.” (The New York 
Times, 1967)  
Udall's executive order caught everyone’s attention.  “It was a critical victory for 
[Alaska] Natives, Robert Willard, a Juneau leader in the claims battle, remembers 
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[Alaska] Natives’ reaction:  ‘Everybody said, He did what?’  Then everybody from our 
side realized this is pretty serious.” (Brown, Thompson & Holst, 1999)   
As 1971 was coming to an end “it was clear there would be a settlement.” (Brown 
et al., 1999)   But what kind of a settlement?   
[Alaska] Native representatives traveled to and from Washington, D.C. as 
a number of proposals and settlement bills were debated.  They spent days 
meeting with pipeline contractors, unions, the Sierra Club and others, and 
knocked on doors of congressman to keep the land claims issue in front of 
them. (Brown et al., 1999)    
“When the settlement bill was in its final stages, lobbyists had gone over it for 
days.  Willard said that even though they had just a few hours to go over the final version, 
they were, by then, thoroughly familiar with it.” (Brown et al., 1999)   
There are other opinions of who knew what was in the bill and what was not in 
the bill.  “Even guys lobbying didn't know what was in the act, Schaeffer of Kotzebue 
said.  People back in the villages knew even less.” (Brown et al., 1999)   
FitzGerald Commission Findings 
When the FitzGerald Commission came out with its findings, the idea that some 
kind of an entity had to ‘own’ the land that would eventually be awarded to the [Alaska] 
Natives, it was a foregone conclusion it would be a corporation.  (Federal Field 
Committee, 1968, p. 530) The corporation is a familiar organizational concept and 
seemed a logical alternative to reservations. Corporations can be used to fit almost any 
concept of ownership and responsibility.   
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Corporations are, in fact, involved in virtually every type of human 
activity today, legal and otherwise.  The reason is that the corporation is 
not comprised of an array of job-specific skills, but rather a means of 
organizing any human activity.  While corporations exist as small as one 
person . . . the real genius of the entity lies in its ability to employ large 
numbers of people in complex enterprises.  (Brown, 2003, p. 2)  
Was the reliance on the corporate system wishful thinking?   
In retrospect, the endurance of a subsistence economy in village Alaska 
suggests that the land claim’s central reliance on a corporate structure 
might of itself have been wishful thinking on behalf of the land claim’s 
architects.  The idea of corporations emerged as a way to hold assets and 
land.  The lands could be lost through bankruptcy and in 1991 they would 
also be at risk from corporate takeover and bankruptcy.  Many wonder 
why Congress and land claims leaders would put the very lands that 
[Alaska] Native peoples hoped to save forever, in something as risky as a 
corporation.  (Zellen, 2008, p. 47)  
‘We didn’t want trust lands.  In a lot of ways this was a social experiment.  
They were trying, I think, to get the Indian into the economic mainstream 
of America,’ founding Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) President Emil 
Notti later explained.  ‘We decided that if we were going to make 
mistakes, we’d do it ourselves.  If we were going to be poor we’d at least 
be responsible for what we did.  And it’s probably best to get people 
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independent.  And one of the quickest ways to familiarize people with the 
economic system is to give them a stake in it.  And what better stake is 
there than a hundred shares in a corporation.’ (Zellen, 2008, p. 47)  
 It should be noted that when Emil Notti was President of the AFN it was 
essentially a two-person office with a volunteer board of directors.  AFN was funded with 
membership dues, donations, and raffles. In May 1968 the organization was awarded a 
$282,792 federal manpower contract to develop training.  That same year the statewide 
Alaska Native organization borrowed $100,000 from Tyonek which was recently wealthy 
from oil and gas revenues on their reservation.  (Federal Field Committee, 1968, p. 443)   
 The early years of the AFN are in sharp contrast with the AFN of 2013, a multi-
million dollar organization with billion dollar corporations as members, all with seats on 
the AFN board of directors. (AFN homepage, http://www.nativefederation.org/)  
Was There Bias for a Corporate Structure?    
 Was this corporate bias coming from the behind the scenes architects?  Was that 
the main reason there was so much secrecy during the negotiation process from 1968 to 
1971?  The answer to both questions is the rising costs of the Vietnam War and the Great 
Society programs were worrisome to President Lyndon Johnson’s administration (1963–
1969).  Perhaps it was time to turn more towards free market ideas instead of continuing 
to follow Keynes economic theory.   
As former Attorney General Ramsey Clark recalled, ‘We were – not so 
much me but the other lawyers working on it – were, business corporate 
lawyers.  That was their history, that was their knowledge, that was their 
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joy.  And their familiarity with [Alaska] Native ways and needs was 
somewhat limited.’  As a result, ANCSA took on a corporate form, and 
this, perhaps more than anything else, led to grassroots movement after 
ANCSA was implemented to restore tribal sovereignty, and to reject the 
corporatization of [Alaska] Native culture. (AFN homepage)  
 In 1970, as the fall elections approached, Charles ‘Etok’ Edwardsen, Jr., 
Executive Director of the Arctic Slope Native Association went ‘berserk’ when he found 
out that the lawyers for the Alaska Federation of Natives were not telling their client what 
was being proposed behind closed doors.  Edwardsen found out there was no coalition 
working for passage of HR 1830.  “Charlie found that things had been both under lobbied 
and over lobbied.  Alaska Natives, lawyers, state representatives, the Alaska delegation, 
and lobbyists were running at top speed in all directions.”  (Gallagher, 1974, p. 203)   
With communications between Washington, D.C., and rural Alaska still primitive 
because in most rural villages, a single telephone was used by all, a great deal of 
technical and detailed bill language got lost in the translations between Alaska Natives of 
different cultures and education levels with those who worked on behalf of the AFN and 
the non-profit Alaska Native associations. 
 During the entire time of the negotiations, it is suggested that little was known or 
revealed to the clients by the corporate lawyers about corporate governance.  And, the 
lawyers knew little about how Alaska Natives governed themselves in remote villages 
over an area one-fifth the size of the United States.  The proposed legislation was on the 
fast track with a third of the U.S. Senate and all House members up for election.  
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Alaska’s gubernatorial election was focused on a proposed trans-Alaska pipeline that was 
stalled by the ‘land freeze’ imposed by former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall.  
Alaskans were impatient and numerous business organizations such as Chambers of 
Commerce passed resolutions urging swift action.  Alaska Native organizations were 
being blamed for stalling economic development.  The state government needed revenues 
to provide for basic services and build public infrastructure such as roads, harbors, 
airports, and education facilities. 
 Even in more recent times, many suggest that the Alaska Native leaders failed to 
grasp the consequences of the use of corporations to own the land.  In the book Growing 
Up Native in Alaska published by the for-profit regional corporation CIRI, Patience 
Merculief views the past as many of those born after December 18, 1971 do.   
When they worked on ANCSA, I get the feeling that they were steam-
rolling through it, trying to come up with something different from 
reservations they had in the Lower 48.  Alaska was (sic) become a state, 
and they had to give the Alaska Natives something, some money and some 
land.  And the Alaska Natives wanted something, something in return for 
their land, but I don’t think they were sure about how they wanted to 
receive it.  I know what it ended up in is that they got in the form of 
corporations, a foreign concept brought into the Alaska Native 
communities.  They didn’t know about big business and corporations.  
They had to get educated and learn about it.  It was a whole new process.  
They had this money and the land.  (McClanahan, 2000, p. 72-73)  
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 She goes on to say “They tried to make the corporations into something that 
would benefit all Alaska Natives, but they weren’t thinking 20, 40, 50 years into the 
future.  They were thinking right now.  With corporations, land could be bought and sold.  
So maybe in 50, 60, 70 years, they could be even non-Alaska Native owned or operated 
corporations.” (McClanahan, 2000, p. 72-73)  
 It must be emphasized that ANCSA was a negotiated settlement with those who 
claimed the land.  Each Alaska Native of at least one quarter Eskimo, Indian or Aleut 
blood, or one accepted by village residents, was entitled to own 100 shares in a village 
corporation and 100 shares in a regional corporation or, if a Alaska Native did not live in 
a village, only in the regional corporation.  There were no restrictions on who could 
inherit the shares.  (Public Law 92-203, Sections 3, 4, 5.)     
Social and Political Pressure for a Settlement     
 The pressure for a land settlement was intense.  Alaska’s political and civic 
leaderships were impatient with the delays in the construction of a pipeline from Prudhoe 
Bay to tidewater at Valdez.  The delays were implemented under Interior Secretary 
Udall’s land freeze – which prohibited any permits on federal land which at that time was 
roughly 99% of the state – until the Alaska Native land claims issue was resolved.  The 
Interior Secretary’s trust responsibilities over Native Americans included Alaska Natives.  
 As the FitzGerald Commission documented, the social, economic, and physical 
conditions of the Alaska Native in the 1960s were among the worst in the United States.  
Seventy percent of the Alaska Natives lived in 178 villages that were predominately 
Alaska Native, half of those villages with a population of less than 155.  However 
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migration was occurring, mainly to Kotzebue, Bethel and Barrow.  Barrow’s population 
doubled in the years from 1950 to 1960.  There were 12 fewer villages than in 1950, but 
80% of the villages were larger.  The crib death rate among [Alaska] Natives was twice 
that of white Alaskans. In 1966 the principle causes of death were accident, influenza, 
pneumonia, and diseases of early infancy.  The cost of goods was 74% higher in the 
Alaska villages than in Seattle.  Joblessness among [Alaska] Natives was between 50% to 
60% in March and September 1966 as there were few year-round jobs.  Most of the 
seasonal jobs were unskilled.  (Federal Field Committee, 1968, pp. 12-16)     
 The FritzGerald Commission also painted a grim statistical image of how well 
prepared the Alaska Natives were to manage a corporate system if the Congress awarded 
land and money in an effort to avoid creating reservations.  Of the 25,000 Alaska Natives 
14 years and older in 1960, 50% had less than a sixth grade education, 21% seventh or 
eighth grade, and 14% high school.  Of those attending high school, 8% graduated.  Two 
percent went off to college and only a fraction of those completed four years. (Federal 
Field Committee, 1968, pp. 12-16)       
 It is no wonder that Charles Edwardsen believed that the Commission thought of 
the lands claims solution as a potential part of a resolution to the poverty in rural Alaska. 
(Gallagher, 2001, p. 192)  
Seeds of Corporate Democracy   
 There was little anticipation of how those born after 1971 would feel about not 
having original shares.  Though a relation, such as parent, grandparent, aunt or uncle, 
could transfer shares upon their death, not everyone could expect to be a shareholder with 
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profit-sharing rights from the development of the subsurface estate.  The regional 
corporations and several of the village corporations have become so large and influential 
that Alaska Native identity is strongly attached.  When the question was asked of Gloria 
O’Neil, an ‘afterborn’ Alaska Native,  
‘How do you feel about the fact that some people born after 1971 are not 
shareholders?’ she said, ‘I understand financially why it might not be in 
the best interests of the corporation to open the rolls and dilute the shares 
of the stock if for some reason a Alaska Native corporation like CIRI were 
to make everybody born after 1971 shareholders.  But then again, I think 
that it’s important that individuals born after ’71 have an identity.  And a 
lot of the young people we see here know they are Alaska Natives or 
descendants of Alaska Natives, but some cases, they don’t know what 
village their parents are from.  Or, they don’t know if they’re Yup’ik or 
Tlingit.’  (McClanahan, 2000)   
In 1974 in testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Gregg K. Erickson, then a staff economist with the National Fuels and Energy 
Policy Study and a former economist for the FritzGerald Commission, said, “In America, 
at least, the corporation has been perceived as a threat to representative democracy and a 
source of irresponsible power for well over a century.” (Federal Charters for Energy 
Corporation, 1974, p. 249)  Erickson  citied an editorial from The New York Times, 
entitled The Corporate State, from which he quoted its views on the growth of the 
corporation by asking the question, “how do we ‘prevent powerful special interests from 
 
 
 
64 
frustrating the Democratic processes . . . without undermining the efficiency of business.” 
(Federal Charters, 1974, p. 249)  Erickson was not referring to the newly created Alaska 
Native corporations but to the corporation as it existed in America at that time.  His views 
are noteworthy because his contributions to the FritzGerald Commission were likely 
considered when its recommendations were made.   
The corporate charter, whoever issues it, is – at the very least – a statement 
of goals.  (Peter) Drucker has been at pains to point out that 
decentralization can only be implemented successfully if the leadership at 
the various organizational levels is committed to common goals, and only 
if all see themselves improved by the achievement of those goals. (Federal 
Charters, 1974, p. 249)  
Undoing Federal Assimilation Policy    
Federal Indian Policy from the 1930s until the passage of ANCSA “showed that 
the assimilation policy had led to a great loss of Indian land and an overblown 
administrative bureaucracy while the Indians’ economic advancement and their readiness 
for initiatives was not promoted.  The Meriam Report (Meriam, 1928) further revealed 
the deplorable socioeconomic situation of America’s indigenous populations:  their dire 
poverty, their high child mortality rates, the generally poor state of their health, their 
appalling living conditions and an altogether inadequate level of education.” (Frantz, 
1999, pp. 30-31)  
The Meriam Report led to more liberal Indian policies which were framed in the 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) at the beginning of President Franklin Roosevelt’s era 
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and lasted until shortly after the end of World War II. (Frantz, 1999, p. 31)   What is 
noteworthy is that the IRA is often hailed as an advancement of Alaska Native 
governance and is seen by Alaska tribes as the authority on which their official federal 
recognition comes.  There was, however, unlike and unseen during the ANCSA 
negotiations anything similar to what the Pueblo Indian communities did which was to 
object to the federal government forcing on them the American form of government.  
They objected to the IRA because it would force them to mimic the American model. 
After fifty years of a policy aimed at undermining them, the tribes now 
were offered the possibility to form themselves anew with an elected tribal 
court and police system.  A considerable number of the tribes – including 
most of the Pueblo Indian communities of the Southwest and, at first, the 
Navajos – objected to this offer, however, as it would have obliged them 
to copy the United States model which was foreign to their culture. 
(Frantz, 1999, p. 31)     
 The negotiators or, perhaps it would be better to described them as interested 
parties, worked to come up with a settlement that they would understand and there were 
no visible signs of anguish or protest as what a corporate system might entail.  As noted 
above, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark maintains, the lawyers were imposing 
their culture, which they understood very well, on the Alaska Natives. 
Managing the For-Profit Corporations 
 The transformation of aboriginal peoples from communal governance of land and 
natural resources to corporations owned by shareholders happened quickly.  On 
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December 18, 1971 Alaska Native ways of doing and thinking changed to what the 
Settlement Act required – organizing as for-profit business corporations along the 
geographic boundaries of the non-profit, community advocacy Alaska Native 
associations.  [Public Law 92-203, Sec. 7(d).] Subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering 
began to lose it allure as the status of a corporate directorship grew. 
 Were Alaska Natives adequately prepared to receive a land settlement of such 
magnitude as a corporate asset along with a cash settlement which would be managed 
under the corporation system?  It was a hotly debated question during the 1970s because 
of low education attainment levels; high poverty rates; remote locations in scattered 
villages without transportation and communications infrastructure; and, a general lack of 
lawyers, accountants, administrators, and other professionals who understood the Alaska 
Native culture. They were entering a well-established system of governance that was 
alien to generations of their traditions and cultures.  Unlike the Pueblo Indians, there was 
no objection.  It was simply an acceptance that the establishment of Alaska Native 
reservations would not occur. 
 Since the passage of the ANCSA and the growth of the Alaska Native population 
since 1971, an increasing percentage of Alaska Natives are not enrolled in any regional 
corporation and increasingly the question is being asked, why?  Where did the corporate 
system originate, why did it originate, and why would only those alive on December 18, 
1971 be eligible for ownership of original shares of stock?  While many attempts to 
answer the questions have been made, the responses have been accepted almost in a state 
of disbelief. How could the following generations be so easily and quickly forgotten, 
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particularly of the fact almost every Native American treaty with the United States was 
predicated on preserving the rights and heritage of the following generations. 
 While there are many unanswered questions regarding governance of the 
settlement corporations, it is probably safe to assume that corporate governance did not 
emerge from the Alaska Native leadership or those in the villages who maintained a 
subsistence lifestyle of hunting, fishing, and gathering.  During the period following the 
act’s passage, and non-Alaska Natives were heaping praise on the corporate system, there 
is little evidence of any Alaska Native leaders boldly stepping forward to claim the prize 
for originating the idea.  By the early 1990s, responses to the questions raised by 
‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives, such as Patience Merculief and Gloria O’Neil, went 
unanswered.  Times had changed as the ‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives matured and reached 
adulthood in full comprehension of being left out of ANCSA. 
 ANCSA corporations were formalized in 1972 and by 1982 the evaluations on 
Alaska Native corporations started to appear.  In three paragraphs, The New York Times 
summed it up.   
There is a roller-coaster quality to the collective business performance of 
the [Alaska] native-owned corporations that were created 12 years ago by 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.  Blessed by huge grants of 
natural resources and endowed by huge injections of Federal and state 
cash, these corporations have run through almost the full gamut of 
American business experience over the years.  Some have established 
solid earnings records; others have come perilously close to bankruptcy.  
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In some instances the Eskimo, Aleut and Indian shareholders brought in 
outside executives to run their affairs.  Sometimes outsiders have done 
well, sometimes not.  (Turner, 1983)   
Germinating the Corporate Seed 
 During the Alaska Native Review Commission hearings, Natialie Susuk of New 
Stuyahok testified as to how it was during those early days of corporate formation.   
As we know, these (corporate) officers-representatives were originally 
chosen for the fact that they would attend to business matters relating to a 
profit corporation.  These representatives may or may not have as much 
convictions as others on the issues of subsistence and land retention, 
which seems to be the main concern of most Alaska Natives I know.  We 
shouldn’t expect corporation officers to represent our interests. (Berger, 
1985, p. 9)  
 In the 1960s a new theory on the practices of corporations began to take shape.  
Academics were theorizing and debating the emergence of new thoughts on corporate 
social responsibility that were evolving from concerns about the environment, civil 
rights, the Vietnam War, and human rights around the globe.  Milton Friedman and the 
free market schools of Chicago and Austria began to clash with Keynesian economics 
that had become the predominant economic theory since President Franklin Roosevelt 
embraced it in order to spur economic growth during the depression years. 
 The national discussion on the evolution of economic thought from John Maynard 
Keynes to his theoretical nemesis Milton Friedman on the role of government in the free 
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market place no doubt had an influence in the fast changing Washington, D.C. public 
policy and political environment of the 1960s and 1970s.  President Johnson's Great 
Society programs changed the face of America and brought new energy to old ideas of 
civil rights and economic justice but the New Deal policies of Franklin Roosevelt had 
little impact on Indians.  There seemed to be no will to replicate them in the last frontier. 
 Lower 48 Indian reservations were pockets of poverty.  The social statistics were 
numbing as was the stereotypical image.   
An Indian reservation can be characterized as an open air slum.  It has a 
feeling of emptiness and isolation.  There are miles and miles of dirt or 
gravel roads without any signs of human life.  The scattered Indian 
communities are made up of scores of tarpaper shacks or log cabins with 
tiny windows and a stovepipe sticking out of a roof that is weighted down 
with pieces of metal and automobile tires.  These dwellings each of them 
home for six or seven persons, often have no electricity or running water – 
sometimes not even an outhouse.  The front yards are frequently littered 
with abandoned, broken-down automobiles that are too expensive to repair 
and too much trouble to junk. (Sorkin, 1971, p. 2)   
In 1964 statistics, the median income for reservation Indians was $1,800, $3,400 for non-
whites and $6,283 for all males. (Sorkin, 1971, p. 9) In 1967 the unemployment rates for 
reservation Indians was 37.3%, 6% for non-whites, and 3.1% for all males. (Sorkin, 1971, 
p. 12) For education attainment, the reservation Indian between the ages of 20-24 had 9.2 
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years of school completed while those 65 and older completed 3.5 years. (Sorkin, 1971, 
p. 38)  By 1971, Milton Friedman's economic theories seemed ripe to put to practical use. 
 Friedman's free market theories began to take deep roots in the nation's capital 
following the Johnson presidency of social programs and more restrictive government 
intervention.  He conceptualized his theories in his 1980 book Free to Choose.   
Economic freedom is an essential requisite for political freedom.  By 
enabling people to cooperate with one another without coercion or central 
direction, it reduces the area over which political power is exercised.  In 
addition, by dispersing power, the free market provides an offset to 
whatever concentration of political power may arise.  The combination of 
economic and political power in the same hands is a sure recipe for 
tyranny. (Friedman & Friedman, 1980 (1979), p 3.)   
The Corporate Seed   
 In the 1960s, Civil Rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X 
were questioning how the world’s wealthiest and most powerful country had so many 
poor people restrained because of racism, bigotry, and prejudices.  The old ways of doing 
things were not acceptable to thousands of blacks – and American Indians – who returned 
home from World War II in the Pacific and European theaters where other people treated 
them as equals.  Racism and prejudice seemed to be alive only in America where poll 
taxes; transportation (back of the bus); separate seating based on color in theaters and at 
lunch counters; and, even in colleges where admissions officers requested that a 
photograph accompany application for admissions. 
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 By 1970, Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman’s publications and essays 
were widely praised and citied. In a New York Times Magazine essay he said “social 
responsibility does not belong in business.” (Friedman, 1970)    
 Friedman’s essay generated discussion on ethics and was quoted by Stanford 
University Professor Jeffrey Pfeffer in his book on corporate governance.   
In a free-enterprise business, there is no room for such a thing as ‘social 
responsibilities of business,’ for responsibilities can only accrue to 
individuals, never to groups such as corporations.  Certainly, as an 
individual, a manager or executive may recognize or voluntarily assume 
some ‘social responsibility’ towards his community or church, for 
instance.  ‘But in these respects he is acting as a principal, not an agent:  
he is spending his own money or time or energy, not the money of his 
employers or the time or energy he has contracted to devote to their 
purposes.’ (Sison, 2008, p. 4)  
 Friedman was enormously influential during the 1960s.  He had a column in the 
weekly newsmagazine, Newsweek (1968 to 1978) and in 1976 was awarded the Pulitzer 
Prize in Economics. 
 The seeds of private corporate ownership of the assets of a yet-to-be Alaska 
Native land claims were sown during a time of conflicting economic theories, spewing 
over into national politics.  The liberalism of Lord John Maynard Keynes, which had 
taken hold of U.S. Federal Government economic policies in the 1930s, lasted until 
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President Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980.  Even Republican President Richard Nixon 
is famously quoted as saying, “we’re all Keynesian now.” (Pealstein, 2008)  
But, the winds of change in economic theory in federal policy-making were 
changing slowly. Friedman’s stature grew immensely in Senator Barry Goldwater’s 1964 
losing presidential campaign where he served as Economics Adviser. 
In ground fertile with free market ideas and pockets of poverty throughout the 
country, and even though a fair, just, and equitable land settlement was second seed to the 
interests of oil, bold experimental ideas took root with the Alaska Native cause.  
Corporations owned by shareholders of Alaska Native blood blossomed in Alaska. 
Secretary Udall’s Trust Responsibility    
The question of Alaska Native land claims arose in 1963 when a group of twenty-
four villages asked Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall to impose a “freeze on all land 
transfers in disputed areas, request echoed by the National Council on Indian Affairs.”  
The Secretary took no action and the only serious proposal was “to work with the State of 
Alaska in getting the [Alaska] natives title to some of the lands which they claim.” 
(Clarkin, 2001, p. 249)    
  Somewhere along the way the corporation seed was planted and it began to grow 
slowly, almost unnoticed as the federal Department of War and Department of Interior 
concepts of the 1800s of how to deal with Alaska’s ‘Indian Problem’ were discarded.  
Alaska’s Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts were too few, the land too vast and the mentality 
of the leadership was too tied to frontier concepts.  The governments headquartered in 
faraway places such as Juneau, Alaska’s capital, and Washington, D.C. were easy targets 
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of angry Alaskans who wanted to do whatever they wanted – mining, forestry, fishing, 
and pay no sales, property or state income taxes.  Contrasting that was the social turmoil 
that erupted easily – and often – on colleges throughout the United States.  Old ideas tied 
to reservations and patronization were not applicable to the Alaska of the 1960s where 
the business and political classes made up of mostly immigrants found those ideas 
unacceptable, but a good starting point of how to deal with the Alaska Natives. 
Senungetuk’s Hide Box   
In Joseph Senungetuk’s book, Give or Take a Century, he talks of a prized 
possession of the ancient ones, a ‘hide box,’ made of walrus hide and known to the 
people of Wales as a place for personal possessions.   For others, it was an object of 
curiosity, for the question was ‘what’s in the box?’  The hide box was an object of 
curiosity. (Senungetuk, 1971, p. 175)  
 The book, written and completed in 1970, paints a colorful analogy of what the 
negotiations process might have been.   
Today our life can be described as one of existence in the 
restricting framework of an alien civilization, an alien Hide Box.  Through 
the government itself and its agencies; through the complete lack of 
understanding of our culture and history; through the mouths of the 
teachers and lecturers and statesman who speak for America – we are 
crushed in a Hide Box.  The foreigners who have painted the Hide Box 
with representations of the Alaska Native culture as savage, useful only as 
excuses for take-over of valuable Alaska Native land, requiring 
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‘Christianizing’ to make us more pliable, have done this.  The Hide Box, 
as used by aliens who come among us, has become the embodiment of 
isolation.  Isolation of the [Alaska] Natives while strangers took his land. 
(Senungetuk, 1971, pp. 175-180)  
 The imposition of the corporate culture probably was not done with ill will or, 
perhaps it was.  But, just as it was when federal Indian policy was changed without 
consultation with Lower 48 tribes, the corporate concept of an incubation period started 
to run after the first land claims were filed in 1963.  The lawyers, consultants, 
accountants, and bureaucrats did not understand the Alaska Native in his element so what 
they did was put the Alaska Native in the Hide Box and discarded it when they began to 
superimpose their concepts that they understood very well – how corporations were 
governed.  
Traditional Alaska Native Governance in the Modern Sense 
 What kinds of governance were the Alaska Natives familiar with so that they 
could make some comparisons?  There were two models in Alaska that Alaska Natives 
had some familiarity with.  The first was the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) village and 
the second was municipal government. 
 After the passage of the IRA (Wheeler-Howard Act, June 18, 1934), the federal 
Indian policies of privatizing lands held in trust for the tribal members was reversed after 
almost a half century under the Dawes Act.  Under the Dawes Act, from 1887 to 1934, 
the lands held in trust for tribes went from 138 million acres to 48 million.  The severe 
poverty of the reservations prompted a new deal for Indians under President Franklin 
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Roosevelt and an American-styled system of governance was implemented whereby 
tribes could elect governing bodies and enact laws just as other local governments in the 
U.S. could.   
Under the IRA, Alaska Natives were familiar enough with aspects of tribal 
governments since 62 villages had adopted constitutions and were certified.  The villages 
had constitutions but no reservations set aside.  The opportunity for any to lead and to 
partake in the decision-making process was preserved for all in a U.S.-styled tribal 
constitution. 
A northwest Alaska village, Unalakleet, requested in 1948 that a reservation be 
established by the U.S. Interior Department so they could have self-government; one of 
the purposes of which was to prohibit the transportation and importation of alcohol 
because of the devastating effects it was having on the residents. (Mitchell, 1997) A land 
base in a Lower 48 Indian reservation-styled government to government relationship with 
the United States could presumably do what the Territory of Alaska was unwilling or 
unable to do.  Nome, a rough and tumble mining town-turned-military outpost consisting 
of numerous bars and liquor stores, was just 90 miles away.  With reservation status, 
Unalakleet Alaska Natives could govern their own reservation and implement those 
ordinances not prohibited by the IRA constitution. 
Eagle, a mining town on the Yukon River near the U.S. Canadian boundary, was 
the first city incorporated in the Territory of Alaska when its citizens voted in 1901 to 
have the powers of local government common to other municipalities in the United 
States.  The Han Indians of the area were, however, not allowed to vote and the U.S. 
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Congress did not give voting status to Native Americans until 1924. (Indian Citizen Act 
of 1924, Ch. 233, p. 253)  Several predominately [Alaska] Native towns were 
incorporated prior to Alaska statehood including Barrow (1958), Bethel (1957), Nome 
(1901), and Kotzebue (1958).  While Nome was, at times up to 80% Eskimo, it was not 
until the 21st century that the residents elected their first [Alaska] Native mayor. (The 
Associated Press, 2003)   
Towns in the territory discouraged voting by the Alaska Natives.  In Ketchikan in 
March 1923, Charles Jones was indicted by a federal grand jury for voting and swearing 
under oath that he was a citizen.  Also indicted was Tillie Paul for aiding and abetting.  
Both were Tlingit Indians.  A bench warrant was issued for their arrests.  At trial the jury 
found for Jones and the federal district attorney dismissed the charges against [Tillie] 
Paul. (Paul, 2003, pp. 43-44)  
While municipal or tribal governments are somewhat similar to corporations in 
governance, there are significant differences.  And while it can be reasonable to assume 
that Alaska Natives did not mistake local governments and corporate governance in 1971, 
it can also be reasonable to argue that it could have been the only forms of governance 
the Alaska Natives were familiar with. It may have been close enough for the Alaska 
Natives to be led to believe that it would be a system of governance that they would have 
voices for all and promises of participation for any that wanted to be involved – just as it 
was with hunting, fishing and gathering in the subsistence economy of rural Alaska. 
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Governance in the Corporate System: The Superimposition of an Alien System 
 Walter Johnson of Anchorage described at the Alaska Native Review 
Commission hearings in Anchorage the difference between an ANCSA corporation and a 
publically-traded corporation this way:   
The corporate structure has been set up for a person to put whatever 
amount of wealth that he wishes to put into that corporation.  But, no, not 
the Alaska Native.  The Alaska Native put everything, the land, the 
money, and according to ANCSA, they put their birthright and everything 
else into that corporate structure that we hate so much. (Berger, 1985, 
p. 36)     
 The expectations and intent over implementation of the settlement act are part of a 
growing debate as more and more ‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives mature and realize the 
enormous wealth of the subsurface estate in an area approximately the size of Missouri.  
The Alaska Native population growth coupled with the Congressional issuance of 6.5 
million original shares is a growing gap likely to split families and communities and 
aggravate the tension between rural and urban residents.  That tension exists in 2013 and 
is apparent but is often explained in terms of Alaska Native vs. non-Alaska Native and 
the underlying tones of prejudices and bigotries. 
The Challenges of Change   
 Congress has always recognized the peoples’ right to change the law through 
pressure on elected officials; for amendments to the U.S. Constitution; or in response to 
economic recessions. Congress did not decide how the ‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives were to 
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be treated nor did Congress even vaguely suggest that the kind of governance of a 
publically traded corporation was to be used in the new Alaska Native corporations.  
 The changes did come and they came fast.  Congress reacted to pressure from 
Alaska Native corporations and implemented changes in policies, laws, and the IRS Code 
for such favorable treatment such as sale of net operating losses, tax-free status of 
dividends, special elders’ payouts, and extended the limitations on the sale and transfer of 
stock in the corporations.  These were revolutionary ideas because of the uniqueness of 
the corporations so it is easy to assume that Congress expected the Alaska Natives to 
develop their own rules and their application, not to be poor imitators of corporate free 
market ideas. 
 The 1950 census showed there were 128,643 residents in the Territory of Alaska 
but what is more significant is the growth during the war years.  In the 1940 census, the 
population was 72,524 a demonstration of World War II’s effect on Alaska.  The Alaska 
Native population grew from 33,863 in 1950 to 43,081 in 1960 and in 1969, one year 
before passage of the Settlement Act, the Alaska Native population was 51,712.  While 
the 2010 census has 722,718 Alaskans counted with 14.9% Alaska Native, the 
significance is in the counting of those who consider themselves multi-racial.  The Alaska 
Native Health Consortium estimated the Alaska Native population in 2006 at 131,002 
which is less than the official census in 2010.  The projected 2030 Alaska Native 
population is 162,820. (U.S. Census Figures, 2010)  
 The Settlement Act restricted the number of shareholders, requiring only two 
things; first, be alive on December 18, 1971 and, second, be at least one quarter Alaska 
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Native blood.  When the number of eligible persons was determined, the total number of 
shares issued was approximately 6.5 million (100 shares per Alaska Native).  The 
numbers offered vary according to when and who gets counted. 
 With the growth of the Alaska Native population and total number of shares 
restricted (for those receiving 7(i) profits), the gap between those who will receive a 
share of the profits from resources development and those without original shares will 
widen.  This will likely create tension and confusion as is common between those who 
have and those who wonder why they do not have.  It is likely to split families and close 
friends as money disputes often do.  To be fair, several of the larger regional corporations 
have attempted to address this issue by creating a class of life estate stock for the new 
Alaska Natives but it is only a partial remedy and does not affect the finite number of 
shares eligible under the original act for 7(i) profit sharing.   
 In a 1986 study by the U.S. Department of the Interior it was reported that 
approximately 80,000 people enrolled for shares under the Settlement Act.  The number 
of people who claimed to be [Alaska] Native in the 1970 census was about 30,000 less 
but the Alaska census does not count the number throughout the nation. (U.S. Department 
of the Interior, ANCSA 1986 Study)  
 In another study, this one done by CIRI in 1983, the number of shareholders in 
regional corporations had decreased.  NANA went from 4,828 to 4,628; Bristol Bay 
Native Corporation, 5,401 to 5,238; AHTNA decreased by 70 shareholders to 1,004; and, 
the Aleut Corporation dropped to 3,144 from 3,249. (CIRI, Shareholder Study, 1983) 
 
 
 
80 
Since 1971, the Alaska Native population continues to increase and by 2030 it is 
projected to be over three times the 1970 census. 
 Several of the regional corporations have created a new class of shareholders for 
those born after December 18, 1971.  Sealaska, Inc., Doyon, Ltd., NANA, and Arctic 
Slope Regional Corporation have enlarged their shareholder numbers significantly but it 
should be noted that there are differences between an owner of original shares and an 
‘afterborn’ shareholder.  An owner of original shares can give his or her shares to family 
members or by death leave his or her shares to anyone in the world.  Perhaps more 
significant is that only owners of original shares will share in the profits from the 
development of the subsurface estate and timber harvesting on regional corporation lands. 
 While there are major differences between Alaska Native corporations with a 
publically traded company, the application of the publically traded corporate culture, 
mores, board election process, and management structure appear to be replicated in the 
Alaska Native corporations and on many of its shareholders.  Management’s never 
ending public relations campaigns convince some shareholders that the corporation is 
doing well.  This ‘trust me, we're doing it for your own good’ attitude is patronizing and 
may obscure problems that will bite the corporation and its shareholders at a later time. 
 In the formative years of the ANCSA corporations, annual elections of directors 
were the norm.  The process changed as disgruntled shareholders voiced strong opinions 
on business operations and directors’ behavior at annual meetings that found little favor 
with the incumbents.  Management and directors determined to maintain control of the 
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board, or angling to gain majority control, adopted the processes and tactics used by 
publically-traded companies. 
 The tactics often used by regional corporations include listing only candidates on 
the ballot deemed qualified by a board committee appointed by a majority of the board 
and then using corporate funds to ensure that candidate's election.  Other tactics include 
cumulative voting; originally used to ensure the election of non-board nominated 
candidates. 
 In publically traded corporations the trend is towards more shareholders’ rights 
and towards corporate democracy.  Under traditional procedures, shareholders have had 
limited options for voting their shares in any corporate election:  shareholders could vote 
in favor of the company’s slate of nominees or withhold their votes for one or more of 
these nominees.  One consequence of this arrangement:  even if just one share was voted 
in favor of a company’s nominee to its board of directors, he or she would be legally 
elected to the board. 
With the last few years that has largely changed.  In 2013, over two-thirds 
of large public companies have adopted a form of majority voting.  Under 
the new rules, if any of the company’s nominees for director receives less 
than a majority of the votes cast at the annual meeting of shareholders, that 
nominee must submit his or her resignation to the board.  At these 
companies, an institutional investor can now lobby other shareholders to 
withhold their votes on a particular candidate and stand a chance of 
forcing that candidates’ withdrawal. (Pozen, 2009)  
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 How soon Alaska Native corporate boards will adopt new rules to allow for more 
shareholder influence remains unpredictable.  The cost of running an independent 
campaign is prohibitive and management often uses control of mailing lists of 
shareholders to their advantage.  In Alaska Native corporation elections the timing is 
everything.   When the shareholder running for office mails out a proxy solicitation to the 
other shareholders determines when those shareholders will return the proxy to the 
shareholder running for office.  Often, early-bird proxy return deadlines mean the 
shareholder can win a cash prize for submitting a proxy vote as soon as possible.  The 
board approved candidate will likely have access to the mailing list sooner than other 
candidates and this means the voting shareholder will have that proxy solicitation before 
he or she has received the proxy solicitation from the shareholder who is running for 
office. The new candidate has little chance of winning a seat on the corporate board. 
 There is an over abundance of evidence to show that the fundamental moral views 
of the Alaska Native in the 1960s, including editorials in The Tundra Times, a statewide 
Alaska Native newspaper; testimony before Congressional committees; letters to the 
editors; political campaigns of various candidates for legislative and statewide office; and 
sermons from the pulpits of various denominations all made arguments for a governance 
that bears little resemblance to the current system of governance in the Alaska Native 
corporations and, arguably, the use of heavy handed tactics that silence those who seek 
participation in a ‘pure’ corporate democracy.  
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Chapter 3 
Prelude 
 Social media has brought Tom of St. Louis and Robert of UAF within seconds of 
each other.  Since the annual shareholders’ meeting they have exchanged numerous 
emails as they discuss their corporation. Robert is envious of Tom’s 100 ANCSA shares, 
which return an average of $75,000 yearly in dividends, while his one village 
corporation share averages $450 a year, which barely covers a one-way ticket to his 
parent’s village on the Y-K Delta.  It does not bother Robert that Tom got a job offer to 
work in the corporation’s branch office in Chicago since Robert has no interest in 
working in the Lower 48.  Robert is pleased that Tom is interested in Yupik Eskimo 
culture and thinks that Tom, though a non-Alaska Native, will insert Yupik ways into the 
corporation — eventually.   
 The corporation’s newsletter is delivered electronically and is updated often with 
the latest business developments around the world.  Since their corporation was created 
by ANCSA, business opportunities created under the Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution have been used to open doors with the federal government similar to and in 
conjunction with the minority programs for African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and 
Asian-Americans.  The minority defense contracts were once a small part of the revenue 
base of the corporation but today they rival resource extraction. 
 The current issue facing the management and the board of directors is what to do 
with 50,000 acres of wetlands that the corporation’s mining and engineering subsidiary 
has deemed worthless.  The board is weighing a proposal, backed by a national 
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environmental lobby, for the federal government to buy the acreage for a fish and wildlife 
refuge.  Robert told Tom that his village’s tribal council has voted against the proposal 
because it would put the land off limits for duck, geese, moose hunting and berry picking 
which the elders like to do.  The corporate board has promised the shareholders that the 
sale proceeds would be redistributed to the shareholders at about $1,000 a share (Tom 
would get $100,000 and Robert $1,000).  Robert is urging Tom to vote no, but Tom has a 
convincing argument that he has bills to pay having spent last August in Paris while Tom 
was hunting waterfowl in the Y-K Delta with a cousin and an uncle. 
 The management’s newsletter is in favor of the sale of the wetlands and in a letter 
jointly signed by the board chairman and the president/CEO, they said that the 
shareholders could use the redistribution check for such things as paying down 
mortgages and paying the off the credit card bills used during the holiday shopping 
season. 
ANCSA Shareholders and Corporate Participation 
 In the book Successful Corporate Democracy:  Sustainable Cooperation of 
Capital and Labor in the Dutch Breman Group, the author emphasizes participation by 
members. “ 
Corporate Democracy has taken (sic) on many meanings.  In its most 
general definition, it refers to a system of democratic governance 
embedded in a supportive organizational structure that at least includes 
shared residual claims by all members in combination with democratic 
decision-making rules.  Democratic decision-making rules offer 
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opportunities to all organizational members to co-determine the 
organization's personnel, social, and economic affairs.  Shared residual 
claims imply that the organization's profits are distributed across 
employees, managers, and owners according to co-determined allocation 
rules, while buffering the organization against non-democratic aggression 
by outside parties.  A supportive structure guarantees the smooth 
functioning of democratic successes. (de Jong & van Witteloosstuijn,  
2004)   
 The definition of the term corporate democracy is elusive and evolving, praised 
by some as a system of corporate governance to bring equality and voice to the 
shareholders of for-profit, publically traded corporations and condemned by others as 
inapplicable to commercial entities.  The above quote by is one of many definitions and it 
applies to publically traded companies and not to privately held corporations created by 
act of Congress.  There are some aspects of corporate democracy as applied to publically 
traded corporations that are not applicable to Alaska Native Corporations created by 
ANCSA.  The approach of this paper is to frame the questions from a shareholder's 
perspective as opposed to management’s attorneys doing so from the legal perspectives 
of publically traded companies.  
 There are certainly numerous benefits of holding the shareholders wealth in 
corporate stock.  Advocates of corporate democracy are criticized for having somewhat 
limited understanding of corporate obligations.  That shareholders are the ‘owners’ and 
that corporations are ‘democracies’ are said to “rest on a weak understanding of corporate 
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law and the elements that have made corporations successful as economic actors.”  
(Wallison, 2007, p. vi)  The loss of shareholder status and the assumption of ownership 
would result in the investors losing their limited liability status.   
In fact, if operation control is the key indicator of ownership, then, under 
most corporate laws, the directors are much closer to being the owners of 
corporations than the shareholders.  It's the directors who have the right 
and authority by law to direct the affairs of the corporation and they 
establish the corporation’s major policies and elect and supervise the 
managers.  (Wallison, 2007)  
 In both the ANCSA corporation and the publically traded corporation the legal 
responsibilities are the same.  “As a formal legal mater, the duty of directors is to act in 
the best interests of the corporation, not the best interests of the shareholders.” (Wallison, 
2007)  This is a concept that is - perhaps - not fully comprehended by most Alaska Native 
shareholders who demand that the corporations serve shareholders and not the 
corporation itself.   
The assumption is that if the corporation succeeds, the shareholders will 
benefit.  In legal reality, shareholders are much more like the beneficiaries 
of a trust than they are like the owners of a piece of property.  There is no 
arbitrary development.  The corporate form developed because, by 
centralizing authority to use capital in a board of directors, distinct from 
the shareholders, it promoted the creation of economic value. (Wallison,  
2007)    
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 Perhaps the regional corporate leadership over the decades has, as a matter of 
convenience rather than assuming the responsibilities of serving Alaska Native 
shareholders, is confused in that they have swung hard to the right into the arms of 
market-driven theorists.  With ANCSA corporations the shareholders have equality of 
ownership established by law.  
 Again, perhaps, regional leadership has adopted the assumption that ANCSA 
corporations are market-driven and not political entities.  If so, though it is absurd, and, 
perhaps, a good fit for the description of the publically traded corporation quoted above 
from The American online magazine.   
 ANCSA corporations were created in a political process by politicians serving 
various interests.  Perhaps the following quote by Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, applies to more to the congressionally created 
ANCSA corporations than to publically traded companies.   
Ever since the recount of 2000, partisans of both parties have paid 
particular attention to everything from who votes to how they vote and 
how their preferences are recorded.  Counting every vote is not only 
integral to our political life; it is central to our economic life as well.  
Shareholder capitalism enables our markets to thrive, our companies to 
grow and our economy to remain strong.  And central to this system is the 
principle that shareholders can have a voice in the running of the 
companies they own, that their votes will count. (Wallison,  2007)   
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 It must be made clear as to what some think is a political democracy versus 
corporate democracy in a publically traded company.   
Here is a complete confusion between the idea of voting in a political 
democracy and voting in a corporation, and a complete confusion about 
the role of shareholders under corporate law.  Voting in a political 
democracy decides the values of the nation. It is necessary because 
citizens, unlike shareholders, cannot as easily change countries as they can 
change investments.  What is voting by shareholders supposed to decide - 
the amount of the dividend, where the next factory will be built, or 
whether to expand into a new market?  Shareholders are not supposed to 
manage corporations, and if they do they will lose their limited liability.  
And if they are ‘owners’ they don't, under corporate law, have any of the 
powers to control and dispose of the company's assets that we usually 
attribute to people called ‘owners.’ (Wallison,  2007)   
Whether it was intentional or by accident, and whether it was understood as such 
by the beneficiaries, when the U.S. Congress passed the Settlement Act (P.L. 92-203), 
they created a form of corporate governance that was unique in almost all aspects. One 
unique aspect was that all eligible Alaska Natives, those born on or before December 18, 
1971, were created as equal shareholders.  Ideally, this creation of a privately-held, 
democratic form of corporation represented Congressional intent to protect Alaska Native 
culture and traditions by preserving common ownership of the land and natural resources.  
An unintended consequence of the superimposition of the western corporate model of 
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governance over the Alaska Natives and their communities has created suspicion and 
distrust among those families and communities.  This occurred primarily because of the 
failure to include the system of traditional Alaska Native ways of governing and formal 
establishment of common ownership rights. 
The traditional form of Indian government probably does not exist in the United 
States in the sense that it is not recognized by either state or federal governments.  What 
has come to be known as Indian governments are those authorized pursuant to the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA) passed by Congress in June 1934. (Indian Reorganization Act, 
1934)  The IRA, also known as the Wheeler Howard Act, did not require a tribe to adopt 
a constitution but if it did it had to allow the tribal council to employ legal counsel and 
authorized the tribal councils to negotiate with local, state and federal governments.  The 
IRA was amended in May 1936 to apply to the Territory of Alaska and authorized Indian 
tribes to adopt a constitutional form of government. (Indian Reorganization Act, 
amended, 1936)    
One of the major criticisms of the IRA and its application was that it was foreign 
to the Native American tribes.  The concept of American democracy, which bore little 
resemblance to traditional tribal governments, was proposed to the Indians.  In A History 
of Indian Policy (1973) it stated,  
Constitutions were not properly prepared for particular groups.  The 
philosophy of the IRA itself was violated in that the Indians did not play a 
truly significant part in preparing these documents (lack of qualified 
 
 
 
90 
Bureau personnel).  As a result the meaning of these instruments of 
government was often quite foreign to them. (Tyler, 1973, p. 132)   
When the IRA was amended to include the Territory of Alaska, it was also 
foreign to Alaska Natives.  Alaska’s residents were not full-fledged citizens and Native 
Americans had only been recently (1924) granted the right to vote.  Many shareholders 
now wonder whether this has established a culture of greed and self-aggrandizement; 
accompanied by self-serving definitions of ethical and moral conduct.  What was not 
misunderstood by the Alaska Natives who would become shareholders in 1971, were 
their expectations. Common ownership, rights of participation, and equality in voting 
were expected to be formally incorporated in a model that was neither western nor 
restricted, and would reflect Alaska Natives’ desire for a fair, just, and equitable 
settlement of their land claims.  Because of time pressure; advice of the professional 
classes (lawyers, accountants, et. el.); and government rules and regulations, the Alaska 
Natives’ expectations and understandings of their intent were frustrated to their 
detriment. 
 Since the beginning, and perhaps even during the negotiation period of the 
Settlement Act (1966 to December 1971), the efforts of the Alaska Federation of Natives 
(the official negotiating entity) was intended to build a Alaska Native corporate model 
that reflected the values and culture of America’s standard 1971 corporate structure.  This 
mirroring continues in 2013 even as modern day academics, regulators, and shareholders 
explore ways to redefine corporations to reflect more modern images of virtue, character, 
and ethics.  Alaska Native corporations appear to be stuck in the 1971 mindset which in 
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and of itself was a reflection of the cultures and ethics of the lawyers, consultants, and 
managers and not a reflection of traditional forms of Alaska Native governance and 
ownership of common property. 
 When the IRA was proposed by the administration of President Franklin 
Roosevelt, after two centuries of failed policies, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) did 
something unique - they asked the Indians what they thought of the legislation.   
It was recommended that the Indians themselves be allowed to express 
their opinions in relation to the proposed legislation, and that finally they 
should have the privilege of voting on whether they would choose to 
accept the legislation on behalf of their tribes or not.  (Tyler, 1973, pp. 
129-130)  
 The BIA convened the tribal leaders and explained what the legislation was and 
invited different points of view.  The leaders met in their countries (Indian reservations 
are dependent, domestic nations) and listen but made no commitments to support or not 
support the IRA.  They came to listen and then to carry back the messages to their tribes. 
(Tyler, 1973, p. 130)  
 The Alaska Native claims legislation is in sharp contrast to the deliberative nature 
of how the IRA was created.  The vote on whether to adopt ANCSA on was rushed.  Both 
Congressional had monumental impacts on present and future Native Americans.  IRA 
was deliberative, ANCSA was not. 
 On Tuesday, December 14, 1971 the House of Representatives passed the land 
claims bill and the U.S. Senate then approved the legislation by voice vote.  The 
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following Saturday, December 18, 1971 the Alaska Federation of Natives met in special 
convention on the campus of Alaska Methodist University.  “Only the Arctic Slope 
Native Association, representing 4,500 Inupiat Eskimos on Alaska's oil-rich North Slope, 
and the Washington state native delegation voted against acceptance of the bill.  The vote 
was 511 to 56.” (The New York Times, 1971)  The devil of governance was in the 
details.   
The president of the federation, Donald R. Wright, said, ‘By no means is it 
over, this is just the beginning.  This is a very serious and important day in 
history.  It would be reasonable to ask for assistance from the business, 
social and political communities of Alaska in working out the details of 
the settlement and I'm sure they will be cooperative.’ (The New York 
Times, 1971)   
Transparencies and Shareholders 
 Corporate democracy in Alaska Native corporations increases the opportunities 
for transparencies which most likely would make it more challenging to practice or 
justify unethical behavior.  The likelihood of concentration of power in management and 
the board would be weakened.  And, perhaps, there would be fewer tendencies to 
legitimize the appearances of corrupt practices established by precedence during a time 
when the experience and education attainment level of the board was at its lowest.   
 In dealing with non-Alaska Native consultants or managers there have been cases 
where the element of trust has been abused.  Perhaps the most notorious of the cases 
involved a village corporation and a regional corporation, and their banker.  Sitnasuak 
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Native Village Corporation won its civil case against Alaska Bank of the North for the 
granting of access to the Sitnasuak accounts to Bering Straits.  “According to Judge Mark 
C. Rowland of the Alaska Superior Court in Anchorage, the Alaska Bank of the North 
breached its trust with the village corporation by allowing more than $2.2 million to be 
lost through bad investments by Eskimos it was supposed to advise.”  The bank's 
president at the time was Frank Murkowski who won election to the U.S. Senate in 1980, 
the year the suit was filed. (Turner, 1987)   
 Because most of the Alaska Natives who became original shareholders after 
implementation of the Settlement Act were under-educated and lacked experience in 
business and corporate matters, corrupt and unethical practices often went unnoticed 
simply because what was unethical or corrupt was not known under a business or 
corporate definition.  
 Alaska Native corporate shareholders have to recognize that managing a 
corporation in a competitive world is an exposure to risk.  If it is widely believed among 
the shareholders that the land is closely tied to traditions and cultures, then even with 
some legal protections the land and all of its natural resources are subject to loss either 
through sale or long-term leases and thus a decline in traditional and cultural values. 
 The growth of corporate power can go unchecked and as demonstrated in U.S. 
history, until the people demand that the political leadership take action to curb the power 
and might of the corporations 
In the United States, in the late 1880s, the growth of the corporation was so large 
and so powerful that it took political leadership from the top to lead the populace to pass 
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the legislation.  President Theodore Roosevelt’s leadership (1901-1909) was unwavering 
and focused on protecting the national treasures that were subject to corporate ownership.  
During the 1920s, free market ideas reigned throughout commerce because corporations 
again ruled the roost.  It all came crashing down in October 1929 when the U.S. stock 
market crashed.  Regulations implemented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
administration (1933 – 1945) sharply curtailed unchecked corporate business activities 
that crossed state boundaries.  President Roosevelt’s regulation policies on big business 
were changed under the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and 
Carter administrations (1945 – 1981). During President Carter’s four years in office the 
U.S. and world economy suffered stagflation. Because of this recession Carter was 
defeated by Ronald Regan in 1980.  During the Ronald Reagan administration the 
country experienced tremendous growth in part because President Reagan reduced taxes 
and regulations on big business. Growth and prosperity continued during his 8 years in 
office.  A small recession occurred during President George H. W. Bush’s 4 year term. 
During President Clinton’s eight years in office (1993 – 2001) the peacetime economy 
expanded especially during his second term when he lowered taxes and reduced 
regulations. President George W. Bush (2001 – 2009) took office in January 2001, dealt 
with the attacks on September 11, 2001, and wars in the Middle East. He left office in 
2009 with the economy in a recession.  President Barak Obama (2009 – 2017) inherited 
the 2009 recession and that recession continued into his second term (2013-2017). 
Though the Alaska economy is tiny compared to many of the other 49 states, the 
influence of the Alaska Native corporations is large.  Perhaps in time the Alaska voters 
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will demand that regulatory action be taken or an environment be created where the 
shareholders can lift the curtain so they can have participatory opportunities to discuss 
the business of these privately-held corporations created by the Congress. 
Raising the Question   
Just as the federal government has stepped up at different times during the history 
of the United States to further define legitimacy and what are illegal tactics or actions, the 
question of illegitimate power over Alaska Natives needs to be raised. Dr. Dennis M. 
Ray, the Chair of Global Strategy and Management at the University of St. Thomas in 
Minneapolis, MN, does this in his 2005 discussion of   
... unlegitimated (sic)  power.  The power of corporations over our 
collective lives continues to grow.  From the perspective of an individual 
citizen, corporations are largely unchecked, unlegitimated (sic) 
concentrations of power.  If corporate boards select management and 
senior management shapes the selection of the boards, from where does 
the legitimacy of huge concentrations of corporate economic and political 
power come?  Self-perpetuating and self-serving corporate oligarchy not 
only fails to deliver sustained social responsibility, it violates a basic 
premise of democratic theory with regard to participation and 
representation.  Even when some corporations behave ethically and 
responsibly, we have a situation akin only to ‘benevolent monarchy.’ 
(Ray, 2005, p. 97)    
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This statement is clearly applicable to Alaska Natives given the ANCSA corporations are 
duplicating the western corporate model. 
The similarities that Alaska Native corporations have with publically traded 
companies are the result of the adoption of their rules and procedures.  It does not have to 
be this way.  Alaska Native corporations were created in 1971 as an effort to find out 
what might work in resolving the dilemmas faced by Native American populations.  The 
reservation system and the Alaska Native corporate system still leaves Native Americans 
with some of the worst social and economic statistics upon which a society is judged.  
Whether it is alcohol, violent crimes, or education attainment levels, Native Americans 
are still at the bottom of the national society in 2013. 
Participation Promotes Change    
The results that come from allowing opportunities and encouraging greater 
participation in any corporation can create an effective forum for positive change.  The 
foreword in the 2008 academic study Corporate Governance and Ethics states that 
reforms have made little difference in eliminating corruption in publically-traded 
corporations because of the mindset.  
The mindset that seems to dominate current discourse all over the world 
is one that emphasizes ends, achievements and objectives, and plays 
down the means and process employed in their attainment.  In business 
and in society more generally, we do not look too hard at the price paid 
for ‘success.’ (Sison, 2008 p. 36)   
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Thus, the answer to this question is simply that we need corporate democracy because the 
system is corrupt.  
It should come as no surprise that the practice of corporate governance 
fails, precisely because it has been built on the wrong pillars atop the vices 
of individualism and utilitarianism.  What we have had so far is corporate 
governance designed for crooks; it is time to devise one that makes 
corporate virtue possible (Osterloh & Frey, 2003). (Sison, 2008, p. 36)   
While Alaska Native corporations are unique in their creation, and unique in that shares 
are restricted, for the most part, to family members, presumably, most of whom are of 
Alaska Native lineage, the superimposition of the western corporate model over Alaska 
Native corporations makes them appear the same as publically-traded corporations and 
thus therein lays the implication of corruption probabilities and possibilities. 
The often stated reason for corporate democracy is to give voice to the 
shareholders, to give them an opportunity to effectuate change.  But change is time 
consuming and expensive and is not a new concept.  Shareholder participation has been 
limping along in this modern era, since the 1950s.  Alaska Native corporations have 
demonstrated no particular interest in democratizing their privately-held companies but 
have been more interested in implementing the rules and regulations of the modern 
corporation that keep the boards stable and the incumbents on the board.  What is 
interesting that as the world turns, so to speak, and activists are exploring ways to open 
the doors for shareholder voice and participation, (Lipton, 2012) the Alaska Native 
corporations have shown little interest in doing this. 
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While the following quote is written to apply only to publically-traded companies, 
it can be made to apply to ANCSA corporations.   
A board need not, and should not, simply accede to every list of corporate 
governance “best practices” promulgated each year by governance 
activists and proxy advisory firms.  That said, a board should proactively 
consider how best to organize itself and its committees to meet the 
increasing demands and responsibilities being placed on the board.  And 
the board should pay attention to shareholder hot buttons, whether it be the 
structure of executive compensation, the separation of Chair and CEO, the 
adoption or maintenance of a rights plan, the use of majority voting in the 
election of directors, or any other issue, making conscious decisions as to 
the best choices for the company on these issues and developing clear 
explanations for these choices. (Lipton, 2012)   
Adoption of Election Tactics 
Transparency has increased since the 1950s and tactics appear to be the same as 
those adopted by ANCSA corporations.  The playing field is still full of bumps, rocks, 
valleys, and booby traps.  With the mirroring of the public corporation tactics, the specter 
of unfairness is raised in the privately-held regional corporation elections. 
In the 1950s, the concept of corporate democracy began to appear more 
frequently at the annual meetings of large publically traded corporations in oil and gas, 
manufacturing, and banks and trusts.  Lewis D. Gilbert was on a crusade to democratize 
the corporations, often appearing as a lonely, outcast holder of proxies at annual meetings 
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only to be shouted down by management and directors.  As then Illinois Senator Paul 
Douglas said in the foreword of Gilbert’s book, Dividends and Democracy, the “power of 
management to seek and obtain voting proxies, even the nominal owners had little to say 
in the conduct of their properties. That was handled for them by the insiders and the 
management was generally self-perpetuating.” (Gilbert, 1956, p. v)   
Gilbert wrote, “While almost any proxy fight offers some opportunity for 
shareholders to better their condition, this is not to say that the proxy mechanism should 
not be further shaped in the direction of democracy. As it is now, it often takes hundreds 
of thousands of dollars to change managements through this device.  It often requires a 
great organization, however hastily thrown together, involving expensive professional 
proxy solicitors, public relations firms, speakers, tours, literature, costly advertisements, 
expensive radio and television time, great aggregation of clerical help, accountants, 
statisticians, economists, stenographers and secretaries, as well as rent and the expense of 
travel, thousands of telephone calls, letters, proxy forms, and telegrams.” (Gilbert, 1956, 
p. 165)   
The situations faced by Gilbert in the 1950s and 1960s appear to be similar to 
those in Alaska Native regional corporations in 2013. Thus, to change the mindset that is 
malleable (shareholder acceptance simply because they do not know what are ethical 
practices) to the unknowing adoption of corrupt practices and policies, the Alaska Native 
shareholders have to have corporate democracy and it begins with honest and fair 
elections on a level playing field. 
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ANCSA: Where All Are Equal 
 In a populist interpretation of the intent and expectations of the Alaska Natives 
who supported a fair, just, and equitable land settlement, the definition of corporate 
governance as applied to ANCSA, must be interpreted to include the fulfillment of intent 
that all Alaska Natives were created as equal shareholders with none more equal nor less 
equal than all the others.  The expectations must include the deserved respect of all other 
shareholders by the management and boards of the corporations and the general belief 
that the social station of the Alaska Native will be financially, mentally, socially, and 
physically better off than the last generation with each generation showing marked 
improvements over the previous.   
 The amount of information in the general public is short on supply and there are 
few ideas on how to share the wealth if all Alaska Natives suddenly become equal as 
shareholders.  Alaska Natives as equal shareholders would mean they share equally in the 
wealth which was the intent behind ANCSA 7(i).  The simplest way to accomplish this is 
to have the original shareholders VOTE in favor of putting all monetary rights to the 
development of resources and other dividends into a fund.  Then once a year the money 
would be divided by the number of shareholders in that Alaska Native corporation and all 
would get an equal share.  The State of Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend Program is an 
example. 
 Such a program, of course, would mean that the original shareholders would lose 
money since ANCSA is a settlement for those born on or before December 18, 1971 and 
those rights vested to them when President Nixon signed ANCSA into law.   
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 Equal status as shareholders must also include the expectation that the heart and 
soul of the Alaska Native peoples must be within the management body of the 
corporation, including the board of directors. This translates into the further expectation 
that greed and self-serving ethical determinations will not be tolerated as evident in large 
bonuses and salaries and the employment of friends and relatives based on political 
support, which reflect the mirroring of publically traded corporations rather than the 
privately-held Alaska Native corporations. 
As a starting point, in an attempt to define corporate democracy and its 
application to ANCSA corporations, lawyer A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, offers an interesting 
perspective.  He wrote in a February 2008 article that,  
The term ‘corporate democracy’ is widely invoked by shareholder 
activists and others as justification for change in the way we select 
directors of public corporations and the power we vest in those directors 
once we elect them.  It is also a concept heralded by the courts as a 
justification for the extensive power given to directors under state 
corporate law.  Understandably, in a political society founded upon 
democratic principles and ideals, there is a natural tendency to analogize 
and even to seek to export those concepts to the governance of business 
corporations.  However, since nations and business corporations are 
fundamentally different, to do so in a blanket and unconsidered fashion 
poses real dangers to corporations as long-term creators of wealth.  
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Understanding those differences is a first step to understanding what a 
sound definition of corporate democracy should be. (Sparks III, 2008)  
 In the above attempt at defining corporate democracy for a publically-held 
corporation, it fails in any application to privately-held corporations, such as the Alaska 
Native corporations, for the specific reason that there is no danger to the creation of long-
term wealth because the wealth has already been created by Congress in the 44 million 
acres of land and its subsurface estate.  The danger for Alaska Native corporations is that 
without corporate democracy, the shareholders are in danger of losing that wealth which 
embodies their culture and heritage. 
Applicability of Sparks Article 
 The Sparks article goes on to state two reasons why corporate democracy is 
inapplicable to publically-held corporations.  These two reasons would be good debate 
material if there was some applicability to ANCSA corporations.  First, Sparks maintains 
that in a democracy, the voting public is more stable than a publically traded corporation 
where thousands of shares are traded for short-term or long-term gain. The citizenry in a 
democracy changes little from election to election.  Secondly, Sparks argues that because 
shares are publically traded, most on a moment’s notice depending on gain or loss, there 
is a high level of disinterest in the long-term financial, economic, and management health 
of the corporation.  Both reasons, while, perhaps, valid with public corporations are not 
applicable to Alaska Native corporations.  Alaska Native corporate stock is restricted and 
can only be passed by death or gifting and thus, there is a long-term – perhaps 
generational – interest in the well-being of the corporation. 
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 The Sparks article is a good starting point in this study of applicability of 
corporate democracy to Alaska Native corporations and the reasons cited by it would 
most likely be referred to by some in the Alaska legal profession when asked by 
management and the boards of directors to bring forth rationale on why corporate 
democracy is not applicable to ANCSA corporations.   
 Corporate governance, whether public or private, is full of complexities involving 
relations, processes, institutions, laws, and policies.  Intertwined throughout these 
complexities are issues involving markets, governments, shareholders, and competition.  
Alaska Native corporations, whether village or regional, are a unique creation of the 
federal government; assuming advantageous aspects of the public corporation and the 
private corporation and often following or attempting to follow the federal policies and 
court rulings based on precedents established since the establishment of the United 
States.  Not only are Alaska Native corporations different in how the U.S. Congress came 
to deal with a centuries old problem,  Congressional boldness in this modern age was 
done in sharp contrast to the federal government policies that began in the late 1880s.   
A major trend . . . was a tendency to further minimize the functions of 
tribal leaders and tribal institutions and to continually strengthen the 
position of the Government representative and his subordinates, and to 
improve effectiveness of their programs to break down traditional patterns 
within the Indian communities.  (Tyler, 1973, p. 91)       
Many would like to say that the settlement of the aboriginal claims in Alaska was 
based on efforts for justice, equality, and fairness. No doubt, there is some truth to such 
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an assertion.  But, recent history has made it clear that without the 1960s civil rights 
movement in the Lower 48 and the discovery of oil on the North Slope, the likelihood of 
44 million acres of land and a billion dollar settlement was remote.  The issue of Alaska 
Native claims was perfectly timed as it came during the Civil Rights leadership of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and the need of the U.S. population for gas to fuel their cars which the 
market-driven oil industry wanted to supply.  
Unique and Distinct From All Others 
 Alaska Native corporations are unique and distinct from all others and they likely 
will always be.   As a legal settlement, the rights attached to the original shares vested in 
those shares and who benefits from those shares attaches to whoever is the current owner, 
Alaska Native or non-Alaska Native, U.S. citizen or non-citizen.  ANCSA shares are 
essentially pieces of property.  Even if the shares are allowed to become freely 
transferrable and can be bought and sold for whatever price, likely what will be attached 
to those original shares will be the right to share in the profits of the development of the 
subsurface estate in an area the size of the state of Missouri.  And, as Native American 
entities, Congress may create rights uniquely applicable to the corporations because of 
the Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Congress may choose to deal with 
Native American tribes almost any way they so choose “to regulate commerce . . . with 
the Indian tribes.” (U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3)   
 Just as the ANCSA corporation is a unique creature of American law, the very 
existence of the American corporation in global commerce is also distinctive.  According 
to Comparative Corporate Governance, A Chinese Perspective,  
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…. there are two important elements that have contributed to the 
separation of ownership and control in U.S. corporations, and the 
managerial capitalism in the United States of America (USA).  First, the 
increasing complexity of technology operated in modern enterprises 
enables professional managers to take more power away from the owners.  
Secondly, the dispersed corporate ownership caused by U.S. bank 
restrictions has resulted in shareholders lacking the information, skills and 
incentives to monitor management.  Thus, control of large companies has 
shifted from owners to professional management. (Wei, 2003)  
It is from this perspective that best illustrates why ANCSA corporations have 
moved towards mirroring the American corporation and veered away from Alaska 
Natives’ traditional ways of governance which, at least from one perspective, was 
communal in ownership of land and natural resources (wood, fish, animals, plants). 
 As for the definition of corporate governance, one definition states:  
…. the purpose of corporate governance is to persuade, induce, compel and 
otherwise motivate corporate managers to keep the promises they made to 
investors.  Another way to say this is that corporate governance is directed at 
deviance within corporations where deviance is defined as any actions by 
management or directors that are at odds with the legitimate, investment-backed 
governance (corporate deviance) is defined as promise-breaking behavior (our 
italics). (Macey, 2008, p. 1)  
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Think Outside of the Box to Empower 
The untapped ideas and creative powers of the vast array of present and 
potential shareholders can best be stimulated by furnishing them . . . more 
information and corporate facts . . . for facts are the lifeblood of ideas, and 
ideas are the salvation of freedom and democracy.  (Gilbert, 1956, p. vi)  
Shareholder Democracy by Frank D. Emerson and  
Franklin C. Latcham.  
 Thinking outside of the corporate box to apply corporate democracy theory to 
ANCSA corporations would help dispel the powerful myths of the lingering influences of 
colonial thinking in the social, economic, and political cultures among rural-focused 
entities.  There appears to be a firmly entrenched idea that rural/Alaska Native people do 
not know what is best for them; and that it is better to bring ideas having worked 
elsewhere in environmental and well-populated areas that are totally different from the 
uniqueness of rural/Alaska Native areas of Alaska.   In essence, importing administrators 
and managers whose techniques, skills, and ideas are foreign to Alaska Natives may have 
caused tremendous and expensive damage to the general well-being of Alaska Natives, 
particularly in rural Alaska.    
The first question to ask in answering whether corporate democracy can be 
applied to ANCSA corporations is whether the U.S. Congress can implement policies to 
regulate the ANCSA corporations.  The answer is obviously yes, but the further question 
is whether Congress will develop and pass such policy legislation.  Further down in this 
section is a discussion on the 1980 effort to pass the Corporate Democracy Act which has 
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some similarities that may apply to a federal effort to either include Alaska Native 
corporations under the jurisdiction of the Security Exchange Act (which the 1971 act 
specifically exempted) or to grant another entity to have the specific responsibility to 
oversee ethical and legal obligations of ANCSA corporations. (Regional Alaska Native 
Corporations, 2012)      
A good example might be the federal authority similar to the National Indian 
Gaming Commission. 
 The Indian Gaming Commission’s stated mission is to “shield Indian tribes from 
organized crime and other corrupting influences; to ensure that Indian tribes are the 
primary beneficiaries of gaming revenues; and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly 
and honestly by both operators and players.” (Indian Gaming Commission)  
 The first step in the application of corporate democracy to ANCSA Corporations 
is to re-energize and motivate the movement that was suppressed during the mid-1970s 
rush to imitate the election and proxy practices of publically traded companies.  Freedom 
to speak includes the freedom to disagree and should not be limited to the annual 
meetings required by State regulations.  Legal challenges to proxy solicitations and 
mailings to shareholders should succumb to the highest right of communications among 
equals and not to the technical or legal jargon and interpretations by staffs of high-priced 
firms who are only motivated by the hourly rate. 
Advocating for shareholders’ rights in a corporate democracy is a lonely battle 
and subjects the person or group to the effective practices of current management and 
incumbent board of directors who are not eager to embrace shareholder participation, 
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especially when it is critical. This is done under the guise that the Alaska Native 
corporation is being operated the way it is done in normal corporations.  This is precisely 
the reason that the adoption of the western corporate model to the letter of the law, rather 
than adapting the ANCSA corporations to the traditions and cultures of the Alaska Native 
peoples, fails the expectations of the shareholders. 
To create change in the way Alaska Native corporations are governed will take 
stamina, endurance, foresight, and dogged focus on the prize.  A democracy proponent 
will face incredible odds and hurdles from highly regarded and high priced corporate law 
firms employed by the current board of directors; from regulatory authorities that are held 
captive by political influences of the State administration; and from the State Legislature.  
To a non-Alaska Native legislator or government bureaucrat, the fear of being labeled as 
anti-Alaska Native because they support efforts to further corporate democracy has a 
destabilizing effect on their efforts even though they may agree. 
A Lonely Cause, ANCSA Corporate Change   
What the ANCSA shareholders will need to implement corporate democracy is a 
gadfly like Gilbert Lewis. 
Lewis D. Gilbert, an advocate of shareholder rights and one of the first gadflies to 
speak at annual meetings on behalf of small stockholders, died yesterday at Lenox Hill 
Hospital.  He was 86 and lived in Manhattan.  So read The New York Times on December 
08, 1993.   
By persistently questioning chief executive officers – some of them 
considered it badgering – he succeeded in getting more companies to hold 
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annual meetings in accessible locations, to issue post-meeting reports, to 
limit stock options for executives and to require their auditors to attend the 
meetings.  A lot of the ideas that the Gilberts pushed for many years to 
make boards accountable to shareholders have become real,” said James 
E. Heard, the president of International Shareholder Services, which 
advises large institutions on voting at annual meetings.  ‘They were a 
lonely voice out there for a long time and a lot of what they were saying 
has relevance today.’ (The New York Times, 1993)  
The irony of all this is that what Lewis Gilbert fought for is relevant today – a full six 
decades later – to the privately-held ANCSA Corporations. The Gilberts (includes brother 
John, Jr.) were owners of small blocks of shares similar to what an average ANCSA 
corporate shareholders owns. 
In 1933, he went to his first annual meeting at the Consolidated Gas 
Company, which later became part of Consolidated Edison.  ‘I expected to 
be welcomed cordially and to be treated like one of the owners,’ he later 
said.  ‘I got up to ask a question, but before I had a chance to say anything, 
one of the officers sitting in the back of the room made a motion to 
adjourn.’  Despite being cold shouldered by many managements and 
hissed by some other shareholders, he continued to appear regularly at 
annual meetings to voice his views. (The New York Times, 1993)   
 Lewis Gilbert’s voice from 1933 to his last annual shareholders’ meeting in 1992 
grew louder over the six decades.  Corporate changes were made only after frustrations 
 
 
 
110 
with the corruption and failures of large corporations. Only then did the shareholders put 
political pressure on the U.S. Congress which in turn put pressure on the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and state regulatory authorities. 
 In the 1970s, in the infancy stage of the regional corporations, the big bold 
experiment of President Nixon’s administration was being watered down by the 
interpreters of corporate management, governance, and legal rights and responsibilities of 
for-profit corporations.  In a relatively short period of time, the bold, innovative spirit of 
the Settlement Act was reinterpreted in the spirit of the lawyers and the managers who 
knew little of the cultures and traditions of the Alaska Native peoples but knew their own 
corporate culture so well they superimposed it over the Settlement Act.  The 
reinterpretation of the Alaska Native intent and Alaska Native expectations of the land 
claims effort was met with increasing hostility by the newly-created shareholders who 
were accustomed to speaking up and asking questions at village council meetings or other 
community events.  The boards, using the skillful tactics that Lewis Gilbert fought 
against, adopted rules to suppress shareholders participation as the boards evolved into 
self-perpetuating organizations. 
 The corporations successfully used the tactics and methods that did wear down 
the ‘Lewis Gilberts’ among the ANCSA shareholders who became fewer in number as 
they aged and died.  As the years went by, the dissidents aged but the lawyers and 
corporate leaders stayed on top of the latest methods that included everything from 
threats of litigation to successfully lobbying the state legislature to adopt new proxy rules 
and regulations that were used to silence any dissent.   
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 By the mid-1980s the Alaska Native corporate culture had changed.  Most of the 
annual shareholders’ meetings were efficiently and routinely managed and voices of 
dissent were calmed.  Chugach Natives, Inc. (now Chugach Alaska Corporation) began to 
use the state's new proxy rules and regulations to strictly define the limits of debate. 
Evidence of the Changing Characteristics of ANCSA Corporations    
 What is evident in at least one of the corporations, Chugach Alaska Corporation 
(CAC), the second smallest regional corporation with almost 2,000 original shareholders, 
is the aging shareholder base. As of December 2012, the original shareholders are 41 
years older than they were in December 1971, which puts most of them into their 70s.  As 
the original shareholders die off, their shares are left to younger people (some non-Alaska 
Native) who are, presumably, unfamiliar with shareholders’ participation rights or who 
are lacking in the confidence of original shareholders or who are easily intimidated by 
management.  This lack of participation at CAC’s annual meetings results in deafening 
silence. The silence is broken only by self-laudatory comments and the Chair’s cry of 
‘Ready for another drawing?’  Another reason for the lack of participation is the growing 
number of Alaska Native shareholders who are not allowed to vote because they were 
born after December 18, 1971. They are not allowed to vote because ANCSA is a 
‘settlement’ (legal term) between the U.S. Government and a restricted group of Alaska 
Natives, those born on or before December 18, 1971. Since the ‘afterborns’ can’t vote 
why should they participate? This creates the likely assumption that the number of active 
participants in CAC is growing smaller and thus increases management’s and the board’s 
control over the assets of the shareholders. 
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The lesson of Lewis Gilbert is the need for motivation and persistence to continue 
to democratize the ANCSA corporations regardless of how long it takes.  Lewis Gilbert 
was ridiculed, threatened, insulted, and litigated against from the depression years to the 
booming 1990s but when his obituary appeared in The New York Times he was called 
“one of the first gadflies.” (The New York Times, 1993) His lonely voice upset the status 
quo and institutionalized changes that led to the codification of shareholders’ rights and 
protections, despite the confrontations with such directors as General Douglas 
MacArthur, banker and former United Kingdom ambassador Winthrop W. Aldrich and 
steel magnate Charles M. Schwab. (Gilbert, 1956, p. 42)  
 It is sometimes forgotten that shareholders in ANCSA corporations have few 
rights or their use of their rights have been curtailed.  Perhaps, yes.  There are seven basic 
shareholders' rights of publically-traded corporations and six for ANCSA regional 
corporations. One of the rights, transfer of stock (#3) is less applicable to ANCSA 
corporations but could change in time.  The seven basic rights are (1) voting rights that 
affect the corporation as a whole; (2) rights related to the assets of the corporation; (3) 
rights related to the transfer of stock; (4) rights to receive dividends as declared by the 
board of directors; (5) rights to inspect the records and financial books of the corporation; 
(6) rights to bring suit against the corporation for wrongful acts by the directors and 
officers of the corporation; and, (7) rights to share in the proceeds recovered when the 
corporation liquidates its assets. (USLegal.com, USLegal, Inc., http://uslegal.com/, 2010) 
Regarding the transfer of stock (shares), in ANCSA corporations the transfer of shares is 
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restricted to family members’ inter vivos (one living person to another living person) and 
after death to anyone or anything in the world if so specified in a legal will. 
Causing Change, Shareholders or Managers or Boards    
 Once a champion, such as a Lewis Gilbert clone, can be found, then proponents of 
corporate democracy have to make sure what naysayers say about corporate democracy 
in publically-held corporations does not necessarily apply to the privately-held ANCSA 
Regional Corporations.  For example, a pro/con commentary written by Mark Green 
(1980), author of The Case for Corporate Democracy, on the Corporate Democracy Act 
said a 1980 article in Regulation Magazine, that the “key issue of corporate governance 
reform is who should make or shape these decisions – a handful of executives, or 
executives and a representative board that is open and responsive to the views of a 
company’s many shareholders.”  (Green, 1980)   
  Mark Green goes on to argue that the fundamental issue of unaccountable 
corporate power warrants federal legislation for several interrelated reasons:  “state 
chartering has failed; corporate illegality is extensive; and our largest corporations are 
private governments.” (Green, 1980) Green’s 1980 argument for corporate democracy 
among the top publically traded companies in the United States raises valid analogous 
positions that unaccountable ANCSA corporate power in 2013 warrants new thought on 
how to regulate ANCSA entities. The new regulatory apparatus would ensure that 
corruption and unethical behavior will not be swept under the rug by the public relations 
campaigns of a self-perpetuating board of directors.  The growing power and political 
influence of the for-profit Alaska Native Corporations was demonstrated in the 2010 U.S. 
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Senate election when Native/rural entities backed the successful write-in campaign of 
Senator Lisa Murkowski.  Financial contributions of well over $1.5 million and the 
tentacles of the Native/rural focused organizations were made possible by the U.S. 
Supreme Court case in January 2010.  (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
558 U.S. 310.)     
 The obstacles to a contemporary Alaska Native Lewis D. Gilbert are huge; not 
only do the corporations have the financial and legal resources to overcome dissident 
efforts, the political trading chips are expensive.  Efforts to change the system could be 
met with a muttering bureaucracy not eager to challenge a powerful incumbent. 
Too Big to Change   
 ANCSA was an experiment and likely will always be in some sort of 
experimental stage.  There are three reasons for this:  first, few Alaska Natives fully 
comprehended the consequence of the ownership of 100 shares and what it meant for the 
after-borns  (Bigjim & Ito-Adler, 1974, Chapter 1 pp. 15-16),  second, the land base 
represents the culture and heritage of the Alaska Natives and to lose the land is to lose the 
culture as the Alaska Federation of Natives’ poster said, “Take my land, Take my life.” 
(Alaska Federation of Natives, 1988 Annual Convention Poster.); thirdly, the growth of 
the Alaska Native population from an estimated 65,000 in 1971 to approximately 140,000 
in the 2010 census (this figure includes those who preferred to be counted as multi-
racial). (U.S. 2010 Census Projections.)    
 Complicating the situation is that an increasing number of non-Alaska Natives are 
inheriting shares of stock in Alaska Native corporations even in villages that have grown 
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from under 100 residents to several hundred, leaving most of the current residents as non-
shareholders who have become the owners of the corporate stock in the corporation that 
owns the subsistence lands around the villages. (Chugach Alaska Corporation 
Shareholders Roll.)   As one consequence, the intense political, economic and financial 
battles over natural resources (i.e. Pebble Mine, Donlin Creek Mine, Greens Creek Mine, 
and 72 other mining prospects [Alex DeMarban,  2012]) are leaving resident villagers on 
the sidelines while village and regional corporations side with the non-Alaska Native 
joint venture partners over natural resource extraction in subsistence areas. 
The Settlement Act was hailed as a big, bold experiment that rejected the creation 
of ‘pockets of poverty’ that had become the defining, descriptive phrase for Indian 
reservations in the Lower 48.  The uniqueness of the settlement was unlike anything that 
any aboriginal group had achieved anywhere in the world.  What the U.S. Congress 
created was done only after a series of compromises among the many aboriginal groups 
in Alaska that aligned the interests of the business sector with State government policies 
and forged complex relationships. These relationships forced village corporations to work 
with the regional corporations and the regional corporations to work with each other.  
However, the Settlement Act was often referred to, especially during the decade of the 
1970s, as the ‘lawyers full employment act.’  High priced law firms fought each other in 
expensive and complicated lawsuits with at-large shareholders and village corporations 
over ownership of surface, subsurface and revenue sharing requirements.  The ensuing 
litigation battles depleted financial reserves of the Alaska Native corporations that many 
thought would be used to create employment and economic opportunities for the 
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shareholders. All of the regional corporations established themselves under state charters 
as for-profit entities.  The regional corporations then incorporated non-profits for social 
services such as housing, health care, and environmental causes. 
Who Will Lead?    
 The complexities of the legal battles were arcane and meetings between the 
litigants were often handled entirely by the hired attorneys simply because the legal 
terminology and subtle technical points of law escaped board members. Most of the 
board members lacked the legal and technical knowledge to fully grasp all the legal 
points and the precedent setting decisions of the lawyers. 
 There were a few novel ideas under the Settlement Act such as the mergers with 
regional and village corporations.  Only two, Ahtna (the smallest regional corporation) 
and NANA in the Northwest Arctic, merged with its village corporations.  NANA's 
largest village corporation, Kotzebue, voted against merger.  There have been several 
Congressional actions since the passage of the 1971 Settlement Act such as the 1991 
amendments that allowed the regional corporations to create other classes of shareholders 
including those born after December 18, 1971 (but not eligible for subsurface profit-
sharing) and elderly dividend provisions. 
 It should be noted that when the Alaska Federal of Natives (AFN) can bring all 35 
entities with voting representation on the AFN Board of Directors to a consensus, a 
powerful coalition of lobbying and voting strength is brought to bear on Alaska’s 
Congressional delegation.  Two good examples of special benefits created outside the 
boundaries of the Settlement Act are the NOLS (net operating losses) which generated 
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$445 million for the 12 regional corporations.  (Institute of Social and Economic 
Research, December 1991, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, p. 1) Both efforts were led by the late 
Senator Ted Stevens which generated billions of dollars in revenues for Alaska Native 
Corporations. 
 While the management style of Alaska Native Corporations appears to be 
western, many of the managers have made substantial efforts to identify with the original 
cultures and traditions. They appear eager to display and educate non-Alaska Natives on 
the uniqueness of the Alaska Native tribes.  This builds greater appreciation for the ethnic 
diversity of Alaska and strengthens the character and virtues of the State’s population. 
 Addressing the issue of whether the corporations are too big to change is not 
much of a hurdle as long as those who have life estate stock (for those born after 
December 18, 1971), that number is likely to outnumber the original shareholders, at least 
in some corporations, and could vote out perennial directors when it comes to changing 
the face and hearts of management. 
 It would be best to keep in the mind one of the opening paragraphs of the well-
used, often quoted book, A Theory of the Firm, Governance, Residual Claims, and 
Organizational Forms:   
The objectives of corporate managers often conflict with those of the 
shareholders who own the company.  Laws and regulations enacted since 
the 1930s have effectively put most of the power in the hands of the 
management, frequently at the expense of the interests of the owners of 
the corporation.  At the same time, boards of directors have tended to go 
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along with management and to ignore the interests of the very party they 
were created to protect.  (Jensen, 2000, p. 9.)   
The challenge for shareholders, if they wish to broaden their influence over the 
corporations, is to resolve to follow more clearly the intent and expectations of the 
Alaska Natives in the early 1970s. This means the shareholders will go against the best 
legal advice money can buy. 
 
 
 
   
119 
Chapter 4 
Prelude 
 Robert is in a state of reflection on this cold, windy New Year's Eve, 2075.  The 
wind always blows on the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta.  He looks at his surroundings, 
thinking of the whole dark catalog of persistent social ills that plague Alaska Natives.  He 
wonders if things will ever change.  The changing but never changing demographics offer 
little hope that the general condition of the Alaska Native will change for the better.  It is 
as if the human condition has been frozen in time - at least for the past 100 years.  
Cancer is still the leading cause of death of Alaska Natives as it was in 2007 when it was 
30% greater than for U.S. Caucasians.  As in 2007, the suicide rate was 3.6 times greater 
than Caucasians; 41% of Alaska Natives were likely to be smokers vs. 20% for non-
Natives: diabetes was still higher than the national average, as was alcoholism, sexually 
transmitted infections, and tooth decay.  What was most alarming, disappointing, and 
depressing was in education and the poverty rate.  The dropout rate among Alaska 
Native students is nearly twice that of Caucasian students in the state and 9.4% of Alaska 
Natives received an associate's degree or higher compared to 37% of U.S. Caucasians.  
The number of children living below the U.S. poverty rate was twice the national 
average. (Alaska Native Epidemiology Center, 2009)    
 Despite the gory statistics, Robert's hope springs eternal even as his patience 
wears thin. 
 Robert wonders, with so much land awarded the Alaska Natives by the Settlement 
Act, an area the size of Missouri, and so much wealth in the subsurface — why the Alaska 
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Native people are still at the bottom of the heap.  What were they thinking in 1971 when 
those who fought for a fair, just, and equitable land settlement said that only original 
shares conveyed with it the right to share in the riches of the mineral estate?  
 In 1950 the earth's population was 2.5 billion.  By the time of the Settlement Act 
in 1971 it was almost 3.8 billion and in 2075, as Robert looks out the window, it is almost 
10 billion and still growing. (GeoHive, http://www.geohive.com/earth/population3.aspx)  
The earth's population is as hungry now as it was when, in the first decade of the 2000s, 
a hundred million Chinese were elevated into the middle class.  Though China now has 
1.4 billion people, it was surpassed by India in 2030.  India, at 1.8 billion is now the 
world most populous country.  (GeoHive)  
 A couple of days after Christmas, Robert started browsing the website of the 
online magazine World Economics, a monthly trade magazine headquartered in Hong 
Kong.  He is surprised to read of India's new prime minister's commitment to elevate 250 
million Indians within 20 years. It will be difficult because of the centuries old cast 
system. That means the country will need iron, gold, diamonds, timber, fish, uranium, and 
numerous other metals.  It is a lofty goal but the prime minister and the Indian 
parliament are determined.  The short and long term strategy is to build economic, trade, 
and financial relations with the countries of the northern hemisphere - namely Canada, 
Russia (Siberia), the Greenland, and Iceland.  Alaska is included because of its sparse 
population and large land holdings owned by the private Alaska Native corporations. 
 The hunger for minerals alarms Robert.  He, like many of the descendents of the 
original shareholders of the village corporation, thought that the surface was protected 
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when the board of directors authorized the sale to the lodge owner in 2020.  In 2053 the 
lodge owner's grandson granted access to the mine developers.  The village residents are 
permitted to hunt and berry pick on the former village corporate lands as long as they 
are a minimum of a half mile from any of the trucks, equipment, or mine workers.  On all 
of the 40,000 acres sold there is not a single place less than a half mile from the mine’s 
operations. 
 The rumor in the village is that the lodge owner’s grandson’s grant of access to 
the mine developers is worth $10 million a year.  The regional corporation has a 4.5% 
royalty (pure profit, the same percentage as the first mine - Red Dog) on the mineral 
estate of which 70% under 7(i) of the Settlement Act requires must be distributed to all 
the village corporations based on the number of shareholders enrolled to it.  At-large 
shareholders receive a direct distribution from the regional corporation.  That means 
over 95% of the 600 village residents receive nothing from the mine since almost all of 
the owners of the ANCSA original shares live elsewhere. 
 Tom Smith IV of St. Louis, MO, has begun studying the annual reports where the 
50 mines on Alaska Native corporate lands are located.  His original shares have 
returned $75,000 a year under the 7(i) provision of ANCSA.  He is thankful his maternal 
great-grandmother was born one quarter Yupik Eskimo.  
The Strength of Culture, The Allure of Dividends 
The ANCSA of 1971 awarded Alaska's Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts 44 million 
acres of land and a billion dollars. The 68,750 square miles is scattered throughout the 
state in parcels that range from 69,120 acres for 25 to 99 people to 161,280 acres for over 
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600 people.  Perhaps the acreage can be better compared in relation to the size of states. 
The state of Georgia is 59,425 square miles, Illinois 57,914, Iowa 56,271, and New York 
54,556.  There are over 200 village corporations and 12 regional corporations with 
another created for those living in the Lower 48.  The 13th regional corporation received 
no land under ANCSA. (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Sec. 12.) (The delegations 
from the Lower 48 and the Arctic Slope Native Association (ASNA) voted against 
accepting the settlement offer, primarily because ASNA was to receive a fraction of what 
they would be entitled to and the Lower 48 Alaska Native corporation would receive no 
land entitlement.) 
The award of land to Alaska Native corporations (as owners in fee simple) was a 
new and unfamiliar concept to most Alaska Natives.  As a tangible asset in westernized 
corporations, land is an asset that can be sold, bought, or used as collateral for business 
operations; thus land owned by corporations with aboriginal peoples as shareholders was 
untried and certainly unfamiliar.  The ANCSA corporations became a forced marriage 
between free market concepts and social agendas.  It now generates angst.  
Under ANCSA, [Alaska] Native peoples were promised title to over 40 
million acres of our former lands and $962.5 million to establish [Alaska] 
Native regional and village corporations charged with promoting social 
and economic well-being of Alaska Natives.  ANCSA is criticized both in 
terms of product and process, i.e., it yielded too little and the process did 
not meet a reasonable bar for inclusion.  Most condemning for some is that 
as Alaska Native corporations, created in the image of a Western corporate 
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model, have prospered, many Alaska Natives see ANCSA as a vehicle for 
assimilation.  In this view the quest for profits has trumped the quest for 
culture.  For others the criticism is that we now have a new class of 
[Alaska] Native corporations who share a common culture of the pursuit 
of wealth. (Ongtooguk, 2012)  
Before there were conflicts over land or money there were questions. In October 
1969 from a question by Rep. John Saylor (R-PA) “whether he favored more emphasize 
on land or money, Notti, president of the Alaska Federation of Natives, said they were 
both important.  ‘The money is needed now and the land is for the future.’” (The Tundra 
Times, 1969)   
Notti's testimony was at a Fairbanks, Alaska, hearing of the U.S. House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs as they toured the state. 
At the hearing Tyonek, a former Indian reserve on the eastern side of Cook Inlet, 
experiences were used as an example of the positive results that can happen when Alaska 
Natives manage their own business affairs on their lands.  Agnes Brown and Fred 
Bismark of Tyonek said that “when oil reserves were discovered on the Tyonek 
Reservation, the Interior Department authorized competitive leasing.  The Bureau of 
Indian Affairs wanted the Tyonek Indians to approve all lease bids.  The Tyoneks held 
out until they were given the right to manage their own affairs.” (The Tundra Times, 
1969)  
Perhaps the Tyonek experience of the marriage of for-profit entities to social 
conditions of housing, education, and employment was the seed that sparked the 
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corporate concept.  “Universally acclaimed as a great success story, the Tyonek Indians 
not only vastly improved their living conditions but also compete in a number of business 
ventures.”  (The Tundra Times, 1969)   
In his online newspaper opinion piece, Ongtooguk, a University of Alaska 
Anchorage education professor, asked questions that many Alaska Native leaders are 
unable to answer.   
It is deeply troublesome, for example, that despite the hard-fought battle 
for land ownership, over 700,000 acres of original ANCSA land have been 
sold by Alaska Native corporations.  A decision to sell cultural lands by 
the present generation of shareholders deprives all future generations of 
this sacred legacy.  Have decisions to sell land been made strategically 
with the well-being of future generations in mind, or have these decisions 
been made to enrich the current generation of shareholders?  Have the 
long-term social and cultural costs of land sales been considered as 
equally or more important than the economic benefits?  (Ongtooguk,  
2012)   
All of the regional corporations are independent of each other but connected by a 
single umbilical-like cord called 7(i) profit-sharing.  All of the companies publicly revere 
to some extent the cultures and traditions in their geographical areas.  The profit-sharing 
cord will likely be severed only when the shareholders en mass determine that they can 
do without the culture and traditions, the 1960s-era indigenous people’s cause for a fair, 
just and equitable settlement tied to land notwithstanding.  When that happens it will 
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probably be because subsurface resource development profits are significant and loom 
larger than cultures and traditions. 
During the Alaska Native Commission hearings on the land claims in the 1980s, 
ample testimony was submitted to the private, independent, mostly privately-funded 
commission.  Almost all of the testimony was based on the Native’s connection to the 
land.  
To one culture, the land is inalienable.  Alaska Natives believe that land is held in 
common by the tribe, a political community that is perpetual. Every member of 
the community in succeeding generations acquires an interest in the land as a 
birthright.  But to western society, land is a commodity to be bought and sold. The 
Alaska Native peoples clearly understand that land is at the heart of this 
prolonged conflict.  The protection of their lands has always been their primary 
concern. (Berger, 1985, p. 73)  
There are some who question the relation of Native Americans to the land.  
Recent sales of ANCSA-conveyed land raise the issue and the question between 
monetary land and claims to heritage and the importance thereof.  There is at least one 
writer who claims that the Native’s attachment to land is a myth and is used for ulterior 
purposes.   
Environmentalists who have cultivated the myth of the environmental 
Indian who left his surroundings in exquisitely pristine condition out of a 
deeply spiritual devotion to the natural world have done so not out of any 
particular interest in the American Indians, the variations between them, or 
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their real record of interaction with the environment.  Instead, the intent is 
to showcase the environmentalist Indian for propaganda purposes and to 
use him as a foil against industrial society. (Woods, 2007)   
Native Americans as conservationists have not always been the image.  There was 
considerable fear from the budding environmental movement in the 1960s about Alaska 
Natives owning land in fee simple.  “The only threat to a favorable land settlement of the 
land claims is yet dormant.  It was pointed out by several of the Congressmen, including 
Chairman Aspinall that active opposition to a land grant may come from powerful 
conservationist lobbyists.”  (The Tundra Times, 1969)   
 There is so much land and - potentially and possibly - great wealth in the 
subsurface that it is not difficult to imagine what kinds of pressures will be exerted on the 
ANCSA Corporations.  But one is thing is clear - absolutely clear - the people living in 
the rural areas will want to continue to have say and sway over how they will be able to 
maintain their lifestyles which are such an important part of local traditions and cultures.  
As was often said, before and after an Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) 1988 Annual 
Convention Poster proclaimed, “Take My Land, Take My Life.”   
 Within one year after the signing of the ANCSA the corporations were up and 
running.  It was a long way from 1962 when the Task Force on Alaska Native Affairs 
issued its recommendations in its Report to the Secretary of the Interior.  The report noted 
that,  
Both [Alaska] natives and non-[Alaska] natives of Alaska often emphasize 
their great desire to have a completely integrated society.  Yet, wishful 
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thinking alone is not likely to accomplish this goal in the near future.  
Both in terms of culture and social status, the bulk of the [Alaska] native 
population is separated by a sizeable gulf from the non-native.  It is 
improbable that integration will be achieved through pretending that there 
are no differences between the two groups at present, and that special 
attention to the problem is unnecessary.  While distinctive programs of 
education, employment assistance, health and sanitation, and real property 
management – whether offered by the State or the Federal Government – 
may appear to endow [Alaska] natives with a privileged status, the 
continuation of such programs into the foreseeable future is 
unquestionably necessary for their well-being and that of Alaska. (Alaska 
Task Force, 1962, p. 57)   
 The Task Force on [Alaska] Native Affairs  
…. found the Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts generally opposed to having 
‘reservations’ (in the sense that term is employed in the Lower 48 states) 
established for their use and occupancy.  Many felt that Indians residing 
on reservations did not have the same citizenship privileges and the same 
freedom of movement as other Americans.  For example, they have 
emphasized that the creation of reservations would be one way of defining 
land rights and of assuring continued access to the fish and game upon 
which the [Alaska] natives depend.  (Alaska Task Force,1962, p. 58)   
 
 
 
128 
 The findings and recommendations of the report were made after traveling over 
5,000 miles, visiting 32 villages, and taking testimony from more than 100 village 
representatives.  The concerns expressed by the village representatives are consistent with 
those expressed by Alaska Natives in the following four decades.  For example, the Task 
Force noted an education problem, [Alaska] Native children “lag behind in education 
attainment” (Alaska Task Force, 1962, p. 11)    a land problem, “the need to lease and 
otherwise develop for the benefit of the [Alaska] natives some of those lands already 
reserved for them and to extend this authority to future withdrawals” (Alaska Task 
Force,1962, p. 69); and subsistence, among the recommendations “making sure that 
Alaskan natives are represented on the Alaska State Board of Fish and Game.” (Alaska 
Task Force, 1962, p. 37)  
 The number of references on the Alaska Natives’ desire to control and influence 
conditions of their livelihoods is numerous in State and federal reports and periodicals.  
There have been thousands of Alaska Natives who have offered testimony at public 
hearings since 1962 and there are likely thousands more to come.  Judging by historical 
precedent, they will almost all raise the same concerns - land for hunting, fishing, and 
gathering purposes and the opportunity to economically and financially benefit from 
traditional lands (The Tundra Times archives).  
 In a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) report requested by the Alaska Federation of 
Natives, Inc., six years after passage of ANCSA, brief profiles of the regional for-profit 
and non-profit corporations showed the for-profits involved in numerous businesses such 
as accounting services, seafood processing, hotel operations, freight hauling, oil and gas 
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exploration, construction, gravel, banking, pipeline maintenance and the list goes on.  
The expectations of the shareholders were high, many of them unaware of success rates 
of entrepreneurial businesses.   
 The transition of a widely diverse indigenous population in an area one-fifth the 
size of the continental United States was sudden given the conditions in 1962 of a poor, 
undereducated, underemployed class of subsistence hunters and fishers.  By 1966 the 
Alaska Natives had come together in what was assumed to be nothing more than a 
transitory loose federation of people who did not trust each other.  Many observers of the 
Alaska Native condition did not expect the Alaska Federation of Natives to hold together 
because the cultures and traditions were alien to each other.  Some of the regions had 
weak ties to land and culture. 
 “Take My Land, Take My Life” (AFN 1988 Annual Convention Poster) seems 
hollow, empty, just words on a piece of paper.  Since 1991, village corporations in the 
Koniag and Chugach regions have sold much of their land back to the United States.  
Following the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill and the creation of a fund from the fines 
imposed on the transnational corporation, the billion dollar trust was used as a bank 
account to buy the rights to the surface estate to protect it from any potential 
development. 
 In 1993 it was reported in The New York Times that the oil-spill trustees had 
reached a deal with the Alaska Natives and environmentalists.   
Six Federal and state officials who are overseeing the civil settlement of 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill voted Thursday to spend $38.7 million to buy 
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and preserve 42,000 acres of coastal land in Alaska.  The decision to buy 
the native-owned land on Afognak Island, which would otherwise be used 
for logging, was hailed by environmentalists.  (The New York Times, 
1993)   
 For example, four of the five village corporations in the Chugach Native region, 
Prince William Sound and eastern Kenai Peninsula, sold almost as much land as Sealaska 
Corporation received in the 1971 settlement.  The shareholders were under an intense and 
focused lobbying coalition effort of fishers and environmentalists who were opposed to 
any development that would potentially harm the fishery.  The shareholders, many of 
them non-residents of the region, voted to sell.  The shareholders received substantial 
redistribution checks from the millions of dollars received for the conservation 
easements.  
 Chugach Alaska Corporation (CAC), the regional corporation the four village 
corporations are affiliated with, still owns the subsurface estate, because, after all, the 
shareholder cannot sell – legally – something the shareholder does not own. (Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, 1998 Status Report, p. 20) The approximately 300,000 
acres of subsurface rights are subject to 7(i) of ANCSA and thus 70% of any profits from 
the development of the natural resources are shareable with the approximately 6.5 million 
original shares. 
 The question raised by the sale of land and conservation rights to the surface 
estate brings up an interesting question.  Though it is assumed that the subsurface owners 
are guaranteed access to what they own, how will they ever gain permission from the 
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National Forest and the National Park Service to do so?  The opposition from the well-
oiled national environmental lobby is powerful, determined and focused to achieve what 
they believe they lost in 1971. (Phillips, 1999)   
 The CAC situation highlights the complexities.  Most of the corporation’s 
shareholders are non-residents of Alaska and the region. Therefore since village 
shareholders are regional corporation shareholders, it is highly probable that most of the 
village corporation shareholders no longer live in the village.  There is a growing Alaska 
Native population in Prince William Sound and on the Kenai Peninsula.   
 ANCSA imposed free market concepts by the use of the corporate system of 
business.  It is an imposition on an indigenous people who knew little of government 
except that created by the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), which did not necessarily 
reflect the kind of traditional governments exercised by the 200 villages in Alaska. 
 Years later, in explaining how it came to be, former U.S. Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark recalled in Breaking the Ice, From Land Claims to Tribal Sovereignty in 
the Arctic,  
We were – not so much me but the other lawyers working on it – were, 
business corporate lawyers.  That was their history, that was their 
knowledge, that was their joy.  And their familiarity with Alaska Native 
ways and needs was somewhat limited.’ As a result, ANCSA took on a 
corporate form, and this, perhaps more than anything else, led grassroots 
movement after ANCSA was implemented to restore tribal sovereignty, 
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and to reject the corporatization of [Alaska] Native culture.  (Zellen, 2008, 
p. 47)   
 The pieces of the puzzle are fluid as the world’s population grows and the 
pressure on natural resources accelerates.  Some of the Alaska Native corporations that 
have not opened up their shareholder rolls to allow those born after December 18, 1971 to 
enroll in a special class with life estate shares, thus granting them the right to participate 
in the election of directors to the board, will face increasing pressure for dividends.  This 
pressure may appear in the guise of environmental protection and a dangling carrot of 
large dividends (as in the case with the Chugach village corporations).   
 Another puzzle piece includes the growing migration of rural people to the more 
urban centers such as Fairbanks and Anchorage, and the larger sub-regional centers such 
as Bethel and Dillingham.  That migration pattern includes original shareholders and their 
descendents, many of whom are not necessarily shareholders.  In a Fairbanks Daily 
News-Miner story, Aaron Schutt, the President/CEO of Doyon, Limited, said,  
In 1971, when ANCSA was passed, about three-quarters of our 
shareholders lived in villages, about 25 percent in Fairbanks and a small 
percentage elsewhere.  Now only about 25 percent of shareholders live in 
villages, another 25 percent in Fairbanks and elsewhere, and about half 
live out-of-state. (Bradner, 2012)  
 The shareholder migration away from the villages and the growth of the non-
shareholder population in the villages will create issues. 
  In the same news story, Margie Brown, President/CEO of CIRI said,  
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There’s a whole class of shareholders not that familiar with the 
corporation and their history.  In 10 to 20 years, many shareholders will 
have to decide what it really means to be an Alaska Native shareholder, 
and in 40 years all of us probably will be at that point. (Bradner, 2012)  
 While Alaska Natives continue to testify with the same passionate reasons and 
arguments in 2013 that were used to propel energy into the early 1960s percolating land 
claims movement, what was said in the Fairbanks News-Miner is not going to happen at 
some future juncture but has happened as in the case of Chugach region villages.   And it 
happened when the land claims battle was still fresh in the minds of most Natives.  It 
happened because environmentalists now had the Exxon Valdez Trustees Council as a 
bank and willing sellers who seemed more concerned with benefitting themselves than 
protecting the land that would be owned by the next generation of shareholders. 
 Alaska Natives who seek instant monetary rewards from the ANCSA corporations 
or at environmentalists who pressure village residents to sell the land should not be the 
only ones who will be faulted by future generations.  Perhaps the Alaska Natives who 
voted in favor of land sales did not believe as the many who believed in the promises of 
ANCSA.  After all, the Congress created individual ownership of shares of stock in the 
corporations so it was not unreasonable for Alaska Natives to expect dividends. 
 Nothing seems fair and just with the ANCSA.  In 1990 the villages were under 
heavy pressure by shareholders to make money and heavy pressure to preserve the land.  
Some Alaska Native corporate officials said non-Alaska Natives were applying a double 
standard.  One such official was Ralph Eluska, then president of the village corporation 
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Aihiok-Kaguyak Inc.  He was quoted in The New York Times in June 1990 as saying “… 
we’re broke.  Congress made us into a corporation, and then said, ‘Go out and make the 
bottom line.’ So, our shareholders keep asking me, ‘What have you done for me lately?’” 
(Egan, 1990) That question was being asked all over by Alaska Native by shareholders, 
unfamiliar with the challenges of entrepreneurial opportunities, particularly in remote 
rural parts of the state. 
 In the 1986 book (a collection of essays), Contemporary Alaskan Native 
Economies, two University of Alaska Anchorage (UAA) professors wrote about the 
prospects for mining.   
Development of hard rock mineral resources has been a frequently cited 
source of economic growth in some circles, but the economic realities 
seem to tell a different story.  Whether the problems are economic or 
otherwise, it is unlikely that hard rock mineral development will ever be 
more than a locally significant element in rural development.  Twenty to 
forty years from now there may be two or three major mines in 
production, but their economic significance will be site specific and of 
minor overall economic importance.  (Langdon, 1986, p. 8)  
 A year after the Alaska Native economic essays were published, Sealaska 
Corporation, the southeast Alaska regional corporation, announced it had formed a 
Natural Resources Department to begin development of its mineral estate of at least 
600,000 acres.  Byron Mallott, chief executive officer, was quoted as saying in The 
Tundra Times (December 27, 1987) that, “This is a major step in a long-term program for 
   
135 
the development of our mineral resources in a way that benefits our shareholders and the 
Southeast Alaska region.”  Sealaska’s mineral estate consists of the subsurface estate of 
Sealaska Corp.’s lands, as well as the subsurface estate of the lands of the village and 
urban corporations of the region.”  
 Three years after creating the division, a major subsidiary of one of the world’s 
largest nickel mineral corporations signed an exploration pact with Sealaska.  The 
agreement was with American Copper and Nickel Co. (ACNC), a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Inco Ltd, a major multinational company based in Toronto.  The surface 
estate of 10,000 acres of the 14,000 acres of the exploration pact is owned by the village 
corporation Kootznoowoo.  The president of the village corporation said in a Tundra 
Times (September 3, 1990) story that, “Our agreement with ACNC will create business 
opportunities for our company.  Although the financial impacts may not be immediate, it 
should provide long-term employment opportunities for our shareholders and additional 
revenues from our land.”    
 In the winter of 2012 the state Department of Natural Resources unveiled a new 
interactive map that showed mining prospects around the state.  The 75 mining prospects 
were listed in the online newspaper Alaska Dispatch (DeMarban, 2012).  “From the Gold 
Rush to today’s trio of gold-mining reality series, Alaska has long been known for its 
hardrock dreams.  But just how big is the potential?  More massive than you think.”  
 Alaska’s history is laced with threads of mining exploration from the Russians to 
the modern oil executives from huge transnational corporations.  Red Dog, Kensington, 
and Pogo are today’s newsmakers.  But there are others on the horizon.  “The truth is, 
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where there’s a mountain, there’s a mine in the making.  Our state is chuck full of 
prospects, more than 75 of them peppering nearly every corner of the state.” (DeMarban, 
2012)  
 Many of the prospects are on public land and require permits for exploration 
which are subject to the scrutiny of anyone interested in the general public.  That may not 
be the case with the prospects on the lands owned by the private, non-publically-traded 
ANCSA corporations.  Some have suggested that 30 years ago when the regional 
corporations were attempting to curry favor from the state's business community which 
was hostile to the land claims effort, they employed public relations tools.  Such tools 
included press releases and appearances at chambers of commerce and other avenues to 
extol the virtues of Alaska Natives working within the free enterprise system.  That may 
not be the case in 2013 as mining development prospects are almost guaranteed to 
generate adverse public attention. 
 Several decades ago, large-scale mining in the arctic and sub-arctic was dismissed 
as too remote, too expensive, and too controversial.  That was before the trans-Alaska 
Pipeline (new in 1974, now rapidly aging) and Red Dog mine, one of the world’s largest 
open pit operations.   
 The 1970s and 1980s were decades of hostility towards environmentalists, then a 
shameful, dirty word.  President Jimmy Carter was the embodiment of the environmental 
movement.   
In December 1980, a month after he was voted out of office, Mr. Carter 
signed a bill that had been fought over, in one version or another, since 
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Alaska became a state in 1959.  It has been called the biggest zoning act in 
history, designating 10 new national parks, monuments and recreation 
areas and protecting nearly a third of the State of Alaska from 
development.  Mr. Carter ranks it among his biggest achievements.  But at 
the time it looked as if Mr. Carter would never be able to set foot in this 
state.  At the Alaska State Fair, he recalled, he was a bigger villain than 
the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as people lined up to throw bottles at 
his image.  Just months after Mr. Carter left office, he stopped in 
Anchorage on his way to Tokyo, and the Secret Service urged him not to 
leave the air base for fear of what angry Alaskans might do to him. (Egan, 
2000)  
 Times have changed in Alaska.  When Jimmy Carter visited Alaska in late 
summer 2000, the crowds that greeted him hailed him “as a hero and visionary for what 
has been called the greatest conservation act in American history.”  (Egan, 2000)  
 The development of the Red Dog mine in northwest Alaska on NANA Regional 
Corporation land has become one of the world's largest producers of zinc concentrate.  
The profits from its development of a portion of the 51.6 tons of reserves which contain 
16.7% zinc and 4.4% lead are subject to 7(i) and resulted in $82 million being distributed 
to the other regional corporations in 2011.  Zinc is priced by metric ton and fluctuated 
between $1,980.07 in January 2012 to $1,855.18 in June.  Metals About.com, (2013)  
 The NANA/Cominco Red Dog agreement states that NANA receives royalties of 
4.5% until capital costs are recovered then rising 5% every year to a maximum of 50%.  
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The 7(i) provision of ANCSA could mean that hundreds of millions of dollars of the 
mine's profits will be distributed to the other regional corporations.  (Alaska Journal of 
Commerce, 2007)   
 Using simple arithmetic, dividing the 2011 Red Dog distribution ($82 million) by 
65,000 (approximate number of original shareholders owning 100 shares apiece), each 
owner of 100 shares is entitled to $1,261.54. Regional corporations receive an amount 
based on their number of original shares which is then distributed to village corporations 
and at-large shareholders.  The amount to the village corporation is based on their 
original enrollment. 
 Red Dog is on Alaska Native corporation land and the proposed Pebble mine is on 
state-leased land.  Pebble royalties will flow to the state of Alaska treasury.   
 The Pebble mine prospect is a good example of what might yet come to be.  With 
billions of dollars in subsurface value in gold and copper, the transnational corporation, 
in 2013, is battling with the environmental organizations, commercial fishers and Alaska 
Native subsistence fishers.  The mine site is on state-leased land and within the 
boundaries of the sparsely populated Lake and Peninsula Borough (population 1,631). 
(U.S. Census, 2010) Pebble is being touted as a potential world-class mine that will bring 
jobs and economic development to one of the poorest regions of Alaska. 
 What if the proposed Pebble mine was on ANCSA corporation land?  Firstly, if 
Pebble was on Alaska Native corporate land, it would bring with it a lobbying base of 
thousands of shareholders who would benefit monetarily from the mine’s development.  
Secondly, as an ANCSA corporation, much of the information about Pebble could be 
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confidential since private corporations do not have to share some financial information 
during the permitting process.  And thirdly, if the Pebble subsurface estate was owned by 
the regional corporation, as NANA owns the subsurface estate of Red Dog, the financial 
return over the life of the mine to the owners of original shares would dwarf Red Dog 7(i) 
revenue sharing. 
 The Pebble Partnership is a transnational corporation owned by Anglo American 
and Northern Dynasty.  Shareholders of Northern Dynasty include Rio Tinto and 
Mitsubishi.  Just judging the project by the amount that is committed to be spent in the 
development phase of the project (Anglo-American is committed to spend $1.4 billion) 
[Pebble Partnership, 2013], the reserves are huge. (Alaska Journal of Commerce, 2007)  
 How big would the allure be, if Pebble was on Alaska Native corporation lands?  
Any financial estimate of the potential worth of Pebble is speculative; some put it higher 
while others put it lower.  Ground Truth Trekking, an environmental leaning non-profit, 
puts the estimate at around $500 billion. 
 Ground Truth Trekking, which was founded in 2007 to  
…. engage and educate the public on Alaska's natural resource issues,” 
bases its estimate on “maximum recovery rates and spot prices for copper 
($3.5/lb), gold ($1720/oz) and molybdenum ($11/lb) in November 2012; 
the total market value of Pebble Mine could be in the neighborhood of 
$500 billion.  (Ground Truth Trekking, 2013)   
 What is interesting about both Red Dog and Pebble is that both were discovered 
by air.  In the mid-1950s, a bush pilot noticed that there were mineral stains and so 
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landed and named the site after his red dog.  In 1986, Pebble was discovered by a pilot 
who noticed that there were color anomalies in the Pebble Beach area (as it was then 
known). 
 There is ample evidence to show that monetary dividends are stronger than 
cultures and traditions.  Villages in the Koniag region (Kodiak Island) and the Chugach 
region (Prince William Sound and the outer coast of the Kenai Peninsula) did sell 
hundreds of thousands of acres back to the federal government.  The prices paid for the 
700,000 acres of surface estate are small compared to what a Pebble-like mine might 
return to generations of shareholders who own original shares. Again, using simple 
arithmetic, if the shareholder divides $500 billion by 4.5% (the royalty NANA gets from 
Cominco from Red Dog) it equals $22.5 billion.  Then times $22.5 billion by 70% and 
that result is $15.4 billion.  Then divide $15.4 billion by 6.5 million shares and that result 
is $2,369.23 per share.  In 1971, each Alaska Native was eligible to receive 100 shares. 
 If the shareholder does the math and he/she may come to the same conclusion, it 
is all speculative but it is definitely an enticement (please note that all of the numbers 
could be greatly inflated, the royalty and administrative and capital costs will be deducted 
from revenues)! 
 There is tremendous opposition to the Pebble mine and it has reached the editorial 
pages of the influential The New York Times.  In June 2012, the paper said that the 
proposed Canadian-British consortium mine, based on the findings of the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency, is “deeply worrisome.”  The editorial speaks of the 
“threat of catastrophic failure of huge man-made reservoirs known as ‘tailing ponds’ 
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where mining companies typically store toxic acids, metals and other mining wastes.  If 
that happens, spawning streams would be widely polluted and future salmon harvest 
sharply diminished.”  The Times concluded that based on the “mining industry’s poor 
environmental record, the value of the fishery that could be harmed” the risks were too 
high.  (The New York Times, 2012)     
 The Pebble mine is on land leased from the State of Alaska.  The Donlin Creek 
mine, one of the world’s largest known undeveloped prospects, is on Calista land because 
it’s subsurface is subject to 7(i) of ANCSA. The Donlin Creek mine is owned by 
NovaGold Resources, headquartered in Toronto, Canada, and Barrick Gold Corporation 
is the world’s largest gold corporation, also headquartered in Toronto.  The prospect is in 
one of the poorest areas of Alaska with some of the worst social statistics in the nation 
including suicides, alcoholism, domestic violence, and the list goes on.  In 2013 there is 
little opposition to Donlin Creek.  Development of Donlin Creek carries many of the 
same risks and rewards as development at Pebble, and yet Donlin Creek has been moving 
forward largely unopposed for more than a decade.  Both environmentalists and 
developers agree on the main reason why:  money.  As Karl Marx long ago observed, 
everything is economics.  Donlin Creek has attracted little attention, said Pam Miller, 
executive director of Alaska Community Action on Toxins, because “unlike Pebble, there 
aren't the wealthy lodge owners.  There’s just poor subsistence residents.” (Medred, 
2010)   
 The prospect is estimated to have 26.2 million ounces and at the current gold 
price of about $1,100 an ounce, about $30 billion of which 70% (as in NANA’s Red Dog, 
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this could be negotiated lower to exclude some capital costs) of the profits could be 
subject to sharing with the other regional corporations.  
 Almost all of the other regional corporations have exploratory agreements with 
transnational corporations and they are searching with increasingly sophisticated metal 
detectors for copper, gold, iron, uranium, zinc and precious metals.  The future is 
arriving. 
 In 1867, Secretary of State William H. Seward negotiated the purchase of Alaska 
from Russia and was roundly condemned by members of the U.S. Congress (whether the 
Alaska Natives were asked if they wanted to be bought notwithstanding).  Thirty-six 
years after the purchase, a New York Times writer reflected on the purchase and quoted a 
“Mr. Loan of Missouri.”  (The New York Times, 1903)  He said, “The acquisition of this 
barren and inhospitable waste would never add one dollar to the wealth of our country, or 
furnish homes to our people.  To suppose that anyone would willingly leave the mild 
climate and fruitful soil of the United States, with its newspapers and churches, its 
railroads and commerce, its civilization and refinement, to seek a home among the Aleuts 
. . . is simply to suppose such a person insane.” (The New York Times, 1903)  
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Chapter 5 
Prelude 
 Four years have passed since Robert and Tom met at the annual shareholders’ 
meeting in Anchorage at the mega-hotel/shopping mall/parking garage complex owned 
by a consortium of three regional corporations.  Both of them are now 25 years old and 
both are well-educated professionals.  Robert, a UAF graduate, is working for his tribe 
in the village he grew up in and where most of his family still lives.  Robert, a Yupik 
Eskimo and an owner of one share in his village corporation, considers himself lucky 
since he has a good job where the unemployment rate in the village is 37%.  Tom, a non-
Alaska Native owner of 100 ANCSA original shares who considers himself a Alaska 
Native but is not recognized as such by the tribal council, went to work for his and 
Robert’s Regional ANCSA Native Corporation in the Chicago corporate office under the 
shareholder-hire program.  After a year on the job, the Corporation agreed to pay for 
Tom’s Harvard University MBA education on condition that he return to the Corporation 
and work for at least two years as a shareholders relations advisor to the Chairman of 
the Board.  Tom is in his second year as a Senior Policy Advisor.  Tom is a Yupik Eskimo 
(for corporate purposes) by descent (his blood quantum is one sixty-fourth Yupik). He 
was born and raised in Florida and went to school in St. Louis.   
 Bud Jones, the Corporation’s Chairman of the Board, is a graduate of Stanford 
University law school.  Bud is one eighth Yupik Eskimo but he has never lived in Alaska, 
nor did his mother.  His grandmother inherited her shares which she left to Bud.  Bud’s 
father and grandfather were also graduates of Stanford Law.  Bud’s family is considered 
 
 
 
144 
‘old money’ which Webster's dictionary defines as the inherited wealth of established 
upper-class families. 
 Chairman Jones is proud of his Alaska Native heritage.  He has a carved oosik on 
his credenza in his office and a historic framed photograph of the 1978 winner of the 
Iditarod dog team race hanging next to a stuffed moose head. 
 There is shareholder preference in hiring, especially for executive positions since 
the law firm emphasizes the use of the Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
in preparing preferential bidding documents for defense contracts.  The defense 
department contractors need the mine’s ore for manufacturing of weapons.  So being an 
Alaska Native firm with Alaska Natives employed as senior officers is a good thing.   
 Robert and Tom use the social network often, exchanging emails several times a 
month.  Several times Robert has invited Tom to visit the village where his great-great-
grandmother was born.  She was adopted and raised in Ohio and never returned to the 
village.  Tom is a corporate Yupik Eskimo, but is more Irish, French, Italian, and English 
than he is Alaska Native.  It is likely that Robert’s and Tom’s great-great grandparents 
knew each other and quite likely that Robert and Tom are distant cousins. 
 Blood quantum has always been factor in Native American policy.  The federal 
Bureau of Indian Affairs Certificate of Indian Blood is important for benefits and tribal 
membership.   It was, however, not as important as ownership of ANCSA shares and for 
decades, in order to receive medical benefits in Alaska, the only proof a person had to 
show was that they were a shareholder in a Alaska Native corporation.  It is rumored 
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that the number of non-Alaska Native shareholders who use the Indian Health Services 
makes up about half of its clients.    
 Robert’s everyday job deals with the issues common to almost all of the 185 rural 
villages in Alaska – alcoholism, spousal and child abuse, unemployment, and teenage 
suicides.  In 2076 Alaska Natives are still at the bottom in every social indicator of how 
well society is doing or, to put it another way, Alaska Natives are number one in every 
worst-case scenario.  This is the same story told since well before the 1971 passage of 
ANCSA.  The deplorable condition of the Alaska Natives was a powerful and persuasive 
argument used in passage of ANCSA and quoted often by oil industry lobbyists and their 
friendly legislators who wanted to get their pipeline built.   And by social activists who 
wanted to do something right for some of the poorest people in America.  In the political 
settlement every Alaska Native with at least one-quarter blood (one full blood Alaska 
Native grandparent) who was alive at the time the Congressional bill became law 
(President Nixon signed the bill on December 18, 1971) was eligible to become a 
shareholder equal to all other shareholders, no more no less.  
 With the pending expansion of the mine and in an effort to foster better relations 
with the tribe - the only government in the village - Tom has emailed Robert to tell him 
that the Board Chair has told him to visit the community to report on how the 
Corporation’s mining operations can double the number of locals working at the site.  
There are 1,500 workers who live in dormitories and who work two weeks on, two weeks 
off.  The company flies the employees at company expense to regional airports near 
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Seattle, Portland, Houston, Chicago, and San Francisco so the workers can spend their 
two weeks off with their families. 
 There are four locals employed by the Regional Corporation’s mine, three of 
them non-Alaska Natives but married to Alaska Natives.  The one Alaska Native local is 
armed with a high-powered rifle used to protect the dining hall’s waste sites from 
marauding animals such as bear, fox, wolverines and wolves.  Four years ago he shot 
and killed a wolf which is now stuffed and mounted in the mine’s executive offices.  The 
mine’s officials introduce the Alaska Native employee as a great hunter. 
 Robert has offered Tom a place to stay during his visit but Tom said no thanks 
since he will arrive in the morning and leave at 5 p.m. in order to catch the 9:55 p.m. 
flight from Anchorage to Chicago.  But Tom asked, shareholder-to-shareholder, if Robert 
could introduce him to some of the village’s leadership during his six-and-a-half-hour 
visit (Tom wants to impress the main office.).  The tribe has an Indian Reorganization Act 
constitution (considered a big part of FDR’s Indian New Deal), which was adopted in the 
1930s in an effort to give Indians more control over their local affairs on their 
reservations, then suffering some of the worst consequences of the 1930s Great 
Depression.  The Territory of Alaska was included even though there were very few 
reservations in Alaska where the land was owned by the United States and held in trust 
for tribal members by the Secretary of the Interior as is often the case in the Lower 48. 
 Robert is thinking, here’s a non-Alaska Native shareholder who is making his first 
visit to Alaska to survey local residents’ financial and economic wants, needs, and 
desires on a six-and-a-half hour visit to a village that used to own the surface estate upon 
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which the mine operates and employs 1,500 non-residents when the unemployment rate 
in the village is 37%.  Also, Tom is a shareholder in the Regional Corporation that owns 
the subsurface estate which means he has a right to vote and participate in the policies 
that determine how the mine is operated and on whom the mine impacts.  Robert is also a 
shareholder but under cumulative voting, Tom has 100 times more votes than Robert 
does (under cumulative voting, each is times the number of seats up for election to get the 
number of votes; thus, with three seats up for election, Robert has three votes (one share 
times three) and Tom has 300 votes (100 times three equals 300). 
 Ever since the airstrip was built during World War II, there has been regular air 
service from Bethel, the regional hub, to the village.  Back then it was twice a month 
service, now it is four times a day.  When the missionaries and territorial officials visited 
they often spent a few days to rest their dog teams or make repairs on their outboard 
motors.  Spending a few nights forced them to learn of the living conditions in a remote 
village.  Today, government officials, corporate officials and even bishops fly in and fly 
out, arrive in late morning and leave in late afternoon.  There seems to be no need to 
spend the night, no need to eat local food, no need to visit and get to know local people, 
no need to get a feel and understanding of the community.  Taking all of this into 
consideration, Robert’s thoughts turn dark.  His friend Tom is just like them.  He’s a 
shareholder in his regional corporation which owns the mine and hires the non-locals.  
The regional corporation is a Alaska Native corporation but Tom is not a Alaska Native, 
yet Tom has 100 times more votes than he does and he has no interest in taking the time 
to know the people of the village that has one of the highest rates of alcoholism, suicides, 
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unemployment, domestic violence and . . .    Tom looks out the window and asks, where 
the hope? 
To Affect Local Affairs, Create Municipal Governments 
 In 2013 one of the most unpopular ideas in the Unorganized Borough of rural 
Alaska is the Borough form of local government.  The Borough is akin to what is known 
in the Lower 48 as the County form of government.  This use of the word ‘Borough’ was 
written into the Alaska Constitution to give local people the opportunity to incorporate 
their ideas, feelings, lifestyles, and general attitudes as much as possible into their local 
government charter (constitution). 
 Under the local government section, in plain and simple language, Alaska’s 
Constitution is clear.  “The purpose of this article is to provide for the maximum local 
self-government, with a minimum of local government units, and to prevent duplication 
of tax-levying jurisdictions.  A liberal construction shall be given to the powers of local 
governments units.”  (State of Alaska Constitution, Article X, Section 1) Thus, with the 
simplest of language, the framers of the state’s Constitution formalized what the local 
people wanted most - to control and affect local affairs. 
 All of the tribal governments in Alaska lack a land base, except for Metlaklatla 
(Venetie and Elim took title to their surface and subsurface of their former Indian 
reserves under ANCSA) and do not have the powers used by Borough governments to 
govern and regulate activities within the jurisdiction of said government.  Those powers 
include the power of education, municipal landfills, the police power (i.e. power to 
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provide for the health and welfare of its citizens), planning and zoning and the power to 
tax. 
 The powers to tax and to regulate through planning and zoning capture the 
attention of corporations all over the world (the less they pay in taxes to local 
governments, the higher their dividends to their world-wide shareholder base).  The big 
challenge, as it is everywhere in the world where there are large mining developments, is 
to keep the corporation from capturing the local government. 
 What several of the regional corporations (i.e. Chugach Alaska Corporation 
(CAC) and Doyon Ltd.) and village corporations (an assumption is made here because 
original village shareholders are also shareholders in regional corporations) are seeing is 
the number of non-Alaska Native shareholders and non-resident Alaska Natives 
increasing.  If local people want to impose their kind of restrictions on resource 
development, they must create a form of government that will give local people the kind 
of power to affect the changes they want.  
 The idea of City and Borough status seems repugnant to many non-profit 
organizations, particularly those servicing rural Alaskans. However, once local people are 
in full realization of what a Borough form of government can do for them, they warm to 
the idea of forming Boroughs.  Such has been the case with the rural residents of the 
North Slope, Northwest Arctic, Yakutat and Denali areas of the state. 
 What is required to advance controlling and influencing policies on economic 
development in rural Alaska is leadership that comes with vision and focus.  The answer 
to the questions related to corporate democracy are fraught with pitfalls and political 
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hurdles and it is unlikely that with a growing number of non-Alaska Native shareholders 
and non-resident Alaska Natives such changes will happen unless there is political and 
economic pressure from within the regional boundaries that will force regional corporate 
boards to respect Article X, Section 1 of the Alaska’s Constitution.  By creating a local 
government within their village corporation boundaries the village residents, by 
participating in the public processes mandated by all constitutions (United States and 
Alaska), can foster and promote the interests of the village corporation or they can 
channel it to stay in step with the interests of the local residents. 
 With dozens of mining prospects on file with the Alaska Department of Natural 
Resources in 2013, it is likely history will repeat itself as in the cases of Prudhoe Bay and 
Red Dog mine.  Resource developers may have to choose who they will want to work 
with if the mining prospect is in the unorganized borough.  In the case of Prudhoe Bay, 
the oil corporations were opposed to having their operations within the boundaries of a 
borough whose likely-voting population was mostly Inupiat Eskimo.  Despite intense 
lobbying by the oil industry, the North Slope Borough (NSB) was created making it the 
largest county-type government in the United States (see Then Fight For It by F. Paul 
[2003). 
 In the Red Dog case, NANA Regional Corporation worked with Teck Resources 
Limited, a transnational corporation headquartered in Vancouver, Canada, to facilitate the 
creation of the Northwest Arctic Borough (NWAB).  Teck’s strategy was totally different 
than the oil industry’s strategy.  This is because the oil on the Arctic Slope was owned by 
the state and there was little need to work with the resident Inupiat Eskimos who were not 
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yet organized into a borough.  NANA supported the creation of the NWAB because it 
would mirror the regional corporation’s boundaries and any development would impact 
many of their shareholders since many of them were residents of Kotzebue or the 
region’s villages. 
 Many of the mining prospects are in the Unorganized Borough, an Alaska 
Constitution designation meaning that the area has not yet organized into a county-type 
local government.  Though in 2013 the Unorganized Borough comprised 57% of the 
state's area, it had less than 10% of Alaska’s population.  (Bockhorst, 2001,  p. 2)  With 
so much of the state rural and without local governments, transnational corporations have 
the opportunity to strategically consider what nearby borough they wish to be in or what 
kind of  borough they might want to foster.  Such may have been the case with Greens 
Creek mine. 
 At a February 1992 public hearing of the Alaska House of Representatives 
Community and Regional Affairs Committee on a resolution disapproving the annexation 
of Greens Creek into the City and Borough of Juneau, then Grand President of the Alaska 
Native Brotherhood Albert Kookesh testified that his village of Angoon had problems 
with the annexation.  (Alaska State Legislature Hearing, 1992)  During the hearing, 
Borough Mayor Jamie Parsons testified that Juneau had a “documented history of 
understanding and a responsible approach toward the complexity of the Greens Creek 
Mine annexation.”  When asked, Mayor Parsons confirmed that Greens Creek had 
approached the city. (Alaska, 1992)  
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 Arctic Slope Native Association (ASNA) was the only regional Alaska Native 
association to vote against accepting the offer from the United States, which was 
embodied in the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), (Public Law 92-
203).  At the special convention of the Alaska Federation of Natives held on the campus 
of Alaska Methodist University in December 1971, ASNA President Joe Upicksoun 
spoke against adoption of the resolution which passed 511 to 56.  He felt that the Inupiat 
Eskimos of the Arctic Slope were being taken advantage of.  “For the right to explore a 
mere 412,000 acres of our land, the oil companies paid the state of Alaska over $900 
million.  We did not receive one penny of this amount.”  (Bauman, 2005)   
 Because there were fewer than 3,000 [2,663] (U.S. Federal Census, 1970)  people 
north of the Brooks Range, (56,842,956 acres), many bureaucrats and politicians felt that 
the Borough proposal was too big. However, for the Inupiat Eskimos it made perfect 
sense from a lands claim perspective.  Under ANCSA the Inupiat Eskimos of the Arctic 
Slope gave up 51 million acres in exchange for $5 million.  The small villages and 
Barrow residents felt that they did not receive what they were entitled to and so sought a 
way to diminish the control and influence of the oil industry’s operations at Prudhoe Bay. 
 Since the Arctic Slope Native Association’s North Slope land claims were 
essentially the leverage for a settlement, once a settlement was achieved they would lose 
that leverage.  The leadership sought ways to benefit local residents from oil 
development.  It came about from local government.  As attorney Fred Paul explained, 
“The North Slope Borough is one of man’s grandest inventions.  With its creation on 
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1 July 1972, the Inupiat living on the North Slope acquired the means they had long 
needed to deal with the white man’s world on their own terms.” (Paul, 2003)   
 Among the authors of the State’s constitution, written in 1956 in Fairbanks, were 
many entrepreneurs who were fearful of a central government, which from anywhere in 
Alaska was far away.  They favored local control and the concept of a Borough that 
would have extensive local control.   
An Alaskan borough is a municipal corporation, comparable in many 
ways to a county in the Lower 48.  It has power to plan and zone, assess 
and collect taxes, provide for police, manage schools, promulgate building 
codes, etc.  If, for example, an entrepreneur wished to build a pipeline 
within a borough, he need only secure the consent of the borough’s 
legislative assembly, a consent no other government agency could 
override.  (Paul, 2003, p. 237)   
 The realization of what local government can do that a tribal government cannot 
do is summed up in Fred Paul’s comment.   
Even more clearly, I was coming to realize that here was the means of 
securing for the Inupiat the power to zone and tax their land.  By zoning 
the oil fields, they could protect the lands important for subsistence.  By 
taxing the oil fields, they could build their own schools.  Taken together, 
the powers of zoning and taxation were almost equal to ownership. (Paul, 
2003, p. 238)   
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 The maximum local control provision of the state’s constitution allows it to do 
what the state government may not want to do, including the recognition of Alaska 
Native organizations.  For example, in a unique provision of the Denali Borough Charter 
there is recognition of Alaska Native organizations as having the same status as local 
governments.   
The Denali Borough may exercise any of its powers or perform any of its 
functions and may participate in the financing thereof, jointly or in 
cooperation, by agreement with any one or more local governments, the 
state, or the United States, or any agency or instrumentality of these 
governments.  In the context of this charter, local governments include 
[Alaska] Native organizations.  (Denali Borough Charter, Preamble, 
Article One, Section 1.04.)   
 The state’s strong local government section of the Alaska Constitution can be 
used to protect and advance local traditions, cultures, and knowledge such as clearly 
implied in the Denali Borough Charter.  Another example is the Northwest Arctic 
Borough, the creation of which was promoted by NANA Regional Corporation, Inc., the 
ANCSA Regional Corporation for the Inupiat Eskimos of northwest Alaska.   With part 
of NANA’s regional lands outside of the regional boundaries and within the North Slope 
Borough, the leadership of the NANA region felt uncomfortable and moved successfully 
to detach the Red Dog mining district to form a new borough called the Northwest Arctic 
Borough. 
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 The Northwest Arctic Borough (NWAB) does not tax the regional corporation’s 
Red Dog mine but receives a payment in lieu of taxes.  One of the main concerns shared 
universally by residents of unincorporated areas of the state is the fear of taxation but, as 
shown in the NWAB case, it does not have to be so.  
 What the North Slope Borough (NSB), Denali Borough, and NWAB had in 
common was leadership that recognized the powers granted under the State’s 
Constitution to local people to influence and control their own destinies.  As Fred Paul 
explained, the power to tax and zone is “almost equal to ownership.” (Paul, 2003, p. 238)  
In other cases in Alaska, for example, the annexation of the then proposed Greens Creek 
mine on Admiralty Island by the City and Borough of Juneau was a local effort by 
residents of that borough to expand their regulatory and taxation powers to an additional 
140 square miles. (Blatchford, 1994)   
 Greens Creek on Admiralty Island was annexed by the City and Borough of 
Juneau in 1994 is near Angoon, a predominately Tlingit Indian community.  The mine is 
a lost opportunity for local people to directly benefit from resource extraction.  The 
mostly Tlingit Angoon is approximately 56 miles from Juneau.  Juneau is 55 miles from 
Greens Creek and Angoon is 41 miles.  In 2006 the mine paid the Juneau Borough over 
$800,000 in property taxes. (Forgey, 2007) The Hoonah-Angoon population, according to 
the 2010 census was 2,129 and for the City and Borough of Juneau, it was 32,556.  (U.S. 
Census, 2010.)  The property taxes of the Greens Creek would have gone a lot further in 
Angoon and Hoonah in addressing local needs than in Juneau. 
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 In an opinion/editorial in the Juneau Empire, the mayor of Angoon wrote that the 
U.S. Forest Service did not listen to Angoon residents about Greens Creek.  Mayor 
Richard George wrote about costs and benefits of mining on subsistence foods.   
In these ways, Angoon has incurred the costs of Greens Creek Mine, but 
it’s Juneau that’s received the benefits.  When the mine first got started, 
five representatives from Greens Creek came to Angoon.  We told them 
we had people that wanted to work, and we also offered to help with 
transporting employees to the mine.  We informed them of our efforts to 
develop hydropower in Thayer Lake, and our desire to work together to 
make power for a mine in a way that would benefit both of us.  But those 
words seem to have fallen on deaf ears.  All of those benefits went to 
Juneau.  Juneau gets the property taxes.  Juneau residents get the jobs, and 
Juneau's economy benefits being the main port for the mine.  Meanwhile, 
Angoon has only received a few thousand dollars each year in 
scholarships.  (George, 2012)    
 The Greens Creek annexation by the City and Borough of Juneau was presumably 
part of a long-term strategy by the transnational corporation (a partnership of Kennecott, 
Hecla Mining and two Rio Tinto subsidiaries) in picking the local government they 
wanted to work with.  Greens Creek was discovered in 1975 and full scale development 
started in 1987 with production beginning in 1989.  In 2009 the mine produced 7.5 
million ounces of silver and 67,000 ounces of gold.  It is the largest private employer in 
Juneau with a payroll of almost 300 workers.  (Ground Truth Trekking, 2012)   
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 There are other examples of local people assuming leadership positions to protect 
or advance local interests.  The creation of the City and Borough of Yakutat in the mid-
1990s gave local residents planning and zoning power and the power to tax 9,463 square 
miles.  Yakutat is home to a strong tribal organization and an ANCSA village 
corporation, Yak-Tat Kwaan. 
 Seven years after passage of ANCSA, the Federal-State Land Use Planning 
Commission was pessimistic there would be subsurface development sufficient to 
alleviate chronic unemployment in rural Alaska.  In the report’s policy recommendations 
it noted the problem.   
Major development of subsurface resources is often held out as a panacea.  
It is important to point out, however, that most resource development in 
Alaska has been carried out by workers commuting from the State’s major 
urban centers or even from outside Alaska rather than by rural residents.  
Except for some fisheries, Alaska’s resources will undoubtedly continue to 
be developed that way.  In addition, resource development opportunities 
will take a long time to mature. (Commission Study, 1971-1979, Summary 
and Findings, pp. 16-17)    
 Most of the government policy recommendations (either state or federal) of the 
1970s and the 1980s did not recommend the creation of local governments to create and 
further opportunities for local residents.  But that was before the Red Dog mine, Greens 
Creek mine and the anticipated Pebble mine and Donlin Creek mine.  Nor did the issues 
of non-resident shareholders and non-resident, non-Alaska Native shareholders and a 
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growing Alaska Native population come into general discussion, although the issue of 
how to bring in the ‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives was allowed in the 1991 amendments.  
The amendments, however, did not address 7(i) profit-sharing of the mineral estate. 
 There are powers that can come only through organizing a municipal government 
under Alaska’s Constitution. The most important powers cities and boroughs have 
(depending on designation) are taxation and the planning and zoning power (land use 
regulation).  With those two powers, once local people organize into an Alaska 
Constitution-authorized municipal government, those who do business, or want to do 
business within the geographic boundaries, have to respect local ordinances passed by the 
local assembly who are elected by local people.  There is one Indian reservation in 
Alaska, Metlakatla and no others.  All other tribal entities in Alaska do not have power 
over non-tribal members, or the powers of taxation and planning and zoning (land use 
regulation). 
 While tribal governments should be encouraged to assume control of issues 
reserved for Native American tribes such as small business incentives, education, and 
child welfare, such governments do not have the power to tax and regulate developments 
on Alaska Native corporate lands.  Opportunities to regulate and tax should not be lost to 
large urban boroughs eager to annex potential revenue sources.  Such eagerness prompted 
protective actions such as the creation of the Denali Borough to prevent the outstretched 
hands of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough and the North Star Borough (Fairbanks and 
adjacent areas), which saw the potential revenues in the numerous lodges and hotels in 
and near Denali National Park and Preserve.  
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The Demise of a Concept, Pure Corporate Democracy 
President Nixon’s signature on the 1971 ANCSA ushered in a bold, new 
experiment on how to deal with indigenous peoples.  The passage of the act came just as 
federal Indian policies were changing into a new direction of civil rights and social 
justice.  “Congress tried an experiment for Alaska that blended self-determination and 
assimilation:  land-owning corporations with [Alaska] Native shareholders.  It was an 
experiment that hasn't been repeated.” (Zizzia, 1997a)  
Almost two decades after passage of ANCSA, the issues turned to how to unravel 
the federal law - not repeat it.  “You’re kind of a footnote off on one of those tangents in 
federal policy,” South Dakota Deputy Attorney General Larry Long said in 1997.  
(Zizzia, 1997b)  The footnote’s footprint is large, 68,000 square miles owned in a split 
estate with the regional corporations owning all of the subsurface and the village 
corporations owning some of the surface estate. 
For many, the land claims battle was based on ideals of justice, fairness and 
equity. The corporate concept was unfamiliar to the thousands of Alaska Natives who 
participated and watched the years of deliberations and political maneuvering that began 
in earnest with the formation of the AFN in 1966.  But the concept of ANCSA was based 
on the image of Lower 48 Indian Reservations.  As the realities of corporate status based 
on public-traded concepts began to take form, seeds of resistance began to sprout.     
Long portrayed as islands of poverty and despair, by the 1980s the image began to 
take a new form, to reshape itself.  Lower 48 Indian rights’ organizations and scholars 
saw what Alaska Natives felt which turned into legal battles in the state and federal 
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courts.  “Congressional support for Indian self-determination has changed the face of 
Indian country,” (Kizzia, 1997) Colorado law professor Charles Wilkinson said in 1997.   
No one when ANCSA was passed would have predicted the kind of 
renaissance we’ve seen in Indian country. . . In hindsight, ANCSA was the 
wrong idea.   What we know now is governmental status is far more 
effective than corporate status. . .  There’s no question that the 
reservations were downtrodden.  But in every area a person could name, 
the tribes are making deep progress.  And they are making it themselves. 
(Kizzia, 1997)  
Since 1966, however, there has been an evolution of how regional boards of 
directors operate.  It is undeniable that there would be no ANCSA today had it not been 
for the volunteer efforts made by those on the non-profit advocacy associations. 
By the time of ANCSA, the non-profit Alaska Native association boards of 
directors had become expert at the meeting rules of procedures imbedded in all western 
democratic processes.  Board meetings could be contentious and stressful as directors and 
subsistence users haggled and negotiated with each other (and with other Alaska Native 
associations, governments, and special interests). Tempers often flared.  All were equal.  
All could speak, and often they did.  The deliberative processes of the Alaska Native non-
profit associations’ boards were exercises in pure and simple democracy where threats of 
legal action were unheard of.  There was no money to pay lawyers to sit in on the board 
meetings. When the for-profits corporations came into existence, it was almost an 
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irrefutable presumption that the lawyers drooled with anticipation when personal 
conflicts could easily be turned into billable hours.   
Knowledge and knowing how to use Roberts’ Rules of Order gave a director 
influence and real power which was respected by the board members.  It was often said 
that the leadership of the southeast Alaska Native groups knew the rules of procedure 
better than any other group of Alaskans and to go into a meeting with a Tlingit and Haida 
Central Council board member was risky business. 
The Alaska Native associations’ exercise of democracy changed with the creation 
and implementation of ANCSA for-profit regional corporations.  There were settlement 
funds and the money to pay for lawyers who regularly attended the meetings and often 
ruled on parliamentary questions.   If the shareholder was a member of the board’s 
majority the shareholder had a stronger chance of getting the legal questions addressed by 
corporate counsel.  Such easy access to corporate funds enlarged the definition of 
influence and control because being in the majority on the Board meant the shareholder 
could use corporate funds to further the shareholder’s personal objectives.  If the 
shareholder was in the minority it was unlikely that the shareholder would be able to self-
fund the defense of the shareholder’s character and reputation via the courts.   
It was often said that in order to get anything done on an ANCSA board, all the 
shareholder had to do was to count to seven (a majority of a twelve-person board) or five 
(a majority of a nine-person board).  Everything else was just noise. 
It is also said in politics, at least in those of the far north variety, that he who 
controls the purse strings controls the votes.  That is probably why there is so much 
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competition and so much political wrangling for legislators to get on the finance 
committees.  Such is the case with ANCSA regional corporations’ politics, at least with 
CAC.  How CAC deals with dissent and shareholders’ rights is succinctly expressed in 
two Alaska Supreme Court cases.  Though the issues were personal, the issues morphed 
into expensive and inappropriately applied ethical allegations.  It was all politics, and 
only because one person wanted to be chair and another did and the conflict resulted in 
the regional corporation board’s decision to fund litigation that cost the shareholders 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.  The law firm was, no doubt, inspired by the legal 
issues and not the money. 
The Henrichs’ cases exemplify the trumping of Robert's Rules of Order.  It is no 
longer how well the shareholder knows parliamentary procedure - if at all - but how 
much control the shareholder has over the purse.  After all, as it is known in the legal 
profession, it is not whether a person is right or wrong, but whether the person can afford 
the best legal representation money can buy.  Lawyers, as all know, are not advocates for 
justice, equality, and fairness.  Lawyers are advocates for the best interests of their clients 
- those who can afford them.   
The first of the two recent Henrichs cases is an example of how majority rule can 
shift understandings, meanings, interpretations, and attitudes towards a director who falls 
from being a member of the majority to outcast status on a regional board of directors. 
Robert J. Henrichs is a former director and chairman of CAC.  In 2005 Sheri Buretta was 
removed as chair in the middle of her one-year term and Henrichs was elected to head the 
nine-person board of directors of CAC.  Sherie Buretta, upset that she lost her job, 
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became involved in a campaign to get her job back.  An ad hoc shareholders committee 
was organized and hired “one of the country’s leading business and litigation law firms, 
with approximately 500 attorneys and offices throughout the U.S. and China.”  (Davis 
Wright Tremaine, LLP, http://www.dwt.com/) Six months later, following a successful 
proxy campaign, Buretta was again elected as chair and immediately appointed an 
investigations committee to look into the allegations she and her supporters had made.  
CAC also hired the ad hoc shareholders committee’s law firm, Davis Wright Tremaine, 
to investigate the allegations. Davis Wright Tremaine then represented CAC in a state 
case against Henrichs that went all the way to the Alaska Supreme Court.  The Supreme 
Court decided in CAC’s favor and affirmed the lower court’s ruling which found 
Henrichs had violated his fiduciary duty as a director and banned him from service on the 
board for five years. (Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corporation, 2011)  
Henrichs’ legal bill was about $50,000.  CAC's Davis Wright Tremaine legal cost 
and expenses were not disclosed.  Henrichs’ lawyer practiced law from a one-person law 
office in southeast Alaska.  In addition to the rumored $1 million cost of litigation against 
Henrichs there were other undisclosed costs, such as the legal expenses for the ad hoc 
shareholders’ committee that solicited proxies for chair who was removed.  As was said, 
he who controls the purse strings controls.  After the removed chair’s reelection, the 
board immediately voted to reimburse the expenses of the ad hoc committee which was, 
in most parts, composed of themselves. 
In the other case (Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corporation, No. S-12878, August 
26, 2011) the relevant facts are simple and pure politics couched in terms of legalese and 
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corporate law based on legal interpretations more applicable to publicly-traded 
corporations.  Henrichs, a minority member of the Board, was denied a place on the 
management ballot and so was left to run as an independent candidate as were two other 
shareholders who were former directions, one of whom was also a former chair.  He 
requested a shareholders’ list of names and addresses and when he did not receive the 
mailing list he filed suit in Alaska Superior Court on September 1, 2011.  On September 
7, 2011 CAC emailed Henrichs the mailing list and on September 9, 2011 CAC sent out 
its proxy.  Since time is of the essence in order for shareholders to have a chance to win 
the early bird prize by getting their proxy in, who first sends out her/his proxy is in a 
better position to get the proxy vote.  Since CAC was first with the mail out and Henrichs 
had yet to label his proxies and envelopes, he was at a disadvantage. (Henrichs, 2011)   
The Alaska Supreme Court also ruled in CAC’s favor by affirming the lower 
court’s decision that the regional corporation had no legal obligation to fulfill Henrichs’ 
request for telephone numbers and email addresses (Henrichs, 2011)     
CAC uses phone numbers and email addresses to solicit proxies.  There were 
other issues in the case. 
Heinrichs used his own funds to file and appeal the lawsuit.  His lawyer, as in the 
above stated case, is from southeast Alaska.  CAC’s law firm has offices in Oregon, 
Washington, Anchorage, and other parts of the country. Among the firm’s specialties is 
Native American law and minority contracting such as SBA 8(a) contracting.   
The Heinrichs’ cases highlight corporate statutes and regulations versus 
fundamental democratic principles.  The Alaska Supreme Court favored Alaska statutes 
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and regulations and corporate bylaws.  The Alaska Supreme Court citied Heinrich’s 
argument that “Chugach violated fundamental democratic principles established by 
public election cases and rules of equity that promote fair shareholders’ meetings.  But 
we conclude that we should refer to the Alaska statutes and regulations, and corporate 
bylaws that more directly relate to the questions raised on appeal.”  (Henrichs, 2011)  
There are other cases involving regional corporations and dissident shareholders 
or directors.  Often the majority on the Board of Directors uses the law firms to 
neutralize, intimidate or punish independent voices on the boards.  And, as in the 
Heinrichs cases, the court’s interpretations of applicable law are based on precedent and 
case law of issues involving publically -traded corporations.  This situation is changing; 
however, as each Alaska Native corporation’s successful lawsuit against a dissident 
shareholder becomes part of a foundation of case law and precedent that favor the 
ANCSA corporations. 
If an ANCSA shareholder is to have the right of dissent, the law and the 
application of the law has to change.  For example, the law is now used to deny 
shareholders access to information that could level the playing field in election of 
directors.  In Heinrichs the majority on the Board used their control of the Board to deny 
him a place on the ballot and then used the statutes and regulations to delay giving him 
the shareholders mailing list which gave the Corporation an advantage. 
The Heinrichs case is a classic one and clearly demonstrates, when taken to 
extremes, shareholders are the losers when their corporate money is used to pay legal 
costs of shareholders who are directors who own roughly the same number of shares as 
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everybody else.  Many of the rules, procedures, laws, and legal precedents were adopted 
from publicly-traded companies and when land claims were filed, they were not under 
consideration and in no case were they understood by the Alaska Natives living in rural 
Alaska. 
How much information goes to the shareholders and how much is needed in order 
for shareholders to make informed decisions on who to vote for is left to be decided by 
the boards of directors. 
The superimposition of the mores and values of publicly-traded corporations over 
the privately-held ANCSA corporations have become the foundations on which poor 
corporate behavior of Alaska Native corporations is justified to the detriment of 
shareholders who were all created as equal shareholders by the U.S. Congress. 
Alaska’s federal representatives have to be careful not to offend the regional 
corporations especially in light of the 2010 Citizens United U.S. Supreme Court ruling 
which held that the First Amendment applies to corporations and labor unions.  This 
means that corporations can give unlimited amount of money to political candidates. 
In a U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) December 12, 2012 report on 
regional Alaska Native corporations, the GAO made no recommendations but in its 
findings it stated the oversight was limited.   
Alaska Native corporations are subject to some financial reporting 
requirements under federal and state law, but oversight of the reporting is 
limited.  The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act generally exempts the 
corporations from complying with federal securities laws while requiring 
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them to annually provide a report to their shareholders that contains 
‘substantially all of the information’ required to be included in an annual 
report to shareholders by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
registrants.  The Settlement Act does not provide for a federal role to 
monitor the corporations’ compliance with this requirement, and oversight 
by the state of Alaska is generally limited to enforcement of state 
securities laws and proxy regulations.  (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2012, p. 29)   
In rural Alaska there is an absence of investigative journalism as it is commonly 
understood.  The rural Alaska’s advertising base is not large enough to generate the 
revenues to hire the skilled reporting teams necessary for investigative journalists to 
uncover the stories and truth behind rumors of corruption and wrong doing.  Story leads 
are not followed through.  For example stories on government defense contracting were 
not reported by the Alaska press organizations but by major dailies in Washington, D.C. 
and in Los Angeles.  The stories on the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Program 
created significant interest in the U.S. Senate. The subcommittee on contracting oversight 
held hearings that culminated in changes to the minority program.  Alaska media then 
reported the stories by using the wire service. 
Government sanctions may not be reported in corporate management newsletters, 
often the only source of information shareholders have about their corporations.  
Newsletters are a public relations tool and information can be spun to put any infractions 
in best light. 
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There are many subsidiaries and joint ventures, many of them under names that 
would not draw attention to the fact that they are owned by ANCSA corporations or other 
subsidiaries.  The overlapping business interests make it challenging to connect the dots 
and follow the trail of money. 
As management newsletters are the only source of information for many of the 
shareholders and with the trend of original ANCSA shares migrating to Lower 48 states, 
even if the Alaska press were to report on allegations of corruption, wrong doing, and 
ethical lapses, it is unlikely that shareholders widely dispersed throughout the United 
States would be aware of what is happening.  It is well to keep in mind that newsletters 
are not journalism.  Newsletters are simply management’s tools to get their sides of the 
information out to the shareholders.  Media outlets, on the other hand, at least strive to be 
objective and balanced by reporting both sides, or multiple sides of a story as objectively 
as possible – at least that is the goal. 
The lack of public and independent monitoring of ANCSA corporations creates 
opportunities for unscrupulous managers to siphon off financial benefits for themselves 
rather than going to the bottom lines of the holding companies and then to the 
shareholders in the form of dividends. 
Since the ANCSA corporations were congressionally created, arguably Congress 
can step in and establish a framework to protect shareholders’ rights. What could be 
created by congressional action could be similar to the Indian Gaming Commission 
which arose because of the concerns expressed by states that organized crime would 
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infiltrate the casinos (particularly where Indian reservations were near major cities). 
(Public Law 100-497-Oct. 17, 1988 100th Congress Sec. 2701)   
The difficulty of getting government monitoring established must not be 
overlooked.  The regional corporations and many of the village corporations have 
become skilled and sophisticated lobbyists and know very well their way around state 
and federal legislative offices.  This sophistication of political ways was seen in the 2008 
write-in election of U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski.  Had it not been for the ANCSA 
corporations it is entirely likely that another person would be Alaska’s Senator. 
How well an ANCSA corporation works and operates in the state and federal 
political environment has tangible benefits such as the U.S. Small Business 
Administration’s 8(a) Program.  Other benefits include the sale of net operating losses 
and the trading of uneconomical lands with the federal government for more valuable 
lands; such is the case in Southeast Alaska. 
The need for monitoring is huge.  The ANCSA corporations hold billion dollar 
contracts with the Department of Defense.  The total since the U.S. Small Business 
Administration’s 8(a) Program was expanded to include Alaska Native corporations is 
estimated to be billions.  Between 2000 and 2008, sole-source contracts to Alaska Native 
corporations were $6.6 billion ($23.7 billion in total 8(a) contracts).  The Senate 
committee that has oversight responsibilities also estimated that there are approximately 
45,000 employees of the Alaska Native Corporations, 95% of whom are not shareholders 
of ANCSA corporations.  (United States Senate, 2009, p 3)  
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 The Alaska Native corporations have been publically criticized for the lack of or 
meager numbers of shareholders, descendents of shareholders, or other Alaska Natives 
employed in the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Program ventures.  When the 
Alaska Native corporations are on the defensive, as has been the case, the other side of 
the story is not reported in the management newsletters.  When it is reported elsewhere it 
only spurs an emotional reaction that the government is messing with the Alaska Natives 
– again. 
 Congressional action is needed in the form of monitoring devices and authorities 
to protect not only public interests but the shareholders interests from the business 
ventures that are often out of sight – way out of sight – such as embassies or military 
installations in Asia and Europe. Any such effort to create monitoring devices will be 
strongly opposed by the regional corporations not only with the Alaska delegation, but in 
other states with their congressional representatives. 
 Perhaps the most important assumption of the moral duty to advance and protect 
the new generations of shareholders who either own original shares or hold life estate 
shares is education.  As a shareholder dies, the inheritor of that share or those shares must 
be told what his or her rights, duties, privileges, and responsibilities are as a shareholder 
in a Alaska Native corporation.  Rarely is this done.  Once a will is opened after the death 
of the shareholder, the new shareholder receives notice that he/she is now a shareholder.  
The shareholder then starts to receive the management’s newsletter which is followed by 
the annual report and the newsletters. 
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 Management tactics and legal tools are expensive and rarely do shareholders have 
the financial means, stamina, endurance, and focus to fight them and continue to press on 
like Heinrichs.  His cases are not rare and he alone bore the entire costs and expenses of 
litigation.  The most effective weapon to use against a dissident shareholder is to 
overwhelm him or her with paper such as claims, counterclaims, interrogatories, 
depositions, and requests for information.  Dissident shareholders rarely have the 
resources to travel to distant places where management holds informational meetings and 
even if they do, are rarely invited to speak or to present other points of view. 
 The shareholders’ playing field must be level.  Since the ANCSA corporations are 
privately held companies and all Alaska Natives alive on December 18, 1971 were 
created as equal shareholders, the practices of publically traded corporations should not 
be used to suppress corporate democracy. 
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Chapter 6 
Prelude 
 The wind blew from the southwest, driving the temperature down on a cold 
February afternoon, 2076.  The sharp gusts mattered little as Robert huddled close to his 
aging snow machine used as a windbreaker to keep the drifting snow from covering his 
fishing hole in the ice where the river meets the sea.  He looked beyond the wretched 
smatterings of government financed low-income homes cluttered together towards the 
Bering Sea, protein breadbasket of the world’s upper middle class.  Looking down at his 
catch of the day, five tom cod in two hours, not bad he says to himself, though it is 
definitely not as good as the elders tell him it used to be. 
 Turning around, Robert looks two miles in the distance at the multi-story 
dormitories used to house the mine’s 2,500 workers who fly in for two-week stints.  The 
dorms sit in the middle of a spacious complex of small shops, movie theaters, gym, and 
even a couple of franchises that sell hamburgers, milkshakes, and fries.  The mine treats 
its workers well and has everything in the camp to remind them they are not in the 
treeless tundra on the edge of nowhere.  The workers make an average of $125,000 a 
year for their skills.  Robert is now the tribal administrator and he earns $55,000. 
 The mine sits on land the village corporation used to own.  According to the 1970 
U.S. census, there were 200 people living in the village; 195 were Yupik Eskimos and the 
other five were non-Alaska Natives - three schoolteachers, a missionary and a merchant.  
Three of the five spoke Yupik and were married to local women.  Two of the 
schoolteachers were a married couple and were in their mid-20s.  They graduated from a 
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teachers college in southwest Texas and when they attended community social events they 
appeared unhappy.  None of the elders expected the couple to remain in the village; in 
fact, the betting was that they would be on the first plane leaving the village on the last 
day of school.  It had happened so many times over the decades that it was almost a 
custom for teachers. It was not always the fault of new school teachers or any newcomer 
unfamiliar with life in a village. 
 For someone new it was like trying to pierce a gapping social hole of intolerance.  
Like in many small communities around the world there was a tendency not to trust 
outsiders which was anyone who was not related to someone in the village.  Villagers 
were slow to accept anyone not familiar with local customs or traditions.  Whenever a 
new teacher arrived to teach at the small elementary school and high school there was a 
suspicion-like attitude that some described as intolerance.  It was a difficult adjustment 
especially for newly-graduated teachers from Outside colleges.  It was also sometimes 
difficult for government workers and even regional corporation employees to interact 
with the villagers. 
 In the hundred years since ANCSA, all of the original shareholders have died.  
The shares of stock are now dispersed all over the country, all over the world, and only a 
few of the Alaska Natives in Robert’s village have shares.  He used to consider himself 
lucky.  He has two shares in the village corporation and two in the regional corporation 
(Robert may inherit a couple more shares since his unmarried great-great uncle told him 
Robert is in his will.).  At least, Robert thought, he could go to the shareholders’ meeting, 
 
 
 
175 
which are closed to all non-shareholders, and speak - well, address the issue on the 
agenda for up to three minutes.  
 Robert attended the mid-October 2075 regional corporation's annual 
shareholders’ meeting in Chicago.  While there, Robert and Tom (now living in New York 
City) introduced their wives and children to each other.  Both have two children.  The 
families had a most enjoyable time over lunch and then again over dinner, though none 
of the family members could go onto the floor of the shareholders’ meeting. 
 On the way back to Alaska, Robert attended the village corporation’s annual 
shareholders’ meeting in Portland, Oregon.  Robert and his wife, also Yupik, met many 
aging third and fourth cousins.  Few, if any, had more than one-sixteenth Yupik blood 
and none had ever been to the village except for Tom who made a yearly day trip to meet 
with the mine’s closest neighbors. 
 Robert is one of the few locals with a college degree.  He is well-liked and well-
respected by almost everyone in the sub-region.  He is also well-known throughout 
Native Alaska, mostly because of the several gold medals he won at the World Eskimo-
Indian Olympics. 
 During the Chicago meeting Robert could not help but think of the comparisons 
that his college professor in 2071 had made with the Oklahoma Indian Territory and 
ANCSA.  The state of Oklahoma came into the union with the merger of the Oklahoma 
Territory and the Indian Territory in 1907 and both territories ceased to exist.  Under 
ANCSA, the use of the corporate system westernized and caused loss of traditional lands 
and resources.  In both cases, as in all situations, the Native Americans were the losers.  
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Robert wished he had paid closer attention to the ancient professor.  Maybe he would 
have more knowledge of potential solutions to two centuries of alienation from the time 
the United States purchased Alaska, to ANCSA, to this cold February day.  Two hundred 
and nine years and still Alaska’s Natives are faced with daunting challenges of 
employment, education, domestic violence and prejudice. 
 Though there are many thoughts colliding in Robert’s mind as he surveys the 
landscape there is one inescapable question, why is it that so many non-Alaska Natives 
have benefitted from this Alaska Native land and so few Alaska Natives? 
 A year ago Robert was in the same place at almost the same time and deep down 
he was thinking about the same thing.   
 During the past four years as a tribal employee, Robert had become frustrated 
with the seeming lack of progress in the general condition of the tribal membership.  
There are more children, more adults, and the same amount of program money for more 
tribal members.  The village has not grown but as adults slowly drift away children who 
become adults replace them.   
 When Robert arrived home after getting a four-year degree from the University of 
Alaska, he was full of hope and enthusiasm.  He convinced the council that what the tribe 
needed to do was to open the gates of opportunities that existed just two hills over on 
what used to be the surface estate of the ANCSA village corporation.   
 Robert received a great deal of encouragement from his friend Tom, a fellow 
shareholder, but a non-Alaska Native and an owner of 100 inherited original shares.  
Tom regularly attended the meetings of the regional corporation’s subsidiary that owned 
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and operated the mine.  As a senior advisor to the regional corporation’s chair, Tom 
surely could help; after all Tom's primary area of expertise was in shareholder-hire.   
 Tom and Robert worked well together.  They developed a list of 25 eligible local 
adults who were unemployed and expressed an eagerness to work at the mine.  Tom 
prepared to make a presentation to the chairman of the board.  With over 2,500 workers 
and an annual turnover rate of 10%, Tom and Robert thought it would be easy to fill 25 
jobs with local Alaska Natives. 
 The corporation that owns the subsidiary corporation that operates the mine has 
a policy of non-interference in the day-to-day management of operations which are run 
from the subsidiary’s main office in Vancouver, B.C.  Translated down the management 
chain, that means the local production and operating managers have ultimate say over 
who operates the heavy equipment, cooks the meals, cleans the dorm rooms, does the 
bookkeeping, expedites the supplies from the airport to office, etcetera.  All of the hiring 
bosses are long term employees and most are from the western states.  All of the workers 
that they supervise are from the home areas of the local bosses.  They have strong 
feelings about following the hiring rules and processes. 
 Robert and Tom scrutinized the list of unemployed 25 locals.  Ten did not have 
driving licenses, a requirement that could not be waived.  Eight did not have a minimum 
of two years’ experience, two had criminal records (fishing without a license), seven 
lacked a high school diploma or a GED, and three had documented encounters with mine 
workers over allegations such as bringing alcohol to the village, a dry community.  To 
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complicate matters, none of the 25 local residents were members of the International 
Union of Resource Workers, Local 85, with the main office in Tulsa, Oklahoma.   
  In a telephone conference call, Tom, from his 27th floor corner office in New 
York City, urged Robert not to proceed with the presentation until at least a majority of 
the 25 villagers could become eligible to be on the list of prospective employees.  Tom 
was unsuccessful in persuading Robert not to present all 25 applications to the mine’s 
part-time personnel office two miles away.  Six months later all 25 local residents were 
deemed not eligible for hire.  That was when Robert decided to run for the regional 
corporation board of directors and the village corporation board of directors.  Again, 
Tom tried to dissuade Robert but to no avail, Robert persisted. 
 The tribal council, Robert’s employer, gave him the go ahead to proceed with a 
run for both boards of directors.  The council did not expect much but, at least it would 
be a reminder to the regional and village corporations that they were created out of 
ANCSA. 
 The scheduling and timing was perfect for a family vacation and attending the 
annual meetings of shareholders in places he had never visited - Chicago and Portland.  
Robert's wife was excited!  Neither she or Robert had been out of the village for two 
years - plane fare was expensive, even to fly to Bethel. 
 Behind the scenes, Tom coached Robert on his bid for the regional board of 
directors.  Tom could not risk losing his job - he was making well over $400,000 a year, 
plus bonuses.  One of Tom's Harvard Business School classmates was contacted and he 
agreed to help with the campaign, pro bono. 
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 Robert downloaded the candidate’s forms and Tom contacted 20 of the 25 people 
needed for the petition form.  All candidates for the regional board were required to 
submit a petition of candidacy signed by 25 shareholders attesting to the candidate’s 
good behavior.  Robert found the other five shareholders, and with glee Robert submitted 
his declaration of candidacy along with the petition. 
 A tug at Robert’s tomcod line brought Robert back to the village on the delta.  He 
smiled and after bringing the fish out of the ice hole, he watched as its withering slowed 
as it quickly froze.  As the cod finally stiffened to move no more, Robert’s fresh memories 
of ANCSA corporations’ politics saddened him.  He was a shareholder, a Alaska Native 
shareholder, and a resident of a Alaska Native village whose corporation once owned the 
land on which the mine’s infrastructure sat.  Yet, with all of that, the board’s nomination 
committee declared him as unqualified to have his name on the regional corporation’s 
ballot.  To further darken Robert’s mood, the village corporation’s nomination committee 
also came to the same conclusion. 
 After the Chicago shareholders’ meeting, Tom listened to Robert as he poured out 
his frustrations and anger.  Tom could offer no advice and little comfort.  Robert asked 
about equality and democracy - corporate democracy?  Didn’t ANCSA create us all as 
equals, equal shareholders with the same rights of participation as shareholders - access 
to the same information; wasn’t this suppose to be a level playing field where one 
shareholder is no more equal and no less equal than all shareholders?  Tom listened and 
finally said there is no such thing as corporate democracy.  It does not exist now and it 
never did exist.  Corporate democracy was an idea, though unexpressed and unwritten.  
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It was an idea that died in the winter of 1972 when the Alaska Natives on the boards of 
directors adopted the rules and procedures that the lawyers of publicly-traded 
corporation knew so well. 
Conclusion 
 ANCSA continues to evolve into a body of law that is unique in its application to 
aboriginal peoples as attorneys’ wordsmith interpretations and precedent to fit the best 
interests of their clients, the regional corporations.  If the intent of the Alaska Native 
leadership was to maintain a democratic system of land and natural resources ownership 
and use by the Alaska Natives they represented, as it was commonly understood and 
traditionally practiced in villages throughout Alaska, today the governance of the regional 
corporations frustrates that intent by the political use of rules, procedures and practices of 
publically-traded corporations.   
 In an Alaska Law Review on bankruptcy in 1986, the authors conceptualized the 
issues at stake.   
Business corporations were originally conceived as vehicles for voluntary 
investment of risk capital.  Failure of the venture was foreseeable 
possibility from the outset and a risk assumed by the voluntary investor.  
Alaska Native corporations, on the other hand, were created by a political 
process.  Though the Alaska Native leadership testified at congressional 
hearings, participated in the drafting of many of ANCSA’s provisions, and 
approved the bill prior to its signing, the individual Alaska Native did not 
make an informed and voluntary choice to subject his or her ancestral land 
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claims to the risks of a laissez-faire economic system.  The original 
ANCSA may have left ambiguities about the role the corporations were to 
play and degree to which the corporations were charged with protecting 
the traditional way of life while creating a new one, but the Act clearly 
jeopardized the assets necessary for maintenance of the traditional lifestyle 
(that is the land) in the course of making it available for use as capital in 
the cash economy. (Black, Bundy, Christinson & Christinson, 1986)  
 The above law review article is a good example of the discussion of the 
corporation-type issues facing ANCSA corporations but there is very little discussion 
about the governance of the Alaska Native corporations.  One of the primary arguments 
favoring the corporate system seems to be that governance was left vague to the extent 
that the corporation system protected the shareholder from the liabilities of the 
corporation as well as the officers and managers.  But, how shareholders became 
presidents and chairs of boards is left unclear. 
 Another often quoted law review article was published in 1976 by the Duke 
University School of Law.   
Congress directed that the settlement be administered under state law, and 
defined the precise manner in which [Alaska] native funds and income 
from [Alaska] native property were to be allocated.  Within this statutory 
framework, though, the [Alaska] natives retain relatively unfettered 
control over their assets, and are free from Bureau of Indian Affairs 
supervision.  ANCSA thus reflects a new departure in government 
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dealings with Indians - a policy which places on the [Alaska] natives alone 
the crucial task of translating the immediate benefits of the settlement into 
permanent, socially and economically productive enterprises. (Lazarus Jr. 
& West Jr., 1976, p. 184)    
 An assumption can easily be made that Congress intended the ANCSA 
corporations be governed in a manner similar to that of publically traded corporations.  It 
can also be the case that Congress intended that the Alaska Native shareholders define the 
question of governance, although the legislation is clear when it states that the 
corporations will be incorporated pursuant to Alaska law. 
 A reasonable argument is Congress left governance of the ANCSA corporations 
vague so that the leadership of the corporations and the shareholders would define 
governance. This is in keeping with the intent of the people most impacted by the 
Settlement Act - the rural Alaska Natives - and since the Settlement Act is still in an 
experimental stage, how Alaska Native corporations are to be governed remains to be 
fully defined. 
 In the first election of a regional board of directors, Calista Corporation, the 
interim officers were struggling to come up with a definition of what an elected director 
was exactly.  Fred Notti and Gilbert Hendrickson,  
…. in explaining that there was no political tradition among the Eskimos along 
the Bering Sea before the white man came, tried to find a word in the Yupik 
Eskimo tongue that meant ‘elected officer.’ Mr. Beans suggested that ‘atanah’ 
might be such a word but after discussion they agreed that it was not.  ‘It doesn't 
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translate,’ said Mr. Hendrickson.  ‘It could mean ‘respected elder’ or ‘adviser’ or 
‘leader.’  Or it could even mean ‘God.’ (Turner, 1972)   
 Thousands of Alaska Native shareholders have died since 1971 and thousands 
more have inherited their shares, many who are non-Alaska Natives living all across the 
country and world.  But there will never be more than the original number of outstanding 
shares established by ANCSA based on the number of Alaska Natives alive on December 
18, 1971.  The number of original shareholders has been estimated between 55,000 to 
over 60,000.  Since the ANCSA corporations are privately held companies, the names 
and addresses of the shareholders are not available to the general public nor is access to 
the annual shareholders’ meetings. 
 There is little evidence that there is effective outreach by regional corporations to 
explain what shareholder status means to someone who has been gifted or inherited 
original shares.  There is a lack of understanding among many new shareholders who do 
not know the difference between shares of stock created by the corporations for those 
born after 1971, the so-called ‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives. There is a need for more 
outreach to explain to all shareholders the value of the subsurface estate that falls under 
7(i) of the Settlement Act. 
 Many of the ‘afterborn’ Alaska Native shareholders are often unaware that they 
cannot divest their shares through a Will since what they own is only for the duration of 
their lives.  Owners of original shares, however, can leave their shares of stock to anyone, 
Alaska Native or non-Alaska Native. 
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 Since all shareholders were created as equals by the Settlement Act, the most 
compelling need to fulfill by the boards of directors is to treat all shareholders as equals 
with equal access to vote and participate in the election of those who govern the ANCSA 
corporations.  This would entail modifying or curtailing the use of cumulative voting by 
the boards. 
 At the annual shareholders meetings, the boards have a responsibility and a duty 
to give each shareholder who wishes to speak an opportunity to speak but not in an 
abbreviated form such as by email, letter, or three minutes at the annual meeting.  All 
who wish to speak and to address their concerns, no matter on inconsequential or 
irrelevant should be listened to - with respect. 
 Since shareholders are all equal, all shareholders who wish to be candidates for 
the board must have the right to have their names listed on the ballot.  It is easier to run 
for Governor of Alaska or President of the United States than to run for the boards of 
most regional corporations.  Their platforms must be included in the management mail 
outs and the listing of candidates the majority of the boards wants to see win election 
must be prohibited either by statute or by corporate bylaws. 
 Probably the most powerful tool used by majorities on the boards is legal 
intimidation.  The corporations have successfully lobbied the State of Alaska’s regulatory 
authority to prohibit the use of false and misleading information in mail outs by 
candidates.  If there is corporate democracy as Congress is thought to have intended, then 
a liberal interpretation of ‘false and misleading’ must be allowed, particularly since the 
education attainment of most Alaska Native shareholders does not include knowledge of 
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the technicalities of corporate finance.  This also includes the application of the 
defamation interpretations to apply to corporate management as it applies to public 
officials and others in the public arena.  Most often what happens is that the legal 
definition of a board officer is the same of a private citizen.  Once a shareholder steps 
onto the corporate stage he should be considered in the same light as a public official.  It 
should be noted that a board officer can file a complaint against a shareholder for damage 
to reputation or profession that would not be allowed for a city council official, governor, 
legislator, or a dog catcher employed by a public entity. 
 In the interpretation of legal precedent applicable to publically traded 
corporations, it must be noted, in the promulgation of rules and procedures, that ANCSA 
corporations are not publically traded and a shareholder cannot sell or buy ANCSA 
shares.  Alaska’s Division of Banking and Securities superimposes, at the behest of the 
regional corporations, the rules of governance of publically traded companies which is an 
aberration of the intent of thousands of Alaska Natives who supported the passage of 
ANCSA. 
 Times have changed and so has how shareholders communicate with each other.  
Most of the regional corporations now use social media and emails to give and send 
information to shareholders.  While, under state proxy rules, any shareholder who decides 
to run for the board can legally obtain a shareholders’ list of mailing addresses, the email 
addresses are not required to be given to an independent candidate.  Thus, a candidate 
who is part of the board’s majority has instantaneous access to a shareholder while an 
independent candidate does not and has to use the U.S. postal system. 
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Aftermath: Igniting a Revolution 
 After putting the kids to bed, Robert stares out the window watching the snow 
drift with the howling northwesterly.  He can see the bright lights of the mine reflecting 
off the hard packed snow on the treeless hills.  The trucks hauling ore from the open pit 
are impervious to the Arctic’s natural elements.  After years of production in plain view 
of the local residents, it still seems surreal and haunting.  He is deep in thought. 
 Tom of St. Louis and Robert of the tundra, through no fault of their own or effort 
on their parts, are shareholders of an Alaska Native regional corporation.  Tom has 100 
shares and Robert has two.  Both were born into the circumstances.  Robert is thinking of 
what he read while he was waiting for his toddling child in the village's dilapidated, 
honeybucket-in-the-shed pre-school teacher's lounge.  It was a poem in a tattered book of 
poetry.  The words reverberated in his mind.   
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveler, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth; 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence; 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I – 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference. (Frost, 1920, p. 1)    
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It was poem written over a hundred and fifty years ago by a guy named Robert Frost.  He 
could have been an Eskimo, Robert thought, chuckling to himself.  ‘I think it time,’ he 
tells his dog, ‘to take the less traveled road.’ 
 Tom is being driven home by his chauffer on the clogged super highway to his 
home in the suburbs. Tom tells his chauffer to take the long way.  Tom wants to chat with 
his friend in Alaska.  Each time he returns to the East coast, Tom returns with feelings of 
guilt of how some of the poorest citizens of the United States who are steeped in tradition 
and culture remain outside of the economic ladder of one of the most profitable mines in 
the world.  ‘They have a right to have voice in their own neighborhood just as he has in 
his neighborhood of five million dollar homes,’ he said talking to himself.  Taking the 
long way home will give him more time to talk to Robert on the audio/visual connection 
in his car. 
 Tom asks Robert. ‘Do you know what I am thinking?’ Smiling, Robert answers 
‘nope.’ Tom explains and it does not take Robert long to agree.  ‘Sooooo, Tom, we'll take 
the road less traveled,’ Robert said.  ‘Hah?’ Tom responds.  ‘What do you mean?’ Robert 
chuckling, answers, ‘Hey, you're the Harvard guy; everyone knows Robert Frost's poetry 
up here, don't you? 
 Over the next several months the two shareholders - one Alaska Native and the 
other a non-Alaska Native - developed a strategy of how to beat the odds; a strategy to 
ignite a revolution based on an experiment created on December 18, 1971.  It would be, 
Robert thought, a less traveled road that would make all the difference in reestablishing 
the ANCSA experiment and that it did not die during the winter of 1972-73. 
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 Robert and Tom recognized that it would be an uphill battle every step of the way.  
The privately held ANCSA corporations would use every tool available to fight any 
inclining of a long dormant concept - corporate democracy.  The corporations were well 
connected with the political leadership not only in Alaska but also in many of the states 
where they had long-standing minority contracts.  All of them had law firms that could 
easily overwhelm legal actions by dissident shareholders, most of whom did not have the 
financial resources to hire the very best in the legal profession.  The law firms also 
lobbied the Alaska Legislature and the administration if there was any attempt to create 
an ANCSA regulatory agency, one that had teeth.  But both shareholders agreed that it 
was worth the fight because it gave meaning to being a Alaska Native.  For Tom, it was 
personal.  Maybe it would be his life's work; a work that would give hope to the 
thousands of ‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives that they too were intended beneficiaries of 
ANCSA. 
 The first step was to create a method of communicating with ‘afterborn’ Alaska 
Natives by using the latest technology.  Both were aware that the corporations monitored 
the social networks but since they did not intend to do anything illegal, they would use 
the Internet anyway, but with caution.  They would focus on the 20,000 rural Alaska 
Natives living in the villages near the mines and urge them to support resolutions at the 
annual meetings of various Alaska Native organizations, usually held in Anchorage and 
Fairbanks in October.  They would be organized on the floor and would fight any 
attempts by the chairs to silence them, which often happened to dissidents who were not 
organized.   
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 The main resolution that they would seek to pass would be the re-introduction of 
the words ‘corporate democracy’ into the Alaska Native lexicon.  Other resolutions 
would address cumulative voting, strong administrative oversight of board elections, 
annual reporting, and allowing for open and fair debate among shareholders without 
fear of corporate complaints alleging false and misleading information.  Every 
shareholder would be allowed the opportunity to run for the board with his or her name 
on the ballot.  Management board slates would be prohibited.  Term limits would be 
placed on directors and compensation for officers and directors would be limited within 
reasonable guidelines.  The use of corporate funds in support of board-endorsed 
candidates would be prohibited. 
 The thorny issues of sharing of profits from subsurface resource development and 
land sales would be open for debate and amendment.  And, perhaps the most 
controversial, would be opening the shareholders’ rolls so ‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives 
would have the opportunity to own stock and share in the profits and opportunities for 
employment and a vote on the question of sale of ANCSA lands. 
 There were other items on the agenda but Robert and Tom concluded that the 
words ‘corporate democracy’ were powerful and would be emphasized at all gathering of 
Alaska Natives.  But they felt the revolution had to have a stronger message.  Finally, 
after several months of emails, teleconferencing and three face-to-face meetings in 
Seattle, they agreed to somehow merge their three ideas for the revolution's slogan:   
corporate democracy; the ANCSA experiment created all Alaska Natives as equal 
shareholders; and the experiment continues. 
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 After packing his bag for the next morning's flight to Bethel, connecting to 
Anchorage, Robert checks in on his family.  He looked at his sleeping wife who was so 
proud and so happy that he was working to give hope to the ‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives of 
rural Alaska.  Then, looking at his two children, it became clear why he was doing what 
he had to do. 
 Looking out the window Robert saw it was starting to snow, the first snow of 
October.  ‘Ah, a lucky sign,’ he said to himself.  He grabbed his coat and went out to 
walk his dog.  As he and Brownie walked, he thought of the poem by Robert Frost.  “Two 
roads diverged in a wood, and I-/I took the one less traveled by,/And that made all the 
difference.” (Frost, 1920, p. 1)     
 The yards of homes held all the trappings of subsistence - snow machines, 
outboard motors, boats, nets and drying caribou hides.  Yes, Robert thought, we are poor 
but we don't know it.  And, yes, he is going down a road definitely less traveled.  He's 
going up against the best and the brightest of the corporate elite.  He's going where few 
have gone before. 
 Walking into his house, Robert sees his laptop has the message light blinking.  He 
turns it on and sees it is from Tom, ‘Call me.’  Robert does and Tom’s face comes onto 
the screen, ‘Hey, I just wanted to wish you the best in Anchorage.  Sorry I can't be there.’  
Robert thanks him and tells that their revolutionary army, as Tom has come to call it, will 
have about 400 people on the floor at any given time during the three-day meeting.  Then 
Tom paused, and somewhat hesitantly said, ‘Robert, after we win this thing, I hope you 
don't become like me.  You have everything up there in Alaska; you have compassion in 
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your heart, a feel for the people, and they like you.  All I have is a market-driven 
corporation and that's not much to have.’  
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Acronyms  
AFN Alaska Federation of Natives 
AHTNA Not an acronym. It refers to Ahtna, Incorporated  
ANCSA Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 
ANF Alaska Native Foundation  
ANRC  Alaska Native Review Commission  
ASNA Arctic Slope Native Association 
BIA  Bureau of Indian Affairs 
CAC Chugach Alaska Corporation 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CIRI Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated   
CPA Certified Public Accountant 
FDR [President] Franklin Delano Roosevelt  
GAO U.S. General Accountability Office 
GED  General Equivalency Diploma 
IRA Indian Reorganization Act 
NANA Northwest Alaska Native Association   
NOLS Net Operation Losses  
NSB  North Slope Borough  
NWAB Northwest Arctic Borough  
P.L. Public Law 
SEC  Security and Exchange Commission  
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TCC Tanana Chiefs Conference  
UAF University of Alaska Fairbanks 
UAA University of Alaska Anchorage 
USA  United States of America 
U.S. United States 
Y-K Yukon-Kuskokwim  
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Definitions 
‘afterborn’ Alaska Natives born after December 18, 1971  
Black Gold Oil from Prudhoe Bay on the North Slope that flowed through the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline to Valdez, AK 
Honeybucket Name given to a 5 gallon bucket used as a toilet in rural Alaska homes. 
Settlement Act see ANCSA 
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Appendix A 
 
THE 12 REGIONAL CORPORATIONS 
 
  Stockholders Total 
 Number of residing in population Number of 
 Stockholders region within region village 
 (9-14-74) (8-28-74) (1970) corporations 
 
Ahtna, Inc. 1,092 495 1,332 8 
The Aleut 
Corporation 3,353 1,667 7,694 12 
Arctic Slope 
Regional Corporation 3,906 2,886 3,266 8 
Bering Straits 
Native Corporation 6,916 4,638 5,749 16 
Bristol Bay 
Native Corporation 5,517 3,596 4,995 29 
Calista Corporation 13,441 11,561 12,617 56 
Chugach Natives, Inc. 2,099 1,062 6,286 5 
Cook Inlet Region, Inc. 6,243 4,181 145,072 6 
Doyon, Limited 9,221 6,683 57,354 34 
Koniag, Inc. Regional 
Native Corporation 3,340 1,958 9,409 9 
NANA Regional 
Native Corporation 4,905 3,643 4,043 11 
Sealaska Corporation 16,493 9,529 42,565 9 
 Totals 76,526 51,899 300,382 203 
 
Sources: Enrollment data: enrollment Office, U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Anchorage, 
Alaska. Population: U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Population, 1970, 
Alaska 
 
Note: Figures subject to change upon formation of the 13th regional corporation. 
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Appendix B 
 
VILLAGE CORPORATIONS 
ELIGIBLE FOR LAND AND MONEY BENEFITS 
 
  enroll- 
village  ment regional 
name name of village corporation 9-14-74 corporation 
 
Afognak Natives of Afognak, Inc. 392 Koniag 
Akhiok  Natives of Akhiok, Inc.   100 Koniag 
Akiachak  Akiachak, Ltd.   332 Calista 
Akiak  Kokarmiut Corporation   211 Calista 
Akutan  Akutan Corporation  106 Aleut 
Alakanuk  Alakanuk  Native Corporation  467 Calista 
Alatna  Alatna  Endeavors, Inc.  30 Doyon 
Aleknagik  Aleknagik  Natives, Ltd.  231 Bristol Bay 
Allakaket Aala Kaa K'a, Inc.   147 Doyon 
Ambler  Ivisaapaagmiit  Corporation  166 NANA 
Anaktuvuk Pass   Nunamiut Corporation  132 Arctic Slope 
Andreafski  Nerklikmute Native Corporation 84  Calista 
Angoon   Kootznoowoo, Inc.  620 Sealaska 
Aniak  Aniak,  Ltd.  250 Calista 
Anvik  Central  Native Corporation 129 Doyon 
Atka  Atxam  Corporation 145 Aleut 
Atkasook Atkasook Corporation  71 Arctic Slope 
Atmautluak  Atmautluak, Ltd.  120 Calista 
Barrow  Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation 2041 Arctic Slope 
Beaver  Beaver Kwit' chin Corporation    190 Doyon 
Belkofski  Belkofski  Corporation 34 Aleut 
Bethel  Bethel  Native Corporation 1725 Calista 
Bettles  Field / 
Evansville Evansville, Inc. 77 Doyon  
Bill Moores Kongnikilnomiut Yuita Corp.  46  Calista  
Birch Creek Tihteet' Aii, Inc. 52 Doyon  
Brevig Mission  Brevig Mission Native Corp. 135 Bering Straits 
Buckland  Nunachiak Corporation  159 NANA 
Cantwell Cantwell Yedetena Na Corp. 72 Ahtna  
Chalkyitsik  Chalkyitsik Native Corporation 90  Doyon 
Chefornak Chefarnrmute, Inc.  162  Calista 
Chenega  Chenega Corporation  68  Calista 
Chevak  Chevak Company 423 Calista 
Chickaloon  Chickaloon-Moose Creek Native  
      Association, Inc. 42 Cook Inlet 
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Chignik  Far West, Inc.  286 Bristol Bay 
Chignik Lagoon  Chignik  Lagoon  Native Corp.  103 Bristol Bay 
Chignik Lake  Chignik  Lake Natives, Inc.  104 Bristol Bay 
Chistochina Cheesh-na, Inc.  32 Ahtna 
Chitina  Chitina  Native Corporation  237 Ahtna 
Chuathbaluk Chuathbaluk Company 114 Calista 
Chuloonawick Chuloonawick Corporation  27 Calista 
Circle  Danzhit  Hanlaii Corporation 104 Doyon 
Clark's Point Saguyak,  Inc. 111 Bristol Bay 
Copper Center Kluti-kaah Corporation 260 Ahtna 
Council Council  Native Corporation 72 Bering Straits 
Craig Shaan-Seet, Inc. 317 Sealaska 
Crooked  Creek Kipchaughpuk, Ltd. 127 Calista 
Deering Deering Ipnatchiak Corporation 159 NANA  
Dillingham Choggiung, Ltd. 925 Bristol Bay 
Dot Lake Dot  Lake Native Corporation 45 Doyon 
Eagle Hungwitchin Corporation 101 Doyon 
Eek lqfijouaq Company 200 Calista  
Egegik Becharof  Corporation 166 Bristol Bay 
Eklutna Eklutna, Inc. 126 Cook Inlet 
Ekuk Ekuk  Natives, Ltd. 39 Bristol Bay 
Ekwok Ekwok  Natives, Ltd. 113 Bristol Bay 
Emmonak Emmonak Corporation 478 Calista 
English Bay English Bay Corporation 71 Chugach 
Eyak Eyak Corporation 323 ChugachFalse 
Pass False Pass Corporation 66 Aleut 
Ft. Yukon Gwitchyaazhee Corporation 737 Doyon 
Gakona Gakona Corporation 35 Ahtna 
Galena Notaaghleedin, Ltd. 344 Doyon 
Georgetown Georgetown, Inc. 45 Calista 
Golovin  Golovin  Native Corporation 171  Bering Straits 
Goodnews Bay,  
Mumtrak Kiutsarak, Inc. 223 Calista 
Grayling Hee-yea-lingde Corporation 178 Doyon 
Gulkana Sta-keh  Corporation 106 Ahtna 
Hamilton Nunapiglluraq  Corporation 35 Calista 
Healy Lake Mendas Chax-aq  Native Corp. 27 Doyon 
Holy Cross Deloycheet, Inc. 429 Doyon 
Hoonah Huna Totem 868 Sealaska 
Hooper  Bay Sea Lion Corporation 623 Calista 
Hughes Hadohdleekaga, Inc. 96 Doyon 
Huslia Bin Googa, Inc. 217 Doyon 
Hydaburg Haida Corporation 570 Sealaska 
Inalik/Diomede Diomede  Native Corporation 104 Bering Straits 
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Igiugig Igiugig Native Corporation 37 Bristol Bay 
Iliamna Iliamna  Natives, Ltd. 75 Bristol Bay 
Ivanof Bay Bay View, Inc. 47 Bristol Bay 
Kaguyak Kaguyak, Inc. 48 Koniag 
Kake Kake Tribal Corporation 552 Sealaska 
Kaktovik Kaktovik  Inupiat Corporation 112 Arctic Slope 
Kaltag Takathlee-todin, Inc. 253 Doyon 
Karluk Karluk  Native Corporation 186 Koniag 
Kasaan Kavilco, Inc. 121 Sealaska 
Kasigluk Kasigluk, Inc. 309 Calista 
Kiana Katyaak Corporation 339 NANA 
King Cove The King Cove Corporation 343 Aleut 
King Island King Island Native Corporation 205 Bering Straits 
Kipnuk Kugkaktlik, Ltd. 359 Calista 
Kivalina Kivalina Sinuakmeut Corporation 191 NANA 
Klawock Klawock Heenya 507 Sealaska 
Knik Knikatnu, Inc. 29 Cook Inlet 
Kobuk Koovukmeut, Inc. 63 NANA 
Kokhanok Kokhanok Native Corporation 106 Bristol Bay 
Koliganek Koliganek,  Ltd. 131 Bristol Bay 
Kongiganak Qenirtalet Coast Corporation 248 Calista 
Kotlik Kotlik  Yupik Corporation 220 Calista 
Kotzebue Kikiktagruk Inupiat Corp. 1983 NANA 
Koyuk Koyuk  Native Corporation 188 Bering Straits 
Koyukuk Mineelghaadza', Ltd. 164 Doyon 
Kwethluk Kwethluk, Inc. 450 Calista 
Kwigillingok Kwik, Inc. 229 Calista 
Larsen Bay Nu-Nachk  Pit, Inc. 201 Koniag 
Levelock Levelock  Natives, Ltd. 100 Bristol Bay 
Lime Village Lime Village Company 26 Calista 
Lower Kalskag Lower Kalskag, Inc. 168 Calista 
Manley  
    Hot Springs  Bean Ridge Corporation 42 Doyon 
Manokotak Manokotak Natives, Ltd. 227 Bristol Bay 
Marshall/ 
    Fortuna Ledge Maserculiq, Inc. 214 Calista 
Mary's Igloo Mary's Igloo Native Corporation 109 Bering Straits 
McGrath Chamai, Inc. 176 Doyon 
Mekoryuk Nima Corporation 306 Calista 
Mentasta  Lake Mentasta, Inc. 97 Ahtna 
Minto Seth-de-ya-ah  Corporation 286 Doyon 
Mountain  Village Azachorok, Inc. 488 Calista 
Naknek Paug-vik Incorporated, Ltd. 293 Bristol Bay 
Napaimute Napaimute, Ltd. 43 Calista 
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Napakiak Napakiak  Corporation 260 Calista 
Napaskiak Napaskiak, Inc. 218 Calista 
Nelson Lagoon Nelson Lagoon Corporation 54 Aleut 
Nenana Toghetthele Corporation 452 Doyon 
New Stuyahok Stuyahok, Ltd. 229 Bristol Bay 
Newhalen Newhalen  Native Corporation 74 Bristol Bay 
Newtok Newtok  Corporation, Inc. 126 Calista 
Nightmute NGTA, Inc. 99 Calista 
Nikolai DonLee  Corporation 93 Doyon 
Nikolski Chaluka  Corporation 74 Aleut 
Ninilchik Ninilchik  Native Assoc., Inc. 203 Cook Inlet 
Noatak Noatak  Napaaktukmeut Corp. 281 NANA 
Nome Sitnasuak Native Corporation 2060 Bering Straits 
Nondalton Nondalton Native Corporation 253 Bristol Bay 
Noorvik Putoo Corporation 487 NANA 
Northway Northway Natives, Inc. 207 Doyon 
Nuiqsut Kuukpik Corporation 206 Arctic Slope 
Nulato Nik'aghun, Ltd. 388 Doyon 
Nunapitchuk Nunapitchuk, Ltd. 325 Calista 
Ohogamiut OHOG, Inc. 22 Calista 
Old Harbor Old Harbor  Native Corporation 335 Koniag 
Oscarville Oscarville Native Corporation 53 Calista 
Ouzinkie Ouzinkie  Native Corporation 333 Koniag 
Paimiut Paimiut Corporation 22 Calista 
Pedro Bay Pedro Bay Corporation 105 Bristol Bay 
Perryville Oceanside Corporation 130 Bristol Bay 
Pilot Point Pilot Point Native Corporation 146 Bristol Bay 
Pilot Station Pilot Station, Inc. 322 Calista 
Pitka's Point Pitka's Point Native Corporation 89 Calista 
Platinum ARVIG, Inc. 68 Calista 
Point Hope Tigara Corporation 500 Arctic Slope 
Point Lay Cully Corporation 88 Arctic Slope 
Port Graham Port Graham Corporation 190 Chugach 
Port Heiden Meshik, Inc. 70 Bristol Bay 
Port Lions Port Lions Native Corporation 112 Koniag 
Portage Creek Ohgsenakle Corporation 78 Bristol Bay 
Quinhagak Qanirtuug, Inc. 346 Calista 
Rampart Baan o yeel kon Corporation 175 Doyon 
Red Devil Red Devil, Inc. 35 Calista 
Ruby Dineega Corporation 288 Doyon 
Russian Mission 
     (Yukon)  Russian Mission Native Corp.  127 Calista 
St. George St. George Tanaq Corporation 215 Aleut 
St. Mary's St. Mary's Native Corporation 297 Calista 
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St. Michael St. Michael Native Corporation 256 Bering Straits 
St. Paul Tanadgusix Corporation 549 Aleut 
Sand Point Shumagin Corporation 402 Aleut 
Saxman Cape Fox Corporation 191 Sealaska 
Scammon Bay Askinuk Corporation 192 Calista 
Selawik Akuliuk, Inc. 477 NANA 
Seldovia Seldovia Native Assoc., Inc. 254 Cook Inlet 
Shageluk Zho-tse, Inc. 185 Doyon 
Shaktoolik Shaktoolik  Native Corporation 207 Bering Straits 
Sheldon's Point Swan Lake Corporation 131 Calista 
Shishmaref Shishmaref Native Corporation 310 Bering Straits 
Shungnak Isingnakmeut, Inc. 161 NANA 
Sleetmute Sleetmute,  Ltd. 164 Calista 
South Naknek Quinuyang, Ltd. 180 Bristol Bay 
Stebbins Stebbins Native Corporation 273 Bering Straits 
Stevens Village Dinyea Corporation 166 Doyon 
Stony River Stony River, Ltd. 82 Calista 
Takotna Gold Creek, Ltd. 38 Doyon 
Tanacross Tanacross, Inc. 167 Doyon 
Tanana Tozitna, Ltd. 595 Doyon 
Tatitlek Tatitlek Corporation 215 Chugach 
Tazlina Tazlina, Inc. 121 Ahtna  
Telida Seseui, Inc. 25 Doyon 
Teller Teller Native Corporation 272 Bering Straits 
Togiak Togiak Natives, Ltd. 400 Bristol Bay 
Toksook Bay Nunakauiak Yupik Corporation 280 Calista 
Tuluksak Tulkisarmute, Inc. 183 Calista 
Tuntutuliak Tuntutuliak Land, Ltd. 211 Calista 
Tununak Tununrmiut  Rinit Corporation 296 Calista 
Twin Hills Twin Hills Native Corporation 61 Bristol Bay 
Tyonek Tyonek Native Corporation 303 Cook Inlet 
Ugashik Ugashik Native Corporation 31 Bristol Bay 
Umkumuite Umkumuite, Ltd. 27 Calista 
Unalakleet Unalakleet Native Corporation 839 Bering Straits 
Unalaska Ounalashka Corporation 268 Aleut 
Unga Unga Corporation 58 Aleut 
Upper Kalskag Upper Kalskag, Inc. 159 Calista 
Wainwright Olgoonik Corporation 371 Arctic Slope 
Wales Wales Native Corporation 167 Bering Straits 
White Mountain White Mountain Native Corp. 202 Bering Straits 
Woody Island Leisnoi, Inc. 296 Koniag 
Yakutat Yak-tat Kwaan, Inc. 334 Sealaska 
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Appendix C 
 
VILLAGE CORPORATIONS WHICH CHOSE FORMER RESERVES 
 
  enroll- name of 
village  ment former 
name name of village corporation 9-14-74 reserve 
 
Arctic Village Neets'ai Corporation 147 Venetie 
Elim Elim Native Corporation 238 Elim 
Gambell Gambell Native Corporation 429 St. Lawrence 
       Island 
Klukwan Kiukwan Corporation 251 Klukwan 
Savoonga Savoonga Native Corporation 412 St. Lawrence 
       Island 
Tetlin Tetlin Native Corporation 125 Tetlin 
Venetie Venetie Indian Corporation 156 Venetie 
 
 

